

How Germane are Moral and Economic Policies to Ideology?

Evidence from Latin American Legislators

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Abstract

Many legislators do not have consistently progressive or conservative policy positions. How does the mix of issue positions relate to the manner in which the legislators' consider their placement on the left-right ideological scale? Analyzing data from the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) survey, this paper counterposes combinations of legislators' moral and economic policy positions with their self-located ideological score. Our results confirm the importance of economics, which is consistent with older studies, but we also find that moral issues are at least consistent with – and perhaps germane– to the left-right placement of many of the region's legislators. Among the findings are that the left is more heterogeneous, especially with respect to moral views, than is the right. We also show that many centrists are closeted conservatives, supporting the “ashamed right” thesis.

Key words

Parliamentary Elites, Latin America, Ideology, Moral Issues, Economic Issues.

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Introduction

How do policies connect to ideology? In Converse's (1964) classic study, ideology "constrains" perceptions of policies. The alternative reverses the direction of causality, such that ideology is a summary of policy positions. Regardless, Downs (1957) and more contemporary scholars (see, Zaller 1992) have explained that ideology aids voters by allowing them to intuit a politician's position on any issue. These and other scholars recognize that ideology also has a broader meaning tied to identity (Barber and Pope, 2019) but a remaining query persists: To what extent do different policies align with or deviate from the contours of ideology? Our version of this pivotal question is: Which issues are germane to ideology?

While these questions are frequently studied with reference to voters, they are particularly pertinent in legislative studies since legislators are specifically charged with making policy decisions and the nature of their positions makes them especially attuned to ideology and policy issues. Applying these concerns to legislative studies also has implications for representation, since details about how legislators combine policy and ideology is a significant part of the offer politicians or parties use to attract voters. Further, those relationships can drive markets, as shown in the link between electoral victories and the stock market (Girardi 2020). At the same time, our research reveals that politicians' preferences are not straightforwardly related to ideology, thus complicating if not invalidating the presumed information shortcut that ideology provides. Left or right-leaning governments may not consistently follow the expected ideological playbook. It is also useful to understand how these links vary across parties and countries, as a means for evaluating how voters evaluate their political choices. In sum, these types of factors justify our evaluation of 'the relation between legislators' ideological self-identification with their policy preferences.

Ideology is a nebulous or polysemic concept that is not necessarily tied to policy. In some conceptions, however, it does have clear relationships with policy positions, though the direction of causality is contested. In our approach to this issue, we conceptualize ideology as reflected through the left-right scale and then assess the degree to which legislators' views on moral and/or economic issues—which are arrayed from progressive to conservative—are germane to the scale. Historically, the use of "left" and "right" as ideological labels has roots in the period when the revolutionaries and monarchists sat on their respective sides in the French National Assembly. The definition of these terms reified somewhat after the Industrial Revolution, such that the "left" has continued to be associated with socialist, communist, or revolutionary ideals, while the "right" has focused on free markets, elitism, and conservative values. If ideology were a significant constraint on policy, or if ideology correctly summarized policy positions, then those aligning on each side of the left-right ideological scale would agree on a range of social and economic issues. Empirically, however, policy and ideological positions are frequently inconsistent; some politicians and parties who proclaim a leftist ideology take conservative positions on some issues (such as abortion), and there are self-identifying rightists who take more progressive positions (for example, on redistribution). When policies are inconsistent with ideology, we argue that they must not be "germane." These or other issues may still be salient politically, but we reserve the word "germane" for those issues that enter into the legislator's calculus of their position on the left-right scale. Because other issues or factors could drive

ideology, we cannot be sure if issues where the position is consistent with ideology are germane, but we can discard that issue as germane when the policy and ideological positions are inconsistent. For example, if a respondent identifies as a leftist and is progressive with respect to abortion, we cannot be sure that that policy position or some other factor drove the ideological position. If the same person were conservative on abortion, however, we could discard abortion as germane to that person's self-perceived leftism.

To study germaneness, we consider how different amalgams of policy positions affect a legislator's self-identified location on the left-right scale. Cases of inconsistent policy positions are common among parties and prominent politicians. In Mexico, for example, President Lopez Obrador and his party identify as leftists, but hold conservative positions on same sex marriage and abortion. Pachakutik, the indigenist party from Ecuador, presents a similar case and Bolivia's Evo Morales, whose opponents branded as socialist, considered abortion to be a crime.² A similar phenomenon occurs on the other side of the spectrum, where parties such as the Partido Liberal Progresista in Costa Rica, the Partido Colorado in Uruguay or Asociación Nacional Republicana of Paraguay, claim to be rightists but take progressive positions on some moral issues. Reflective of these parties and leaders, many legislators in our study proclaim support for socially conservative but progressive economic policies or the reverse. These contrasting policy and ideological positions provide evidence about which policies are (or are not) germane.

An extensive literature has confirmed the importance of multiple policy dimensions in European political parties (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; Rovny and Polk 2019), while parallel literature on Latin America has focused mostly one relevant dimension (Saiegh 2009; Power and Zucco 2009). Martínez-Gallardo et al. (2022) have found that while European parties are structured around economic and socio-cultural dimensions, Latin American party systems are less structured overall and combine the two dimensions. These differences between regions are not inherent to them, but rather a function of contextual characteristics. For example, voters' attention to the economic dimension has been proven to be affected by recession, volatility and underdevelopment (Singer 2011), all conditions more common in Latin America than in Europe. Despite this, moral issues have risen in political salience over the last two decades in Latin America, and thus perhaps they have come to play a more significant role in structuring party systems and legislators' views about ideology. These new issues should not necessarily have a similar effect on how all legislators think of their ideology. With respect to abortion, for example, rightists can hold tight to their traditional views (opposing abortion) without challenging their ideology, but leftists would have to change their traditional position on abortion in order to continue a progressive alignment. It is also possible that a leftist would continue to oppose abortion, but not see that stance as germane to their ideological position which was formed for other reasons. Since only the left requires a changed policy position to maintain ideological alignment, that side of the scale would likely embody more diversity in its ranks.

Our paper uses the concept of germaneness to empirically evaluate how and to what extent economic and moral issues influence Latin American legislators' left-right ideological identities. We focus on the combination of issue baskets, and thus are able to evaluate, for

² Infobae, 20 Jul, 2013: "Evo Morales dice que el aborto es un delito."

example, whether a legislator who is progressive on economics but middling or conservative on moral issues will claim a leftist, centrist, or rightist position. Once answering the empirical questions, we want to understand the patterns theoretically. Empirically, our work contributes to and extends prior research in several ways. Benoit and Laver (2006) used expert surveys to assess the relative importance of economic and social policy positions in determining parties' left-right positions, revealing significant cross-country variations in the substantive meanings of left and right. We adopt the idea of variable ties to the ideological scale but employ individual-level data to further specify these connections. We use the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America (PELA) to gauge legislators' attitudes, which aligns with the approaches of (Zechmeister 2010) , Saiegh (2009), and Rosas (2005). These scholars acknowledge that legislators have a more direct influence on policy outcomes than voters and lawmakers should therefore exhibit heightened awareness of both policy and ideological stances. Our study follows their lead, but provides updated data, affording a focus on issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage that have gained salience since previous studies were conducted. We also diverge from earlier analyses by emphasizing how legislators respond to potentially conflicting positions on moral and economic issues. We employ a substantially larger dataset and modern statistical techniques to enhance the precision of our assessments. While Zechmeister and Rosas primarily sought to delineate dimensions of inter-party competition, our emphasis centers on defining the relationship between policy and individual legislators' positions on the left-right scale.

Our cross-sectional analysis demonstrates that the left encompasses more diversity in opinions, and that many who hold rightist policy positions self-identify as centrists. This supports the “ashamed right” hypothesis, and largely discounts the idea that there is a leftist parallel. Our empirical analysis also implies that moral issues (we focus on abortion and same sex marriage) do impact legislators’ ideological self positioning, in spite of previous studies that find that economics drives ideology in the region. In recognition that issues do not exist in a vacuum, our analysis emphasizes the mix of policy positions held by legislators. In so doing we are able to gauge germaneness, because not all legislators of the left hold consistently progressive policy positions, nor do all rightists take conservative positions on both moral and economic issues. Concomitantly, we evaluate whether a centrist ideological position reflects middling policy positions, or a mix of progressive and conservative views. That part of the analysis also points to legislators who obfuscate by indicating centrism in spite of more extreme policy views.

Policy Positions, Germaneness, and Ideological Self-Identification

This paper evaluates the relation between legislators’ views on different policy issues to their self-placement on the left-right ideology scale. It would be facile and incorrect, however, to suggest that policy is the only component of ideology generally, or that scale in particular. In searching for a definition, both traditional (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Stimson 1975) and recent literature (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017; Barber and Pope 2019; Holcombe 2023) theorize ideology as a foundational belief system that may, but does not necessarily “constrain” (Converse 1964), views about policy. Focusing on Trump supporters, Barber and Pope (2019) find that

respondents' self-labeled ideology is often at odds with their expressed policy positions, as a result of the cues given by a party leader, an argument that is made in a more general fashion by Holcombe (2023).

Policies are also not at the forefront of definitions of ideology as a deep-seated social identity based around affective connections to social groups or political actors (Mason 2018; Zechmeister 2006; 2010). As an example, at least since the Cold War, "left" in Latin America and elsewhere has implied anti-Americanism or anti-imperialism, as much as an explicit support for socialist economic policies (Chiozza 2009; Azpuru and Boniface 2015; Almonds and Samuels 2011).

A connection between the literature about ideology as a foundational belief system and social identity can be extrapolated from the work on party branding by Lupu (2013). In his theory, he focuses on the fact that social psychology has shown that group membership of individuals comes from individuals identifying with the prototype of a member of the social group. Lupu applies this to party identity and considers ideology as one of the characteristics by which this prototype is identified. Going back to the findings of (Barber and Pope 2019), an interpretation of them based on the party branding could be as follows: Respondents identify as Republicans, by using party leaders as a reference category. That is to say, they know they are Republicans because they are similar to party leaders, and the expressed ideological positioning of party leaders makes the respondents adjust their own positioning in order to remain able to identify as Republicans, regardless of their policy positions. A couple of caveats should be mentioned at this point: For Lupu, ideology is one of several possible characteristics by which parties brand, but it is not the only one. More importantly, it could also be the case that a party moving away from their brand on a relevant (germane) characteristic might weaken an individual's attachment to that brand.

In these conceptualizations of ideology, policy views are shaped by the larger framework. Marxism, liberalism, and Peronism, for example, provide lenses through which a political actor should take a position on government-run healthcare. Policy perspectives, thus, emanate from ideology. This view is consistent with several authors in the literature who see ideology as providing a shortcut for voters who want to understand a party or politician's issue position by simply knowing their ideology or partisanship (Downs 1957; Popkin 1991; Hinich and Munger 1992). Ideological frameworks, however, may not clarify a stance on all issues; does conservatism privilege individual rights or Church doctrine? What position will a Peronist take on nationalization of industry? As Rosas (2005) explains, issues can, but do not necessarily divide parties.

An alternative view of the relation is Downs's (1957) classic view that an individual's ideology is a summation of their policy views. For him, parties craft an ideology from policy positions, which they then provide to voters. From the individual's point of view, this understanding of the relationship, in which policy positions lead to ideology, has strong empirical support in the political psychology literature that finds a relationship between psychological traits and policy positions. In short, multiple studies have found that psychological attitudes regarding social change and equality determine the political preferences of people, including policy preferences (Jost 2009).

If ideology can be summarized as a point on the left-right scale, then each germane issue should contribute to that score. This implies that if all policies were equally relevant to ideology,

then left/right legislators would be progressive/conservative on every issue, regardless of theme. Downs recognizes that issues will not have the same weight in the calculus of overall ideology, an idea formalized by Hinich and Munger (1997) in their use of non-circular indifference curves to represent the relative importance of two different policies.

A different interpretation of the unequal policy weights is that ideological scales can mask many inconsistencies in policy preferences. Two legislators who claim a similar ideological score, for example, may disagree on same-sex marriage but agree on a redistributive tax policy. In this scenario, same-sex marriage must not be germane to how one or both of the legislators define their own ideology. Same sex marriage would also not be germane if the two legislators disagreed on their ideological positions and the tax policy, but had similar views about same-sex marriage.

While these two conceptualizations imply different directions of causality, both imply that some policies will be tightly linked to positions on the left-right scale while others will be less so. To operationalize this idea, we use the term “germaneness” to indicate the different weights that an individual puts on different issues in determining their left-right score. We then reserve the term “salience” to refer to the political relevance of a policy. As such, we presume that there is an imperfect correlation between a policy’s political relevance and implications of that policy for a legislator’s ideological identification. Here we only focus on the latter, evaluating legislators’ attitudes towards moral and economic issues along a progressive to conservative scale and testing the correlation of those attitudes to positions on the ideological scale. By implication, the tests measure germaneness.

While economic issues have traditionally been the policies which divided partisans and ideologues, across Latin America (and elsewhere), moral issues started gaining political salience a few decades ago. Concerns with gender equality, indigenous rights, abortion rights, and same-sex marriage have generated wide-scale protests as well as success in forcing legal and constitutional challenges in numerous countries. Furthermore, economic and moral issues have been found to correspond directly with the two main psychological attitude dimensions relevant for ideological identification (Jost 2009). Our study is dedicated to evaluating whether and how moral issues, in combination with attitudes about traditional economic issues, correlate with ideological identities, as measured through the left-right scale.

In order to theorize this relationship, we consider a policy position as not germane if it is inconsistent with the ideological identification of the legislator; progressive policy positions must be irrelevant to ideology for someone who self-identifies as a rightist, and vice-versa. If a policy position is consistent with ideology we cannot be sure that it is germane, as other factors, such as the role of the military in society, religion, or attitudes towards the United States, could determine the ideology. We highlight these ideas in Table 1, which shows the resulting ideological position for different mixes of policy baskets, assuming that the legislator holds relatively progressive or conservative (rather than middling) views on the two types of policy. The table indicates the relation between the mix of the two policy dimensions with the left-right ideological position, as mediated by the germaneness of the policies. In the northwest box (1), for example, both policy baskets are consistent with a leftist ideology, while the northeast (9) box indicates that neither policy would be germane for a legislator who professed progressive policy positions but identified with the right. Boxes 2, 3, 10 and 11, present cases in which one of the policy

positions is not germane. In Box 2, the legislator has morally progressive policy positions, economically conservative positions, and identifies as leftist. Since only the moral position is consistent with the ideology, economics cannot be germane.

Table 1: Issue Germaneness for Ideological Identification

POLICY POSITIONS			IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS		
Moral	Economic		Left	Center	Right
Progressive	Progressive	(MpEp)	1 Economics and morals consistent	5. Ashamed Left	9. Neither policy germane
Progressive	Conservative	(MpEc)	2. Economics not germane	6. Balanced germaneness	10. Morality not germane
Conservative	Progressive	(McEp)	3. Morality not germane	7. Balanced germaneness	11. Economics not germane
Conservative	Conservative	(McEc)	4. Neither policy germane	8. Ashamed right	12. Economics and morals consistent

The penultimate column presents cases where the legislator self-identifies as a centrist, in spite of policy views that suggest a left or right ideology. A first possibility is that a legislator holding opposing positions on two germane issues would accept a centrist ideology as an average of the two issue positions (Boxes 6 and 7). Another possibility is that legislators obfuscate, indicating a centrist position in spite of extreme views. For the right, this is reflective of the idea that legislators are “ashamed” to accept a far-right label owing to shadows of abusive historical authoritarian leaders (Power 2000; Rocha, Solano, and Medeiros 2021, 13; Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020; Power and Zucco 2009; Zechmeister 2010). Thus while some legislators who hold conservative policy views will proudly self-identify as a rightist, others will portray themselves as centrist (Box 8). In a similar manner, leftists also have some negative historical and contemporaneous role models plus Downisan incentives, which could lead strong progressives to also identify as centrists (Box 5). Both of these descriptions—centrism as an average or as obfuscation—presume that at least one of the issue baskets is germane, even if the policy positions are inconsistent with the ideological identification.

While this theoretical table suggests that either moral or economic issues might be germane, historical analyses found that economics were more salient – and thus potentially germane – for Latin America. Over the last two decades, however, many countries in the region have debated and extended same-sex marriage and abortion rights (Blofield 2006; Corrales 2022; González-Rostani and Morgenstern 2023) and thus morality also has the potential to affect left-right positions. These new issues, however, are unlikely to have equivalent impacts on the two ends of the political spectrum. Since Catholicism was nearly ubiquitous in the region, historically

religion was not a salient political divide. Leftism, then, was based on anti-imperialism, labor and the peasantry, and sometimes socialism or even revolutionary ideals, while rightism emphasized business-friendly policies and support of the elite. Religion and church positions on moral policies have become relevant divides, however, since more leftists than rightists have dropped their attachments. In our data about one-third of leftists attend church at least once per week, which is one half the rate of rightists. As such, the secular leftists should redefine their view of left-right ideology to take both religious views into account (as well as economics and other factors). Leftists who maintain ties to the Church, however, would not necessarily switch their policy positions and may not see moral issues as germane to their ideology. In other words, this group would privilege other factors (e.g. anti-imperialism or a favorable view of progressive economics) as defining leftism. If, however, those in this group come to see moral issues as germane, and they see that leftism implies an anti-Church position, they would be forced to rethink their own ideology, presumably moving themselves towards the right. Note that this is a case where policy would move ideology, rather than the reverse.

The rise of moral issues should affect the right in a somewhat different way. For them, conservative religious positions on moral issues, regardless of how germane they are to ideology, would be consistent with their rightist identification. But, what about those rightists who succumb to trends and take anti-Church positions? If they are among the ashamed right, they would not have to adjust, even if they do see moral policy positions as germane to ideology. Further, those who do not consider these policies as germane to ideology would see no need to adjust their right side location. Thus, the only rightists who would have to adjust their left-right position under this circumstance would be those who 1) formerly identified with a rightist ideology, 2) take a progressive position on morals, and 3) see moral positions as germane to ideology.

Our overall expectation is that moral issues will be more germane to rightists, simply because they have continued their ties to the Catholic church or evangelical movement. On the left, since many but not all consider themselves secular, it should not be surprising that some legislators hold conservative policy positions on moral issues. Further, leftists have traditionally identified as such in spite of acceptance of conservative interpretations of Christian doctrine, so the inconsistency of progressive economics and conservative morals is not new. For the right, however, religiosity continues to be an ideological marker. Thus, any policy that counters conservative religious positions would necessarily imply a less-than-staunch rightist position. Still, because of the ashamed-right thesis, not all who hold conservative economic and moral policy positions will identify as rightists. Conservative policy positions, thus, will be a necessary but insufficient explanation of rightism.

These propositions allow empirical testing. While we expect that a mix of progressive economics and conservative morals will not necessarily lead traditional leftists to leave their ideological home, those who hold more conservative economic positions plus progressive morals should be uncomfortable with a rightist identification and might therefore identify themselves as centrists. Thus, focusing on those legislators who hold contrasting conservative and progressive policy values, yields our main hypothesis:

While either moral or economic issues can be germane to leftists, both policy baskets will be germane to rightists. As a result, rightists will be conservative on both moral and economic policies, while some leftists will be progressive on just one policy area.

If this is correct, we should see that progressive moral positions will do a poor job in predicting whether legislators consider themselves leftist, though conservative morals will be a necessary condition for rightism. While we agree with previous scholars that economics is probably the primary consideration for determining ideology, the hypothesis still suggests that the correlation between the two variables will be stronger for the right than the left. We test this hypothesis on individual legislators, but there are clear implications for the cohesion of parties. If we define a party's ideology as the average of their legislators' positions, rightist parties would be cohesive on both economic and moral issues, but leftist party members would hold disparate positions, at least on moral issues.

While we will not present them as enumerated hypotheses, several other factors should determine how germane moral or economic issues will be for a legislator's ideological position. First, Inglehart's ideas about post-modernism would suggest that moral issues would take more precedence in countries that are more economically developed. Concomitantly, where the debate between capitalism and socialism still divides societies, it is less likely that moral policies will move ideological needles. For example, legislators who support or oppose governments whose identity is based on anti-imperialism will not likely move towards the center over moral issues. We thus expect that economic issues will take precedence in defining ideology in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, in comparison to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Third, since younger voters have been mobilized based on the recent emergence of social issues such as gender equality, gay rights, and abortion, we expect that younger legislators would also be more attuned to these issues. Similarly, newer parties – which are very common in the region – are likely to be composed of legislators concerned with newer issues. We thus expect increased germaneness of moral issues among younger legislators and younger parties.

A final variable in our model is time. This variable allows us to gain an initial perspective on whether the results exhibit any time-dependent patterns, but we do not attempt to study how germaneness of particular policies changes across time. The PELA dataset (and other surveys) only includes questions that have some salience, and thus we do not have information about abortion or same sex marriage before they rose to political importance. We thus focus on the cross-sectional analysis, rather than analyzing dynamic changes.

Research Design

Data and Measurement

To begin our investigation, we first present bivariate analyses of the data and then multivariate logistic regressions. These analyses rely on the PELA-USAL data (1994), a comprehensive survey of legislators' characteristics and policy positions that is collected after every legislative election. Surveys are a common tool in studying the policy preferences or ideological views of voters, and the PELA data allows us to extend those studies to legislators.

The PELA survey contains several variables that describe legislators' characteristics, including age, education, and religiosity. It also ascertains legislators' self-position on the ideological spectrum (1-10, with 10 being extreme right) and their policy positions on a range of issues. We harmonized the data from four waves of the survey covering legislative bodies in 17 Latin American countries dating between 2003 and 2022.³ Not all questions were asked in all countries or in all waves, but we have consistent data on over 5000 observations for many key questions (details about questions are in Appendix A).

For the purpose of this study, we are particularly interested in examining the relationship between legislators' self-identification on the left-right ideological scale and their views about moral and economic policy dimensions. To evaluate moral issues, the survey included a question about abortion in all waves and in all countries,⁴ and in later waves it added questions about same-sex marriage, drugs legalization, and tolerance toward immigrants. Here we focus on abortion and same-sex marriage, both of which are originally coded from 1 to 10, with 10 being the most progressive position. To operationalize the economic dimension, we consider questions that ask whether the respondent favors regulation of the economy by the state or the market, legislators' positions regarding pensions, and their views on employment protection. We choose to focus on the regulation question because in addition to its continual presence in the survey, a Pearson correlation test shows that economic regulation is more relevant to ideology than other economic positions. Still, for robustness, we do test other economic variables.

To classify legislators as to whether they have consistent policy views, as well as whether their policy positions are consistent with their stated left-right ideology, we cut the policy and ideology scores into three baskets. Left legislators are those who place themselves at three or below on the 10-point scale, rightists are eight and above, and centrists are the residual category. We consider progressive, middling, and conservative positions on the policy questions in a parallel manner, and then use the combinations as our main independent variables. This generates nine categorical variables, from progressive on Moral and Economic issues (MpEp) to conservative on both dimensions (McEc). The three categories simplify the coding and discussion but we do show in a robustness test that using continuous variables yields similar results.

Results


Bivariate Analysis

With separate graphs for abortion and same-sex marriage and using the regulation question to gauge economic preferences, Figure 1 fills in the earlier theoretical table by providing the percentage of left, centrist and right legislators for each possible combination of policy mixes. The data yield several conclusions about the germaneness of the policy baskets to ideology, the ashamed right, and our hypothesis about how the left and right differ with respect to the relation

³ The countries included are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

⁴ The abortion question for the Brazil survey did change, but our tests suggest that this did not significantly affect which types of legislators (i.e. religious or associated with right-wing parties) answered as a conservative or progressive.

of issues and ideology.⁵ Because of the similarity between both images, we will focus our description on the first.



*Note: Bar length shows percent of legislators in each category holding each mix of policy preferences. See N for each category in Appendix Tables B1a-B1b. The issue positions refer to moral (M), economic (E) and whether the position is progressive (p), middling (m), or conservative (c). The color red indicates far-left, green indicates center and blue indicates far-right.

Figure 1: Left and Right Legislators, by Policy Mix

First, with regards to germaneness, the images indicate that most legislators do have a policy basis for their ideological beliefs, and that while economics has a stronger impact, views on moral policies are also relevant. The correlation of policy and left-right ideology is evident from the two extremes in the graphs, which show that those who have consistently conservative policy preferences (McEc) are more likely to call themselves rightist than all the others, and about three-quarters of those who are consistently progressive (MpEp) self-identify as leftists. The inconsistent policy preferences provide more evidence about germaneness. Economics seems to have a stronger relation to the position on the left-right scale, since moving to a moderate position on regulation (Em) reduces the probability of being on either end of the ideological scale more than does a move to a middling view on abortion or same-sex marriage (Mm). For example, the data indicate that in comparison to MpEp, the probability of calling oneself a leftist drops 16 points for legislators whose preferences are MmEp, but 32 points when moving to MpEm. The changes are in a similar direction for the right, and again economics seems to have a higher level

⁵ Appendix Table B1a provides percentages and numbers of far-left, centrist, and far-right legislators within each category of policy positions using the abortion and regulation questions, while Tables B2-B4 provide these numbers for each country.

of germaneness, since 17% of economic conservatives who have moderate views of moral (MmEc) issues consider themselves rightists, as compared with 11% who are moderate on economics but conservative on morals (McEm).

These differences among the right-identifiers are smaller because fewer legislators self-identify with that side of the ideological scale, even when they have conservative policy positions (McEc). While 78% of those with progressive views on both policy issues (MpEp) claim a leftist label, only 30% of those with conservative views (McEc) claim a rightist label. This is direct evidence of the ashamed right thesis; progressives are content to call themselves leftists, but many conservatives refrain from identifying with the right.

Our main hypothesis is that consistent policy positions (MpEp or McEc) on the two issue areas are necessary for the right but not for the left. While this implies that rightists should have conservative views on both policies (McEc) the graphs indicate that some rightists do hold moderate or even progressive views on one or the other issue. Still, the proportion of those with moderate or progressive views that call themselves rightists is below 17% for all cases except one (MpEc, in which it is 21%). But since few (about 30 percent) who do have consistently conservative views are willing to call themselves rightists, those values are higher than expected. While our paper is not based on country-level differences, we did look for outliers and present those data in the appendix (Table B4). Importantly, the data show that the exceptions to consistent policy positions for the right come mostly from three countries: Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama, where a higher proportion of legislators had progressive morals combined with conservative economic positions (MpEc) than other countries. This suggests that at least in these cases, morals are not germane to (rightist) ideology.

In contrast to the right, progressive views on either economics or morals lead large numbers of legislators to a leftist self-designation, and overall, the data are supportive of our hypothesis that leftists need not have progressive positions on both moral and economic policies. Specifically, 46% of those with progressive morals but moderate economics (MpEm) are leftists, as are 61% of those with progressive economics but moderate moral views (MmEp). Economics appears to be somewhat more germane to a leftist designation, since more than one-half of those in the McEp category are leftists as compared to just 19% of those in the MpEc grouping. The combination, however, leads many to a centrist position; 36% of those in the first of these categories and 60% in the second. This again suggests that both issues are germane, though economics has a somewhat stronger pull.

Through their impact on ideology, these data translate into party-level implications. Foremost, they suggest that left parties should be more divided on moral issues than rightist parties, and that there should be general agreement in both the left and right on economic policies. To illustrate, we chose three countries with externally-identified left and right parties and graphed the level of agreement on abortion and regulation.⁶ Figure 2 shows the percentage of surveyed legislators who have clear progressive (1-3 on the scale) or conservative (8-10) positions on abortion and regulation questions. For the leftists in El Salvador, there was significant disagreement about both issues, as shown by the relatively even height of the bars.

⁶ We use external identification of the parties, to take into account the “ashamed right” hypothesis (and perhaps a similar phenomenon on the left).

On the right, however, almost 80 percent of ARENA members agreed with an anti-abortion position and over 60% took the statist economic position. In Chile, no Socialists took a free market economic position (versus 35% who chose 1-3 on the scale) though the abortion question, as hypothesized, generated a significant number on the opposing poles. This is again a sharp contrast for the rightist UDI, where there was clear consensus on both morals and economics. These patterns are repeated for the third country, Nicaragua.




Figure 2 Percent of Left and Right Strongly Favoring/Opposing Abortion and Regulation

*Note: The length of the bars represents the percentage of legislators in each category by party across economic regulation (either pro-market or pro-state) and moral issues (either pro-regulation of abortion or anti-regulation).

Multivariate Analysis

Modeling Strategy

We evaluate our theoretical framework through a cross-sectional analysis at the individual level that covers multiple years and countries. Our primary aim is to test whether and how moral and economic policy positions inform legislators' ideological self-perception (left, center, right).

Our models test for the impact of all nine potential mixes of policy positions, ranging from conservative on both morality and economics (McEc) to consistently progressive (MpEp), using middling positions (MmEm) as the base category. Additionally, following the earlier discussion, we include age, gender, religiosity, and education level as control variables. At the party level, in addition to party size, we also control for the age of the party by including a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the party is less than 10 years old and 0 otherwise.

Incorporating fixed effects is imperative when dealing with cross-sectional data, as it allows us to account for country-specific idiosyncrasies and temporal trends observed across

different waves.⁷ Religious context (Gonzalez-Rostani & Morgenstern, 2023), for instance, could increase the impact of moral issues on ideology. We confirm this expected country-level heterogeneity in our data using a Lagrange Multiplier Test (Breusch-Pagan). We choose fixed rather than random effects based on a Hausman test. Finally, to account for potential non-independence of residuals, we use robust standard errors clustered by political party, as legislators from the same party may exhibit correlated behavior⁸.

Results

Figures 3A and 3B depict the predicted probabilities derived from our first two models (see Appendix Table C1), which use multinomial logistic regressions to predict legislators' ideological self-placement, defined as left (1-3) or right (8-10), relative to the center (4-7). In Figure 3A the graph on the left shows results for predicting a leftist legislator when abortion is the moral issue and the right graph shows predictions for the ideological right. Figure 3b, in turn, shows the results with respect to same-sex marriage. The nine dots with error bars within each graph represent the possible policy-mix categories. Moving from left to right in each graph, the economic position transitions from conservative (Ec) to middle (Em) and progressive (Ep), and the moral positions are represented by three distinct colors: pink for conservative (Mc), green for middle (Mm), and blue for progressive (Mp).

As should be expected, the left-side graph reveals that individuals holding consistently progressive views (MpEp) are most likely to identify as leftists (probability of 0.66). The two policy baskets, however, exert unequal weights. Keeping morals constant and transitioning from conservative to progressive economic positions (moving from McEp to MpEp), the probability of identifying as left-leaning almost doubles, escalating from 0.39 to 0.66. Shifting the moral stance while maintaining a conservative economic position (from McEc to MpEc) produces a lesser alteration, yet the probability of self-identifying as a leftist triples, ascending from 0.06 to 0.18.

The graph of the right implies that even for legislators with consistently conservative policy positions (McEc), the overall probability of being far-right (0.27) is less than one half than that of being far-left for those with progressive (MpEp) views (0.66). Especially given that there are more legislators with (far-right) conservative than (far-left) progressive policy positions, this finding is supportive of the ashamed right thesis. The graph also implies that compared with legislators with conservative positions on both issues, the probability of self-selecting as a rightist drops to about 0.13 if the legislator holds a middling or progressive economic position (regardless of morality), but it does not change much if the legislator is conservative on economics and middling on morals (MmEc). If, however, the legislator takes a progressive moral position while still professing conservative economics (MpEc), the probability of a rightist identity drops to 0.21. While these results suggest that morals are a bit less impactful for a rightist ideology than we expected, the low overall probability of selecting a rightist ideology affects the test since there is less margin for change. Further, as we noted in the discussion of the bivariate results, this

⁷ It's important to note that our inclusion of fixed effects by wave primarily serves to control for temporal trends and heterogeneity across time. We want to clarify that we are not suggesting a dynamic analysis of germaneness in our study. Instead, our focus is on understanding the influence of various factors on ideology within the cross-sectional data framework.

⁸ The results remain almost unchanged with or without `vce(cluster partido)` in Stata.

outcome seems driven by three cases (Panama, Ecuador, and Guatemala) where several legislators rate themselves as far right, but support progressive moral positions.⁹




Figure 3A Predicted probability: Abortion (Model 1)




Figure 3B Predicted probability: Same-Sex Marriage (Model 2)

*Note: The dotted line in each quadrant represents the overall probability of a legislator to self-identify as far-left or far-right in our sample. The predicted probabilities come from Model 1 and Model 2 (centrist are the baseline).

⁹ We investigated these cases and found some odd results. For example, while most rightist legislators did oppose abortion, some who supported abortion rights coded themselves as highly religious. As another example, members of Panama's PRD party included members who rated themselves as far left, centrist, and far right.

We next evaluate our expectation that leftists are likely to hold more diverse views on moral issues. A first support of this idea comes from comparing the probabilities for legislators to choose a left versus right label when they have consistent views on economics but opposing views on morals.¹⁰ The difference is stark; while the predicted probabilities of a MpEc legislator choosing a rightist label is 0.21, the opposite situation, McEp, generates a 0.39 probability of choosing a leftist label. Reconfiguring, the data from Table B1b show that a similar small percentage of leftists (4%) and rightists (5%) have economic positions that are inconsistent with their ideological label while the moral positions are consistent, but the percentage of a leftist having a conservative position on abortion (29%) is double that of a rightist having a progressive view on that issue (14%). (The story is parallel when considering same sex marriage.¹¹) Similar contrasts are also evident when comparing legislators who take middling positions on moral issues. When comparing MpEp legislators to those whose policy positions are MpEm, the probability of those choosing a leftist ideology drops by 41 percent. That large change shows that morals are germane, but moving from McEc to McEm changes the probability of rightists on the scale by a much larger factor, 61 percent.¹² In sum, while morals are germane to the left, they have a greater relevance to the right.

Beyond our main variables of interest, several controls suggest interesting relations. First the time (fixed effects) indicate that there is a significantly lower probability of being in the far left during the earliest wave (years 2003-07) of the survey (Figure D1). The country fixed effects also reveal significant results, which we illustrate in Appendix Figures D2-D4. For regulation and then abortion, the first two figures show the predicted values for the different country intercepts as positions on those policies move from conservative to liberal. For example, the probability that a Nicaraguan legislator will signal a leftist ideology drops from about 0.9 to 0.2 as their position on regulation moves across the scale. More importantly, the figures indicate a wide range among the countries, with the likelihood of a far rightist being between 0.1 (Argentina) and 0.5 (Panama) at the conservative end of economic preferences, and between 0.3 in Panama and 0.9 in Nicaragua for being on the left. The range regarding abortion is similarly large. Figure D8, which plots different combinations of moral and economic positions, demonstrates that Panama's highest probability of being from the far-right occurs when both policy positions align as conservative, with a sharp drop in probability for mixed or middling positions. In contrast, Argentina also concentrates the highest probability of being far-right when positions are both conservative, but the difference between being from the far right across these combinations is less pronounced.

To assess the robustness of our findings, we present additional nine models in five tables in Appendix C. First, we incorporate an alternative variable for ideological identification in Table C2 by using legislators' positioning of their party's ideologies instead of relying on self-positioning

¹⁰ Data in this paragraph focus on abortion; the results are similar for same-sex marriage.

¹¹ Using the question about same-sex marriage, while 17% of leftists have McEp, only 5% of rightists have MpEc. Overall 33% of leftists are conservative (Mc) on same-sex marriage, while just 10% of rightists have progressive (Mp) views on that issue.

¹² For the leftists, this is based on a change from 0.66 to 0.39; for the right it is 0.27 to 0.11.

of their own ideology as used in the baseline model. The results remained consistent (see the first two pairs of graphs in Figure C1).

We also re-ran our models using different independent variables. For economic issues, we tested legislators' positions on pensions (available for all waves) instead of the regulation of the economy in Model 5 and Model 6 in Table C3. This confirmed that our results were not contingent on the proxies we use (see the graphs for the two models in Figures C1).

In an additional robustness check, we re-coded the dependent variable (ideology) as a continuous variable (Model 7 in Table C4). The predicted ideologies are plotted in Figure C2, with higher values meaning a more rightist position. It shows, as expected, that the only prediction for a right-of-center identification is consistently conservative policy views (McEc)¹³. Even that prediction, however, is just slightly to the right of center (owing, again, to the high propensity of conservatives to claim a centrist ideology). By contrast, more combinations produce leftist positions, which confirms the idea that the leftists are heterogenous. Also of note is that the predicted ideology for McEp (4.1) is significantly above that of MpEp (3.2), which indicates the germaneness of moral policies.

Additionally, to demonstrate the lack of sensitivity of our results to the cut-off points of the three categories of each policy position, we recoded them based on quantiles of the original two policy variables (see Appendix A for details). We also recoded the dependent variable using quantiles. As shown in Models 8 (original specification of the ideological scores) and 9 (quantiles), regardless of the specification for the dependent variable, the specification of the policy variables does not significantly alter the results. In sum, our results are robust and not heavily influenced by specification biases.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to contribute to the debate about the relation between policy and ideology, with an emphasis on whether the former is germane to the latter. Our innovation has been to emphasize combinations of moral and economic policies and compare them to legislators' positions on the left-right scale. The analysis has shown that many legislators hold conflicting positions, and as such we can extract the idea that one or the other policy baskets are not germane to their ideological position. Further, we have shown empirical evidence that the effects are not homogeneous; leftist legislators are more likely to hold a mix of progressive and conservative preferences regarding economics and moral policies than are rightists.

Our findings challenge previous studies that have emphasized the strong link between economics and ideology in Latin America. Instead, we have demonstrated that Latin American legislators' ideological positions resemble those in Europe, where both economic and moral dimensions wield significant influence. However, there is considerable variation across the ideological spectrum. While the left exhibits a broader range of views, particularly on moral issues, the right tends to hold more homogeneous conservative positions in both dimensions.

¹³ Center here is 5.5. The predicted ideology for McEc, MmEc, and MpEc are 6.2, 5.6, and 5.5. McEc is the only one whose 95% confidence interval is above 5.5.

Nevertheless, even though both economic and moral issues impact the likelihood of a legislator's ideological orientation, economics plays a more substantial role.

This paper also clarifies our understanding of centrist ideology in Latin America, shedding light on its role as a facade for ashamed conservatives. While there are instances of shame within the left, they are far less prominent than among legislators with conservative views. Furthermore, centrists either a) espouse moderate views, indicating germaneness of the policies, or b) adopt opposing stances on various issues, suggesting that their ideology is a compromise.

Future analyses have much to study. A particularly cogent question is how ideology changes over time in response to new issue areas. In our case, moral issues have become more politically salient, but we know that they are not germane to ideology for some politicians, since their ideology and policy positions are inconsistent (eg. López Obrador in Mexico and Morales in Bolivia). For many in our sample, however, the policy positions and left-right location are consistent. Did the ideology lead to the policy position? Did the policy position influence the ideological positioning? Will those who have inconsistent policy and ideological views shift towards consistency? Overall, these questions suggest an attempt to answer whether ideology constrains the policy or whether ideology moves in response to new policies. These types of questions must wrestle with the impact of time. We have shown that time affects the probability of choosing a rightist ideology, but different data and modeling strategies would be necessary to test or measure the changing relative weight of an issue in the ideological calculus—or its reverse, how ideology drives views about new policies. We have shown the degree to which issues are consistent with ideology, but only panel data or perhaps an experiment could confirm germaneness – that is, whether a legislator's (or voter's) ideology and policy preferences move together or independently.

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Online Appendix

A. Coding of Variables

We select four waves of 17 Latin American countries in PELA (see List of countries and corresponding legislature for each wave). We first recode each wave in each country from PELA's "Country Databases" separately and then merge them together.

The main dependent variables are ideology of the legislator (ID1) and the legislator's perception of the ideology of his/her party (ID2), both on a 1-10 scale, with 1 meaning left and 10 right. They are recoded to three categories: Far-Left ($ID < 4$), Centrist ($4 \leq ID \leq 7$), and Far-right ($ID > 7$). For robustness check, we also use the DV at their original 1-10 scale (see Tables C3). Moreover, we also recode the DV based on quantiles (see Model 9 in Table C5): 1-4 are far-left, 5-6 are centrist, and 7-10 are far-right. The three categories amount to 39.74%, 39.69%, and 20.57% of all cases respectively.

The main independent variables are opinions about abortion ("What is your personal opinion about abortion?")¹⁴ and whether they favor a market or government regulated economy ("As you know, there is currently a deep debate between the statist and neoliberal positions in various countries of the continent. In this regard, could you tell me if you are more in favor of an economy regulated by the State or by the market?"). The two opinions are on a 1-10 scale, with 10 meaning the most progressive view on abortion rights or the most conservative position on market regulation of the economy (i.e. pro-market). Opinion about abortion is recoded to three categories: Moral Conservative ($abortion \leq 3$), Moral Middle ($3 < abortion \leq 7$), and Moral Progressive ($abortion > 7$). Similarly, opinion about regulated economy is recoded to the same three categories: Economic Conservative ($regulated\ economy > 7$), Economic Middle ($3 < regulated\ economy \leq 7$), and Economic Progressive ($regulated\ economy \leq 3$).

For one of the robustness tests, we recoded the two issue positions such that there were about three equal groups (see Table C5). As such, the cutoffs for economic progressives were those scoring less than 6 (36.6% of cases), middle was 6-7 (33.0% of cases) are middling, and 8-10 are conservative (30.5% of cases). Similarly, for the moral position, 1-2 are conservative, 3-6 are middling, and 7-10 are progressive (41.5%, 29.0%, and 29.6% of cases respectively). For the ideological scale, we divided at 1-4 (39%); 5-6 (40%); 7-10 (21%). Because no number at the original 1-10 scale can divide the legislators into three equal portions, we can only select the cutoff points closest to 33% and 67%. Models 8 and 9 (in Table C5) test these alternative cutoffs;

¹⁴ As noted in the body of the paper, Brazil did change its abortion question for the study 55 in Brazil. In that years, the survey asked the degree of agreement from support "The pregnant woman is the only one who has the right to decide on the morality of abortion and its practice." to opposition "The state should declare abortion illegal and penalize it as any other crime."

the first of these uses the original dependent variable (as in Model 1), while the latter uses the new cutoffs for the ideological scale.

We use seven control variables, either from PELA or collected from the Internet. Female is a dummy variable, with 1 meaning woman. Age refers to the age of legislators. Education is the highest level of education of legislators on a 1-6 scale, with 1 meaning no education and 6 graduate studies. "Religious" is a dummy variable, with 1 reflecting a positive response to the question "Are you a believer.". Party size is the number of sampled members in each party at each wave in PELA (PELA tries to interview a number proportional to the number of legislators per party in the legislature). New party is a dummy variable based on information about party age collected manually online, with 1 meaning younger than 10 years.

B. Summary Statistics by Country

Table B1a: Bivariate Analysis of Policy Positions and Ideology (Individual Legislators, column percentages)

	McEc	MmEc	MpEc	McEm	MmEm	MpEm	McEp	MmEp	MpEp	N
Far-Left	40 (4%)	29 (7%)	56 (19%)	215 (16%)	219 (24%)	339 (46%)	156 (52%)	117 (61%)	225 (78%)	1396
Centrist	622 (66%)	288 (76%)	181 (60%)	979 (73%)	629 (70%)	377 (51%)	108 (36%)	59 (31%)	56 (19%)	3299
Far-Right	283 (30%)	64 (17%)	64 (21%)	151 (11%)	50 (5%)	25 (3%)	36 (12%)	15 (8%)	9 (3%)	697
N	945 (100%)	381 (100%)	301 (100%)	1345 (100%)	898 (100%)	741 (100%)	300 (100%)	191 (100%)	290 (100%)	5392

Table B1b: Bivariate Analysis of Policy Positions and Ideology (Individual Legislators, row percentages)

	McEc	MmEc	MpEc	McEm	MmEm	MpEm	McEp	MmEp	MpEp	N
Far-Left	40 (3%)	29 (2%)	56 (4%)	215 (15%)	219 (16%)	339 (24%)	156 (11%)	117 (8%)	225 (16%)	1396 (100%)
Centrist	622 (19%)	288 (9%)	181 (5%)	979 (30%)	629 (19%)	377 (11%)	108 (3%)	59 (2%)	56 (2%)	3299 (100%)
Far-Right	283 (41%)	64 (9%)	64 (9%)	151 (22%)	50 (7%)	25 (4%)	36 (5%)	15 (2%)	9 (1%)	697 (100%)
N	945	381	301	1345	898	741	300	191	290	5392

Table B2: Number of Far-Left Legislators Within Each Category of Issue Position

Country	McEc	McEm	McEp	MmEc	MmEm	MmEp	MpEc	MpEm	MpEp	Total
Argentina	1	11	0	0	13	3	0	26	23	77
Bolivia	3	41	63	3	19	20	7	17	17	190
Brazil	3	19	12	2	15	11	1	12	26	101
Chile	0	9	4	1	18	9	1	18	11	71
Colombia	1	3	1	1	16	0	5	12	10	49
Costa Rica	0	3	1	0	2	1	0	7	6	20
D. Republic	2	6	4	4	8	5	1	8	3	41
Ecuador	3	38	41	5	37	31	12	37	42	246
El Salvador	2	18	6	1	16	11	6	36	9	105
Guatemala	6	10	6	2	5	2	7	10	4	52
Honduras	5	8	1	3	1	4	2	3	2	29
Mexico	0	4	3	0	9	3	4	50	16	89
Nicaragua	9	20	8	5	26	5	7	26	2	108
Panama	2	4	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	11
Paraguay	0	3	1	0	5	0	0	5	1	15
Peru	3	10	2	1	16	5	2	14	4	57
Uruguay	0	8	1	1	11	7	1	57	49	135
Grand Total	40	215	156	29	219	117	56	339	225	1396

Table B3: Number of Centrist Legislators Within Each Category of Issue Position

Country	McEc	McEm	McEp	MmEc	MmEm	MmEp	MpEc	MpEm	MpEp	Total
Argentina	14	77	4	7	82	1	2	49	11	247
Bolivia	16	39	8	6	32	1	8	25	2	137
Brazil	46	74	5	19	41	6	9	11	2	213
Chile	71	70	6	6	28	4	4	15	1	205
Colombia	22	79	4	23	71	12	12	29	6	258
Costa Rica	12	92	15	4	24	5	1	16	2	171
D. Republic	28	67	17	19	52	11	10	25	6	235
Ecuador	36	37	8	11	20	2	21	16	3	154
El Salvador	32	25	1	10	9	0	3	3	0	83
Guatemala	65	65	12	39	27	2	33	21	3	267
Honduras	69	61	8	25	18	0	6	8	0	195
Mexico	46	52	4	44	71	2	24	70	9	322
Nicaragua	26	23	1	12	9	1	3	10	0	85
Panama	34	41	5	13	29	2	13	16	3	156
Paraguay	49	76	1	17	35	0	6	13	1	198
Peru	38	66	7	23	57	3	15	14	1	224
Uruguay	18	35	2	10	24	7	11	36	6	149
Grand Total	622	979	108	288	629	59	181	377	56	3299

Table B4: Number of Far-Right Legislators Within Each Category of Issue Position

Country	McEc	McEm	McEp	MmEc	MmEm	MmEp	MpEc	MpEm	MpEp	Total
Argentina	2	3	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	10
Bolivia	4	8	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	23
Brazil	12	4	3	2	7	0	2	0	0	30
Chile	40	9	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	53
Colombia	13	15	3	5	4	3	3	4	1	51
Costa Rica	8	6	1	2	3	0	4	1	0	25
D. Republic	13	20	5	1	9	5	3	3	2	61
Ecuador	6	2	1	4	3	1	10	2	1	30
El Salvador	38	9	1	2	2	0	4	2	0	58
Guatemala	22	10	2	7	5	0	10	1	0	57
Honduras	29	9	7	9	1	1	3	1	0	60
Mexico	17	13	0	5	2	0	5	3	1	46
Nicaragua	20	5	4	6	2	0	1	0	0	38
Panama	27	18	5	2	4	2	13	1	2	74
Paraguay	11	14	1	5	0	0	1	0	0	32
Peru	17	5	1	7	4	1	1	0	0	36
Uruguay	4	1	0	1	1	1	1	4	0	13
Grand Total	283	151	36	64	50	15	64	25	9	697

C. Models 1 & 2 and Robustness Checks

Table C1: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results

	Model 1: Abortion				Model 2: Same-Sex Marriage			
	Far-Left		Far-Right		Far-Left		Far-Right	
McEc	-1.695***	(0.287)	1.597***	(0.166)	-1.219***	(0.345)	1.486***	(0.321)
McEm	-0.342**	(0.116)	0.587***	(0.175)	-0.381	(0.263)	0.233	(0.304)
McEp	0.994***	(0.173)	1.185***	(0.230)	0.864**	(0.333)	1.238***	(0.368)
MmEc	-1.111***	(0.224)	0.997***	(0.220)	-0.700 ⁺	(0.401)	1.441***	(0.377)
MmEp	1.605***	(0.234)	1.094***	(0.292)	1.270***	(0.315)	0.570	(0.501)
MpEc	-0.305	(0.219)	1.415***	(0.194)	-0.263	(0.408)	0.963*	(0.417)
MpEm	0.839***	(0.133)	-0.050	(0.235)	0.631**	(0.222)	-0.557	(0.458)
MpEp	2.348***	(0.232)	0.852**	(0.319)	2.988***	(0.306)	0.078	(0.696)
New Party (<10 years)	-0.380	(0.335)	-0.059	(0.181)	-1.386*	(0.691)	-0.189	(0.340)
Age	0.006	(0.004)	-0.003	(0.005)	0.013**	(0.005)	0.001	(0.008)
Party Size	0.025**	(0.008)	0.006	(0.005)	0.034***	(0.010)	0.010	(0.007)
Female	0.288**	(0.106)	0.197	(0.141)	0.275	(0.184)	0.223	(0.209)
Education	-0.108**	(0.041)	-0.137*	(0.053)	-0.168*	(0.068)	-0.097	(0.093)
Religious	-1.471***	(0.138)	0.298	(0.283)	-1.800***	(0.229)	0.457	(0.398)
FE: Country					included			
FE: Wave					included			
Observations	5084				2140			
Pseudo R^2	0.250				0.315			
AIC	7240.381				2911.704			
Log lik.	-3552.190				-1391.852			

se in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The base category of the DV is Centrist. The first eight rows are the categories of variable policy mix (base=MmEm). The moral issue is abortion in Model 1 and same-sex marriage in Model 2. Coefficients of waves and countries are omitted in the table.

Table C2: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results (DV = ID2)

	Model 3: Abortion				Model 4: Same-Sex Marriage			
	Far-Left		Far-Right		Far-Left		Far-Right	
McEc	-1.843***	(0.317)	1.124***	(0.146)	-0.892*	(0.347)	1.180***	(0.253)
McEm	-0.313*	(0.158)	0.436**	(0.139)	-0.056	(0.242)	0.244	(0.234)
McEp	1.021***	(0.192)	0.960***	(0.192)	0.772*	(0.317)	0.922**	(0.290)
MmEc	-0.920***	(0.240)	0.742***	(0.183)	-0.479	(0.436)	1.175**	(0.398)
MmEp	1.337***	(0.272)	-0.029	(0.317)	1.469***	(0.303)	0.375	(0.465)
MpEc	-0.287	(0.222)	0.848***	(0.188)	-0.711	(0.494)	0.780*	(0.376)
MpEm	0.752***	(0.204)	-0.016	(0.185)	0.614*	(0.282)	-0.078	(0.305)
MpEp	2.063***	(0.280)	0.245	(0.307)	2.282***	(0.314)	-0.505	(0.575)
New Party (<10 years)	-0.878*	(0.397)	-0.004	(0.204)	-2.162*	(0.906)	0.043	(0.277)
Age	0.001	(0.005)	-0.007	(0.005)	0.003	(0.006)	-0.005	(0.008)
Party Size	0.029**	(0.009)	-0.002	(0.005)	0.037***	(0.011)	-0.006	(0.008)
Female	0.432***	(0.124)	0.274*	(0.111)	0.556**	(0.210)	0.467**	(0.180)
Education	-0.185***	(0.050)	-0.100*	(0.045)	-0.214**	(0.074)	-0.105	(0.084)
Religious	-1.236***	(0.186)	0.302	(0.229)	-1.643***	(0.238)	0.540	(0.434)
Observations	5084				2140			
Pseudo R^2	0.250				0.315			
AIC	7240.381				2911.704			
Log lik.	-3552.190				-1391.852			

se in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The base category of the DV is Centrist. The first eight rows are the categories of variable policy mix (base=MmEm). The moral issue is abortion in Model 3 and same-sex marriage in Model 4. Waves and countries are omitted in the table.

Table C3: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results (DV = ID1, economic variable = pensions)

	Model 5: Abortion + Pension				Model 6: Same-Sex Marriage + Pension			
	Far-Left		Far-Right		Far-Left		Far-Right	
McEc	-0.233	(0.306)	1.513***	(0.271)	-0.111	(0.454)	1.307**	(0.468)
McEm	-0.523**	(0.198)	0.653**	(0.208)	-0.336	(0.260)	0.640	(0.408)
McEp	-0.048	(0.142)	0.811***	(0.186)	0.017	(0.247)	0.814*	(0.412)
MmEc	0.572	(0.374)	0.513	(0.498)	0.901	(0.552)	1.977***	(0.409)
MmEp	0.375*	(0.162)	0.280	(0.227)	0.515+	(0.286)	0.505	(0.460)
MpEc	0.642	(0.406)	1.083**	(0.391)	1.317*	(0.539)	0.688	(0.690)
MpEm	0.759***	(0.179)	0.449+	(0.257)	0.790**	(0.261)	-0.025	(0.491)
MpEp	1.246***	(0.189)	0.499*	(0.243)	1.695***	(0.291)	-0.148	(0.523)
New Party (<10 years)	-0.452	(0.305)	-0.105	(0.189)	-1.699*	(0.728)	-0.210	(0.371)
Age	0.003	(0.004)	-0.001	(0.005)	0.011*	(0.005)	0.004	(0.008)
Party Size	0.035***	(0.008)	0.006	(0.005)	0.042***	(0.010)	0.010	(0.007)
Female	0.406***	(0.090)	0.059	(0.131)	0.318+	(0.169)	0.215	(0.205)
Education	-0.129**	(0.045)	-0.135*	(0.053)	-0.220***	(0.063)	-0.108	(0.087)
Religious	-1.680***	(0.152)	0.502	(0.313)	-1.967***	(0.226)	0.468	(0.407)
Observations	4999				2042			
Pseudo R^2	0.196				0.276			
AIC	7519.686				2868.499			
Log lik.	-3691.843				-1370.250			

se in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The base category of the DV is Centrist. The first eight rows are the categories of variable policy mix (base=MmEm). The moral issue is abortion in Model 5 and same-sex marriage in Model 6. And the economic issue is pension in both models. Waves and countries are omitted in the table.

Table C4: OLS (DV = ID1 (1-10))

	Model 7	
McEc	1.663***	(0.179)
McEm	0.458***	(0.104)
McEp	-0.454**	(0.158)
MmEc	1.010***	(0.143)
MmEp	-0.807***	(0.203)
MpEc	0.956***	(0.171)
MpEm	-0.542***	(0.132)
MpEp	-1.390***	(0.187)
New Party (<10 years)	0.419 ⁺	(0.238)
Age	-0.006*	(0.003)
Party Size	-0.015**	(0.005)
Female	-0.066	(0.083)
Education	0.010	(0.032)
Religious	0.968***	(0.089)
Observations	5015	
R^2	0.349	
AIC	19919.074	
Log lik.	-9925.537	

se in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: DV in Model 7 is legislators' ideology on a 1-10 scale, with 1 meaning the leftest and 10 the rightest. Rows 1-8 are categories of the variable eco-moral with the base category being MmEm. Waves and countries are omitted in the table.

Table C5: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results (DV = ID1, IV is based on quantiles of abortion and regulation)

	Model 8				Model 9			
	Far-Left		Far-Right		Far-Left		Far-Right	
McEc	-1.288***	(0.312)	1.515***	(0.171)	-1.148***	(0.227)	1.190***	(0.169)
McEm	-0.900***	(0.242)	0.983***	(0.232)	-0.508**	(0.186)	0.884***	(0.200)
McEp	-0.135	(0.212)	1.096***	(0.181)	-0.191	(0.185)	1.048***	(0.176)
MmEc	-0.316 ⁺	(0.165)	0.602**	(0.224)	-0.407**	(0.140)	0.333 ⁺	(0.199)
MmEp	0.716***	(0.173)	-0.315	(0.257)	0.687***	(0.186)	-0.238	(0.231)
MpEc	0.817***	(0.159)	0.554*	(0.222)	0.453*	(0.178)	0.245	(0.183)
MpEm	1.115***	(0.193)	0.221	(0.231)	1.015***	(0.200)	-0.038	(0.222)
MpEp	2.020***	(0.210)	0.196	(0.237)	1.695***	(0.245)	0.071	(0.259)
New Party (<10 years)	-0.522	(0.345)	-0.085	(0.179)	-0.318	(0.315)	0.129	(0.195)
Age	0.007	(0.004)	-0.003	(0.005)	0.007*	(0.004)	-0.006	(0.004)
Party Size	0.025**	(0.008)	0.006	(0.005)	0.018*	(0.008)	0.003	(0.005)
Female	0.344***	(0.104)	0.211	(0.139)	0.102	(0.116)	0.140	(0.110)
Education	-0.126**	(0.042)	-0.139**	(0.053)	-0.105*	(0.043)	-0.127**	(0.039)
Religious	-1.443***	(0.140)	0.282	(0.282)	-1.199***	(0.123)	0.354	(0.242)
Observations	5084				5015			
Pseudo R^2	0.244				0.194			
AIC	7153.741				8728.340			
Log lik.	-3508.871				-4296.170			

se in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Rows 1-8 are categories of variable policy mix, and the base category is MmEm. Here the variable policy mix is based on quantiles of the two issue positions. DV in Model 8 is the same as that in Model 1, while DV in Model 9 is based on quantiles of ID1. Waves and countries are omitted in the table.




Figure C1: Predicted Probabilities of Being Far-Left and Far-Right from Models 3, 4, 5, and 6




Figure C2: Predicted Ideology From Model 7 (DV is on a 1-10 Scale)







Figure C3: Predicted Probabilities of Being Far-Left and Far-Right from Models 8 and 9



D. Fixed Effects




Figures D1: Heterogeneous effects by wave



Figures D2: Heterogeneous effects by country - Economic Deregulation



Figures D3: Heterogeneous effects by country - Moral Issue, Pro-Abortion Rights



Figures D4: Heterogeneous effects by country - Economic-Moral Combinations