

Immigration Shocks and Political Narratives: Evidence from the Venezuelan Migration Crisis

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How does an immigration shock affect politicians' discourse? This study examines the massive and sudden influx of Venezuelan migrants into South American countries. We argue that such events reshape politicians' agendas, offering strategic opportunities to frame emerging issues in ways that align with their electoral goals. Using over two million social media posts by Chilean and Peruvian legislators, we employ text-analysis methods—including dictionaries, topic modeling, and large language models—to investigate politicians' immigration narratives. Our results indicate that, in the short term, immigration gained salience across all party families. We also find that right-wing politicians predominantly adopted pro-immigration stances but focused their rhetoric on criticizing Venezuela's "socialist" regime, whereas left-wing politicians promoted humanitarian narratives. Unlike in developed countries, anti-immigration statements remained limited, underscoring that context shapes how politicians choose the dimensions along which they polarize. This study enhances our understanding of the politicization of immigration in the digital age.

Key words: Immigration, Political Elites, Global South, LLMs, Text-as-data.

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INTRODUCTION

How do sudden immigration surges shape political discourse? Immigration shocks are known to significantly affect public attitudes and electoral outcomes, often triggering nativist backlash in high-income democracies. Yet, little is known about how these shocks influence elite discourse (Alesina and Tabellini 2024), particularly in low- and middle-income countries, which host over 80% of the world's refugees.¹ Previous scholarship has overwhelmingly concentrated on immigration politics within European and North American contexts (e.g., Gessler and Hunger 2022; Hutter and Kriesi 2022; Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2019; Alizade and Ellger 2022; Alesina and Tabellini 2024), leaving an important empirical gap. Do politicians in emerging host nations adopt the same narratives observed in the Global North?

We address this gap by examining politicians' responses to the sudden migration of over 6.6 million Venezuelans across South America. Existing literature would lead us to expect right-wing politicians to promote exclusionary policies, yet countries across the region—even those governed by right-wing parties—initially responded by granting Venezuelan migrants legal status and access to education and healthcare (Selee et al. 2019; Brumat and Geddes 2023). This inclusive response poses a puzzle: in a global context increasingly hostile toward immigration, why might political elites still choose inclusion over exclusion?

Immigration shocks represent key opportunities for political elites to strategically frame emerging issues, shaping public perceptions and electoral dynamics. Our chosen setting differs significantly from traditional high-income democracies due to closer cultural ties, relatively liberal immigration laws, and immigration emerging as a novel political issue. While immigration debates typically polarize around exclusionary versus inclusive narratives, we argue that the choice between these narratives is contextually driven and may diverge significantly from established patterns observed in wealthier democracies. In contexts where migrants pose limited cultural threats and inclusive rhetoric yields

¹ See Figure A.1 in the Appendix for trends on displacement, illustrating that non-OECD countries now host significantly more displaced persons than OECD nations.

tangible political benefits—such as quickly incorporating migrants as potential voters or leveraging foreign crises to undermine domestic ideological opponents—politicians will strategically adopt inclusive rather than overtly exclusionary positions. Under these conditions, political elites may “nationalize” immigration discourse along ideological lines. In contexts like the Venezuelan crisis—where the sending country has a radical-left government—right-wing politicians might strategically frame migrants’ plight as indicative of ideological failure, whereas left-wing politicians are likely to avoid discussing the origins of the crisis, emphasizing humanitarianism instead.

Strategic uses of foreign crises in domestic politics extend well beyond the specific context examined here. Politicians frequently exploit migration from adversarial regimes to underscore domestic ideological arguments (Hathaway 2017; Abdelaaty 2021). For example, Cuban exile Maximo Alvarez’s 2020 speech at the Republican National Convention explicitly linked his own refugee experience from Cuba to a domestic anti-socialist message: “I’ve seen movements like this before. . . we cannot let them take over our country” (Sprunt 2020). Similarly, during the Cold War, Western nations often accepted refugees fleeing communist states, explicitly framing their humanitarian openness as proof of democratic superiority (Hathaway 2017).

To empirically examine such strategic elite behavior, we constructed an original dataset comprising over two million social media posts authored by Chilean and Peruvian legislators between 2013 and 2020. Using advanced computational text-analysis methods—including dictionary-based approaches, unsupervised topic modeling, and large language models—we demonstrate that the Venezuelan migration crisis substantially increased the salience of immigration across all party families. However, legislators’ rhetoric diverged along ideological lines. Notably, explicitly anti-immigrant rhetoric remained relatively limited, even among right-wing politicians, underscoring the importance of context when analyzing rhetorical strategies. Left-wing politicians predominantly emphasized humanitarian narratives and migrant inclusion, whereas right-wing politicians, despite generally adopting pro-immigration positions, primarily leveraged the crisis to criticize Venezuela’s socialist regime. Employing a “red scare” strategy, they

warned of the dangers associated with leftist ideologies, linking Venezuela's failures to potential domestic outcomes. By emphasizing leftist politicians' historical ties to Venezuelan leaders, right-wing legislators framed the crisis as evidence that socialist governance results in economic and political instability. Furthermore, our evidence aligns with a national-level politicization of immigration rather than a localized reaction to migration pressures, as regional exposure had minimal influence on politicians' narratives.

This article contributes to scholarship on the political consequences of immigration, particularly within the underexamined context of migration in the Global South (Blair, Grossman, and Weinstein 2022; Alrababa'h et al. 2021; Zhou and Shaver 2021; Esberg and Siegel 2023). By centering on the rhetorical strategies of political elites, we complement and extend existing studies on forced migration from Venezuela. This growing literature has primarily explored economic consequences (Caruso, Canon, and Mueller 2021; Lebow 2022; Rozo and Vargas 2021; Argote and Daly 2024), crime perceptions (Ajzenman, Dominguez, and Undurraga 2023; Severino and Visconti 2024), voter sentiment (Argote and Perelló 2024; Zhou, Peters, and Rojas 2022), and misperceptions about migrants' political orientations (Holland, Peters, and Zhou 2024). Our findings reveal new evidence of the polarizing role elites play following an immigration shock. Immigration frames significantly influence voter attitudes, as pro-immigrant rhetoric emphasizing empathy may foster tolerance (Schleiter, Tavits, and Ward 2022; Kustov and Landgrave 2025), whereas narratives highlighting ideological threats (such as anti-socialism frames) can deepen societal divisions and anti-immigrant sentiment.

Methodologically, our study also advances the use of large language models (LLMs) for analyzing political discourse. Employing OpenAI's API, we directly prompt LLMs to classify legislators' posts into pro- or anti-immigration categories, surpassing traditional sentiment analysis methods. Previous research highlights the effectiveness of LLMs in identifying topics and annotating texts (e.g., Gilardi, Alizadeh, and Kubli 2023; González-Rostani, Incio, and Lezama 2024; Törnberg 2025); we extend these applications to systematically capturing complex political positions from short texts. Our validated

approach accurately addresses linguistic complexities such as irony and negation, while also offering robust multilingual scalability ideal for comparative analyses of large corpora (Licht 2023; Courtney et al. 2020; De Vries, Schoonvelde, and Schumacher 2018).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: IDEOLOGICAL FRAMING, AND STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY

Politicians are strategic actors who aim to maximize electoral support. They make calculated decisions regarding which issues to emphasize, which positions to adopt, and how to frame these positions (Green-Pedersen 2007; Carmines and Stimson 1986). Unlike established issues, where parties often have longstanding reputational advantages, emerging issues offer opportunities for political innovation, prompting multiple actors to compete for issue ownership. Immigration exemplifies this dynamic, as it often transcends traditional left-right divides. When immigration unexpectedly gains salience, politicians from across the ideological spectrum strategically decide whether—and how—to engage with and frame the issue. Immigration may also change the electorate's composition, compelling politicians to appeal not only to their existing voter base but also to potential new voters, such as migrants gaining electoral rights (Dancygier 2017).

Competing Narratives in Immigration Debates: Threat vs. Inclusion

Once immigration gains political salience, debates generally form around two primary competing narratives: the anti-immigration “threat” narrative and the pro-immigration “inclusion” narrative. The anti-immigration narrative portrays immigration as a source of threat and burden, emphasizing economic, cultural, and security risks posed by migrants. Politicians advocating this perspective often emphasize job competition, resource strain, and security risks. Central to this discourse is the depiction of migrants as culturally distinct and resistant to assimilation, posing perceived risks to national identity (Tabellini 2020; Allport, Clark, and Pettigrew 1954). Economic arguments—such as concerns over wage suppression (Lebow 2022), rising unemployment (Rozo and Vargas 2021), in-

creased poverty (Caruso, Canon, and Mueller 2021), and crime (Ajzenman, Dominguez, and Undurraga 2023; Severino and Visconti 2024)—are commonly leveraged by political actors, particularly in developed nations, to justify restrictive immigration policies (Alesina and Tabellini 2024).

Conversely, the pro-immigration narrative emphasizes empathy and inclusion, framing migrants as individuals who deserve humanitarian support and social integration. Advocates focus on humanitarian principles, emphasizing the moral obligation to assist those fleeing war, persecution, or severe economic hardship (Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016; Hartman and Morse 2020; Sturridge 2011). Additionally, this inclusive approach underscores migrants' positive contributions through economic participation and cultural enrichment. Typically, left-wing and liberal political actors champion these inclusive, multicultural arguments (Knappert et al. 2021; Dancygier 2017).

Recent studies reveal right-wing actors increasingly “own” the anti-immigration stance, centering it as a core issue within nationalist and populist conservative platforms (Gessler and Hunger 2022; Hutter and Kriesi 2022). Immigration shocks can further bolster nationalist appeals by shifting social identification from class-based distinctions to national identity (Bonomi, Gennaioli, and Tabellini 2021). Such appeals resonate with right-wing constituents who prioritize communal values, social stability, and traditional identities, fostering suspicion of perceived outsiders (Enke 2020). In contrast, left-wing ideologies typically advance universalist values, extending moral consideration to out-groups and advocating for social equality and inclusivity (Enke 2020). Left-leaning voters, particularly those from urban and educated backgrounds, are thus more receptive to pro-immigrant and multicultural rhetoric (Alesina and Tabellini 2024).

Additional Factors Affecting Strategic Calculations

While ideology provides a strong foundation for predicting politicians' positions on immigration, specific electoral incentives can significantly alter these calculations and override traditional ideological positions. We propose two critical factors that can fundamentally reshape strategic incentives: the prospect of incorporating new voters and the opportunity to weaponize immigration issues against ideological opponents.

New Electorate Considerations

Liberal citizenship regimes that facilitate immigrant political incorporation create powerful strategic incentives that may transcend conventional ideological positioning. When immigrants can become voters relatively quickly through accessible naturalization pathways or non-citizen voting rights (Bloemraad 2006), forward-looking politicians face compelling reasons to avoid alienating these potential supporters. The strategic implication is straightforward: when today's immigrants are tomorrow's voters, parties have tangible electoral incentives to adopt more pro-immigration rhetoric and policies than their ideological position might otherwise suggest. For example, Bhatiya (2025) demonstrates that UK MPs representing areas with significant enfranchised immigrant populations are more likely to express positive sentiments toward immigration and to discuss it frequently, compared to MPs from areas where immigrants remain largely disenfranchised.

This calculation becomes even more significant when immigrants demonstrably align ideologically with specific political parties, creating a direct electoral pathway that incentivizes inclusive rhetoric and policy positions. As Dancygier (2017) notes, parties anticipating support from immigrant communities often adjust their positioning accordingly, particularly when these communities are concentrated in electorally significant districts. Moreover, the political inclusion of immigrants can shift policy priorities, reflecting their distinct issue preferences compared to natives (Vernby 2013; Reeskens and Van Oorschot 2015).

Instrumentalizing Immigration to Undercut Opponents

Beyond direct electoral considerations, immigration crises offer politicians unique opportunities (Hutter and Kriesi 2022). In particular, politicians may benefit from leveraging the issue as a strategic weapon against domestic opponents. For example, accepting refugees from a rival state can “send an unequivocal political message” against that state's regime (Freier 2018, p.3). When migrants flee regimes identified with particular ideological positions, politicians can frame the migration itself as evidence of ideological

failure, creating powerful narratives that transcend the immigration issue itself. Hence, asylum policies may serve as strategic political instruments to criticize or delegitimize opposing regimes. During the Cold War, Western nations adopted welcoming policies toward refugees from communist countries to emphasize the superiority of democratic governance over authoritarian systems (Hathaway 2017). More recently, Abdelaaty (2021) shows that states tend to adopt more receptive policies toward refugees escaping adversarial regimes compared to those fleeing allied governments. Thus, immigration issues serve as platforms for creating political narratives that link domestic opponents with failing foreign ideologies or emphasize the dangers of policy failures abroad.

This instrumental approach involves portraying refugees either positively—as allies opposing common enemies—or negatively, as evidence of ideological risks. Politicians thus weigh immigration stances against electoral gains, adjusting strategically according to situational contexts. For instance, Sosa Popovic and Welfens (2025) show how EU representatives depicted refugees negatively in 2015 but positively portrayed Ukrainian asylum seekers in 2022, reflecting dynamic strategic adjustments aligned with changing political contexts.

Empirical Expectations: The Venezuelan Case

Venezuelan immigration to Andean countries provides a valuable context for testing our theoretical expectations about politicians' strategic behaviors beyond traditional ideological alignments. Without entrenched historical stances on immigration, politicians are less constrained by ideology and more responsive to immediate electoral incentives. First, cultural similarities between Venezuelan migrants and host populations—including shared language, religion, and ethnicity—likely diminish the appeal of exclusionary narratives typically used by right-wing politicians.²

Second, liberal citizenship policies allowing migrants to vote after short residency periods position them as a growing electoral constituency. In Chile, for instance, immigrants can vote after five years; by the 2024 elections, they represented 5.1% of the

²For example, Venezuelan migrants and natives share similar educational, religious, and linguistic profiles (see Appendix A.2 for details).

national electorate and up to 32% locally in areas like Santiago (SERVEL 2024).³ Given that these migrants fled Venezuela's left-wing government and lean conservative, they are likely to align electorally with right-wing political interests (Holland, Peters, and Zhou 2024). Right-wing politicians, thus, have strong incentives to adopt inclusive immigration narratives rather than alienating these potential voters.

Moreover, the Venezuelan crisis allows right-wing parties to indirectly critique leftist ideologies by framing forced migration as evidence of leftist governance failures. Such framing highlights risks associated with leftist policies domestically without antagonizing migrants themselves. This strategy appeals both to moderate voters and migrants, who predominantly lean right politically—only about 12% identify as leftist (Holland, Peters, and Zhou 2024). Consequently, right-wing politicians can adopt inclusive rhetoric toward Venezuelan migrants, simultaneously attracting future voters and managing short-term domestic political costs. Thus, our theoretical expectations would predict that, in the Venezuelan context, right-wing parties will strategically employ inclusive immigration narratives, leveraging electoral incentives while undermining domestic left-wing opponents. Meanwhile, left-wing politicians will avoid discussing the origins of the crisis, strategically focusing instead on humanitarianism and solidarity, positions consistent with their typical ideological commitments.

BACKGROUND ON THE VENEZUELAN EXODUS

Venezuelan migration began with the economic and political crises following Hugo Chávez's death in 2013. Nicolás Maduro's presidency was marked by political instability, electoral controversies, declining oil revenues, hyperinflation, and a severe economic collapse, reducing GDP by two-thirds between 2013 and 2019 (Knight and Tribin 2020). Human rights violations and nationwide protests exacerbated instability, causing approximately 8 million Venezuelans to flee, creating one of the largest recent displacement crises (R4V 2024).

³In Peru, immigrants are eligible to vote in municipal elections after just two years of residency. See Appendix A.3 for details on immigrant voting rights in South America and further discussion in (Hammoud-Gallego and Freier 2023).

This migration offers an opportunity to study political responses to sudden immigration shocks in South American countries previously unaccustomed to significant migrant inflows. Venezuelan migration began in 2015, accelerating with the reopening of the Venezuelan-Colombian border in August 2016 (BBC 2016) and U.S. financial sanctions imposed in August 2017 (see Figure 1). By March 2023, Colombia and Peru hosted about 2.5 million and 1.5 million Venezuelans, representing approximately 4.9% and 4.5% of their populations, respectively (see Figure 2). To contextualize the magnitude, the influx was 19.25 and 1.20 times the 2010 foreign-born population in Peru and Chile, respectively, significantly impacting citizens and public policies (see Appendix A.4 and A.5). Currently, 80% of Venezuelan migrants reside within Latin America.




Figure 1: Evolution of the Number of Immigrants in the Top 5 Spanish-Speaking Countries
Note: Y-axis represents millions of Venezuelan nationals. Source: Authors' own elaboration based on R4V (2024).




Figure 2: Latin American Countries with the Highest Number of Venezuelan Immigrants
Note: X axis represents millions of Venezuelans. Source: Authors' own elaboration based on R4V (2024).

DATA AND METHODS

To examine the political impact of immigration, we collected temporally disaggregated data comprising over two million posts from Peruvian and Chilean legislators on X, covering the period before and after the immigration shock (2013–2020). We begin by analyzing how immigration gained salience in political discourse. Yet beyond its rising prominence, our main focus is on the content and narratives of these discussions. We therefore assess the impact of immigration shocks on the prevalence of pro- and anti-immigration stances using OLS models and a shift-share instrumental variable strategy. Finally, recognizing that immigration discourse can take distinct ideological forms with different political and social implications, we further analyze its content.

Specifically, we explore how narratives—such as humanitarian appeals or critiques of socialism—shape immigration framing through unsupervised topic modeling and dictionary-based analysis.

The Cases

We focus on Peru and Chile, two major destinations for Venezuelan immigrants during the crisis (see [Figure 2](#)). Both countries experienced significant migration shocks, enabling us to track political responses before and after the crisis. Our analysis includes legislators serving during the immigration shock: the 2018 Chilean Congress and the 2016 Peruvian Congress.⁴ These cases provide a clear context for studying the impact of immigrant settlement, unlike transit countries such as Colombia and Ecuador, where migration dynamics differ.⁵ Chile also experienced a smaller yet substantial migration shock from Haiti during this period, further contributing to the broader context of immigration pressures (see [Figure K.13](#)).⁶

Data

Politicians statements

To analyze the relationship between immigration exposure and politicians' discourse on X, we used X's API to collect posts from 141 Chilean and 114 Peruvian legislators between 2013 and 2020.⁷ This timeframe captures the period before, during, and after the Venezuelan exodus. To identify the effects of the immigration shock and ensure that any observed changes in rhetoric are not driven by changes in congressional composition, we restrict our sample to legislators serving during the immigration shock. The dataset includes reposts, quotes, replies, posting dates, and user handles, covering

⁴Peru had a unicameral legislative system during the period analyzed, while Chile maintained a bicameral legislature. All representatives elected in Peru in April 2016 and in Chile in November 2017 were included in this study.

⁵Ecuador and Colombia primarily served as transit countries during the Venezuelan migration peak years, with many immigrants continuing to Peru or Chile (e.g., Woldemikael [2022](#)). In 2018, Ecuador's government reported that 80% of Venezuelan immigrants entering the country were destined for Peru and even provided free transportation to its southern border (Cuartero [2018](#); Caceres [2018](#)). Moreover, Colombia, has a long history of immigration with Venezuela and significant internal migration due to decades of civil war (Lebow [2022](#)), making it difficult to isolate the effects of the recent wave of immigration.

⁶The results section discusses the role of Haitian migration in politicians' rhetoric.

⁷Data collection occurred between December 2022 and February 2023.

88% of Peruvian and 71% of Chilean legislators. In total, it comprises 2,026,110 posts, 515,433 of which were posted after the shock (2018–2019).⁸

Unlike complex and infrequent party manifestos, X offers real-time insights into politicians' strategies, aligning with more dynamic approaches to party politics and greater geographic variation, such as those proposed by Gessler and Hunger (2022) and Hopmann et al. (2012). Moreover, analyzing individual legislators on this platform reveals dynamics within political parties, challenging the notion of parties as monolithic entities (Meyer and Wagner 2021). Social media platforms, particularly X, are widely used by politicians to engage with the public. Nearly all US Congress members maintain active X accounts (Golbeck et al. 2018), with similar trends observed in Europe (Scherpereel, Wohlgemuth, and Lievens 2018) and Latin America (Munger et al. 2019).⁹ Previous studies have shown that X data can be used to measure political attitudes, spotlight key issues, and mobilize the public (e.g., Waisbord and Amado 2017; Barberá et al. 2019; Munger et al. 2019; González-Rostani, Incio, and Lezama 2024). For example, during the Venezuelan migration crisis, X served as a valuable tool for citizens in exile, enabling them to engage politically and socially (Esberg and Siegel 2023).

Party system

Legislators' ideological affiliations were determined using their parties' positions from CHES:LA data (Martínez-Gallardo et al. 2022), with smaller parties not covered by CHES coded by the authors. Parties were classified as left (scores < 4), center (4–7), or right (scores > 7).¹⁰

Exposure to Immigrants

Since representing electoral districts more exposed to immigrant influx may influence politicians' rhetoric on immigration, we also account for the share of immigrants in each electoral district. These are derived from census data¹¹ (Chile: 2002, 2017; Peru: 2007,

⁸See Table E.11 for further details.

⁹Social media enables politicians to share updates, connect with voters (Hemphill, Otterbacher, and Shapiro 2013), and amplify their presence in traditional media (Graham et al. 2013).

¹⁰See Appendix B for the list of parties included in the analysis.

¹¹Variations are estimated based on a census question identifying individuals' residence during the past five years and their country of origin. The most recent census available is from 2017.

2017) and bilateral migration flow data from the UN Population Division (2010–2017). For the initial immigration share, we use earlier census data, supplemented with individual-level visa and residency records to update the Chilean data to 2007.¹² Immigration exposure is calculated as the proportion of new immigrants in a district relative to its total population, where a new immigrant is defined as someone who lived in another country five years before 2017. [Figure F.7a](#) illustrates the regional distribution of foreign arrivals in both countries.

Measurements: Legislators' Rhetoric

Our outcome variables measure politicians' immigration discourse using text-based analysis of X statements. First, we identified immigration-related posts dating back to 2013; then, we classified each post into distinct narratives. The specific outcomes are defined below.

Identifying Immigration Statements

We identified immigration-related posts in legislators' online discourse through a systematic process. First, we developed an initial dictionary containing relevant immigration-related keywords (e.g., "immigrant," "migrant," "refugee"), detailed in [Appendix C.2](#). To improve the accuracy and coverage of this identification, we trained a Naive Bayes classification model using manually coded posts from one country. This process enabled us to refine the dictionary by incorporating additional single and multi-word terms, while also filtering out irrelevant matches (e.g., "migration birds"). We validated the accuracy of our approach by having two independent coders review a random sample of 500 statements per country, achieving 85% intercoder agreement. A comprehensive explanation of these steps is provided in [Appendix C.1](#). [Figure F.7b](#) visually illustrates the geographic distribution of identified immigration-related posts, showing that these discussions concentrated in northern Chile and Lima, Peru, with overall higher frequency in Chile.

¹²The focus on authorized immigration in Chile is justified by its geographic isolation due to the Andes (Ajzenman, Dominguez, and Undurraga 2023).

Pro and Anti-Immigration Positions

Immigration statements were classified as pro- or anti-immigration using OpenAI's API (GPT-3.5, with April 2024 as the end of its training period). This model effectively identifies complex linguistic features that traditional dictionary-based or sentiment analysis methods miss. Recent studies highlight ChatGPT's high accuracy in annotation and topic classification tasks (Gilardi, Alizadeh, and Kubli 2023; Kocoń et al. 2023), as well as its ability to detect themes like hate speech (Ji et al. 2023), populism (Bellodi et al. 2023), and policy issues (González-Rostani, Incio, and Lezama 2024).

To ensure accurate classification, we designed a prompt instructing the model to account for irony, negation, and quotations, while distinguishing between immigration views and unrelated critiques of foreign political situations. For instance, a posts quoting a politician's anti-immigration stance but using irony to criticize it would be classified as pro-immigration. The prompt was applied iteratively to a CSV file, processing each row with the corresponding post.

Classify posts from members of the Chilean Congress regarding their stance on immigration, based on the content and implications of the post. Pay special attention to the context, including irony, negation, and the specific use of language that may indicate criticism or support of immigration policies.

[Prompt continues]

Statements were initially scored on a scale from "Highly Pro-Immigration" (2) to "Highly Anti-Immigration" (-2), with "Other" (0) assigned to immigration-related statements lacking a clear stance and (99) to non-immigration posts.¹³ For analysis, this classification was simplified into two categories: pro- and anti-immigration. Validation by two research assistants, using a similar prompt, on 1,376 posts confirmed an accuracy rate of 84%. We further validated the classification using a fighting words analysis, which identifies the most distinctive words associated with each group (following Monroe, Colaresi, and Quinn 2008). Anti-immigration statements were characterized by terms such as

¹³A small sample of unrelated statements was included as part of the validation check.

“extranjeros” (foreigners) and words linked to criminality, including “antecedentes” (criminal records) and “delincuentes” (criminals). In contrast, pro-immigration statements featured words like “derechos” (rights), “niños” (children), “personas” (people), and “xenofobia” (xenophobia). Appendix C.3 provides the full prompt, additional details on costs, the validation process, and the justification for using a closed-source model. This choice was primarily motivated by its significant advantages for non-English analysis, compared to existing open-source LLMs at the time of implementation.

Ideological Framing

To assess whether political leaders employ ideologically charged language in their immigration-related posts, we estimate an ideological score for each post using Word-scores (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003). This measure captures the similarity of a post to the corpora of left- or right-wing party posts. Word frequencies from left- and right-wing posts (excluding immigration-related statements) are used to compute scores for individual words and the overall corpora.¹⁴ We compute the scores separately by year and country and present the results aggregated at the country level. Scores range from -1 (average left-wing post) to 1 (average right-wing post). Detailed calculations are provided in Appendix C.4, following the method outlined by Le Pennec (2024).

Topics

To identify topics in immigration discourse, we use unsupervised machine learning methods to uncover semantic structures and latent themes and dictionaries. Specifically, we apply Non-Negative Matrix Factorization (NMF), a matrix decomposition technique that highlights significant words in the corpus while reducing text complexity, enhanced with TF-IDF weighting. We cluster posts into four groups for each country and analyze them by ideological family.¹⁵

Given our theoretical expectations and the results from the unsupervised topic analysis, we examine two specific narratives in immigration discussions, Venezuela and

¹⁴This approach preserves the distance between reference texts (Martin and Vanberg 2008).

¹⁵For more on NMF, see O’Callaghan et al. (2015) and Greene and Cross (2017) for applications in political speech analysis.

socialism, identifying relevant posts using keyword dictionaries.¹⁶ Examples of posts with their classifications are provided in Appendix D, and a summary of the measures is available in Appendix E.

Empirical Strategy

To analyze elite responses to the immigration shock, we first assess salience by measuring immigration as a share of all posts from legislators between 2013 and 2020. Next, we compare how politicians from the left, center, and right differ in their framing of immigration. We classify their immigration-related posts from the post-shock period (2018–2019) according to whether they contain pro-immigration, anti-immigration, socialism, or Venezuela references. We then calculate the share of posts falling into each framing. As explanatory variables, we consider both the politician's ideology and regional exposure to immigration, allowing us to assess how partisan alignment and local context shape political discourse.

Model Specification

Given that we are interested in identifying differences across party families, we estimate the following linear model using individual legislators as the unit of analysis.¹⁷ For salience, the sample includes all legislators, while for rhetoric, it is restricted to those who posted about immigration. Party family dummies (right and center, with left as the baseline) capture ideological variation. Control variables (X_{pt}) include gender and post count (to weigh more active users), while district¹⁸ fixed effects (δ_i) account for time-invariant regional differences:

$$Y_p = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Right_p + \beta_2 Center_p + \gamma X_p + \delta_i + \varepsilon_p \quad (1)$$

¹⁶Refer to Appendix C.2 for dictionary details.

¹⁷Since there was minimal immigration before 2017 and, as illustrated in Figure 3, almost no immigration-related posts, we focus exclusively on the post-shock period (2018–2019). We end our analysis in 2019 to avoid potential confounding effects introduced by the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, we combine data from 2018 and 2019 into a single period, as we do not anticipate substantial differences between these two years. Thus, our analysis compares framing across politicians after the shock rather than employing a difference-in-differences design. We aggregate all posts made by each politician during the post-shock period into a single observation per politician.

¹⁸A district refers to the electoral constituency from which a member of Congress was elected. This applies to both representatives (in Chile and Peru) and senators (Chile).

Here, Y_p denotes either the proportion of immigration-related posts (salience analysis) or the share of specific framings within immigration-related posts for legislator p . The primary independent variable, $Right_p$, is a binary indicator of right-wing party affiliation. A positive β_1 suggests that right-wing legislators emphasize immigration or adopt specific framings more frequently than their left-wing counterparts within the same electoral district (i).

Additionally, we implement alternative model specifications to account for regional variation in immigration exposure. First, we include the share of recent immigrants in each electoral district as a control variable to explicitly capture local immigration exposure.¹⁹ This helps rule out the alternative explanation that increased attention to immigration—or specific types of framing—may simply reflect the ideological composition of legislators in regions with higher immigrant inflows. Second, to address potential endogeneity when estimating the effects of immigrant share, we use an instrumental variables (IV) approach. We construct a shift-share instrument based on pre-existing settlement patterns, following the strategy of Ajzenman, Dominguez, and Undurraga 2023. This strategy allows us to estimate the causal effect of regional immigration exposure on legislators' attention to immigration and their rhetorical choices.²⁰ See Appendix F for further details.

RESULTS

This section examines how the Venezuelan exodus shaped immigration discourse among political elites on X. Consistent with our theory, immigration emerged as a cross-cutting issue, with all major party families—left, center, and right—actively engaging with it. However, framing varied across party families. While most posts were predominantly pro-immigration regardless of party affiliation, right-wing legislators frequently used the issue to criticize socialism and the Venezuelan regime.

¹⁹We control for $\Delta imm_p = \frac{NewImmigrants_p}{Population_p}$, which measures the share of immigrants who arrived from another country between 2012 and 2017, relative to the district population.

²⁰To address the non-random allocation of immigrants—where migrants may settle in districts that are more welcoming or economically prosperous—we construct a shift-share instrument using pre-shock immigrant shares at the district level, updated with national-level inflows.

From Neglect to Prominence: The Rise of Immigration in Political Discourse

We first document the rise in immigration’s political salience following the Venezuelan exodus. Prior to 2016, immigration was nearly absent from elite discourse—mentions were close to zero in 2013, as shown in [Figure 3](#). The topic gained visibility after the first major wave of migration, peaking in 2018. For example, in Chile, parties devoted about 1% of their social media posts to immigration that year. Importantly, as shown in [Appendix G.1](#), we find no statistically significant differences across party families regarding overall attention to the issue and only a weak positive relationship with exposure to the immigration shock. This suggests that immigration became a widely shared political concern rather than one championed by a specific ideology. While this share may appear modest, it is significant given that 50–70% of political




Figure 3: 12-Month Moving Average of Immigration Salience - Chile and Peru (2013-2020)

Note: The figure shows salience of immigration operationalized as the ratio of statements about immigration to the total number of public statements made. The shaded areas around each line confidence intervals at 95%. Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data retrieved from X. Full OLS and IV results across party-family are displayed in [Table G.14](#) in the [Appendix G.1](#).

posts typically address non-policy topics (González-Rostani, Incio, and Lezama [2024](#); Hemphill, Russell, and Schöpke-Gonzalez [2021](#); Barberá et al. [2019](#)). By comparison,

even at its peak, COVID-19 accounted for only 10% of posts (Appendix G.2).²¹ Moreover, 76% of the legislators who posted in X have at least one post about immigration between 2018 and 2019.

Legislators' Immigration Stances by Party Family

So far, we have demonstrated that immigration has become increasingly salient in political discourse. We now turn to examine the specific narratives legislators employed. Our main finding—supported by descriptive statistics presented in Table 1—is that most legislators across all party families predominantly adopt pro-immigration positions. Specifically, Table 1 shows the means, medians, and selected percentiles for the shares of pro- and anti-immigration posts among legislators in Peru and Chile, disaggregated by ideological orientation (left, center, and right). Notably, the median legislator from each ideological group in both countries devoted at least half of their immigration-related posts to pro-immigration narratives, with fewer than 12.5% classified as anti-immigration.

Country	Ideology	N	Pro-Immigration (%)				Anti-Immigration (%)			
			Mean	P10	Median	P90	Mean	P10	Median	P90
Chile	Left	56	79.7	50.0	85.7	100	6.5	0.0	2.6	20.0
	Center	10	84.0	63.7	85.6	100	4.7	0.0	3.3	13.5
	Right	49	63.1	0.0	66.7	100	17.7	0.0	12.5	50.0
Peru	Left	15	82.2	37.5	100	100	9.9	0.0	0.0	62.5
	Center	22	62.9	0.0	70.0	100	29.3	0.0	3.6	100
	Right	30	51.0	0.0	50.0	100	26.2	0.0	8.5	90.0

TABLE 1: Summary Statistics of Immigration Statements by Ideology and Country (2018-2019)

Note: The table reports the proportion of pro- and anti-immigration statements made by legislators, classified by country and ideological affiliation. Ideological categories (Left, Center, Right) follow standard party family classifications. Columns display the mean, 10th percentile (P10), median, and 90th percentile (P90) for each group's share of pro- and anti-immigration discourse. Data are derived from legislators' posts posted in 2018 and 2019. Density plot can be found in Appendix Figure H.10. Regression results (OLS and IV) are displayed in Table H.15.

Additionally, regression analyses presented in Appendix H (Table H.15) show that legislators from regions with higher immigration exposure post, on average, more pro-immigration statements. While there is still ideological differentiation—right-wing legislators post 18.5 pp fewer pro-immigration and 12.9 pp more anti-immigration statements

²¹For context, González-Rostani, Incio, and Lezama (2024) reports that in 2015, Chilean Congress members' posts on Education (6.82%) and Health (4.36%) were among the most-discussed topics. Immigration, with 1%, would rank as a top issue, surpassing topics like Corruption, Crime, and Inflation.

than their leftist counterparts—these differences are relatively modest, particularly after controlling for district-level immigrant populations. Overall, the evidence consistently points to a broadly pro-immigration stance, with most legislators posting predominantly pro-immigration statements.

Immigration Narratives by Party and Ideological Alignment

Given that most legislators adopt pro-immigration positions, an important question emerges: Do legislators across party families frame immigration similarly, or do they construct distinct narratives around the issue? We argue that the immigration shock introduced a new issue onto the political agenda, creating opportunities for politicians to articulate divergent narratives. To evaluate this claim, we analyze immigration posts using three different methods: first, we estimate ideological scores; second, we apply topic modeling; and third, we examine framing patterns through dictionary-based methods.

Figure 4 shows average ideological scores, where values close to 1 (-1) indicate that the words used in immigration-related posts resemble those in the average statement from a right- (left-) wing politician. The results confirm differentiation: left-wing statements cluster near -1 and right-wing statements near 1, consistent with ideological baselines. These results suggest that party families' immigration narratives reflect their ideological perspectives, using language similar to that used for other topics.

Given the observed ideological differences in language use, we further explore these distinctions by employing topic modeling. Using NMF, we cluster immigration-related posts into four topics, revealing how framing differs across party families. Table 2 presents the most representative words for each cluster. In Chile, Topics 2 and 4 (accounting for 43.8% of posts) emphasize rights and humanitarian concerns, dominated by left-wing legislators who frequently use terms such as “derechos,” “mujeres,” and “niños” (rights, women, and children, respectively). In contrast, right-wing legislators primarily engage with administrative and national issues captured in Topic 1, highlighting terms like “país,” “gobierno,” and “extranjeros” (country, government, and foreigners, respectively). In Peru, left-wing legislators concentrate their discourse within Topic 2, addressing rights and reactions to Trump's immigration policies, while right-wing




Figure 4: Mean Ideological Score by Party Families and Immigration Content

Note: Bars represent the mean of the ideological score (-1 left, 1 right) for legislators' posts posted in 2018 and 2019 by ideological party family and subject (immigration or not immigration). The dark color bars represent the ideological score of non-immigration-related posts, while the light color bars represent the ideological score of immigration posts. Error bars indicate 95% CI. Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data retrieved from X.

legislators dominate Topic 1, centering around Venezuelan migration using terms such as “venezolanos” (Venezuelans) and “Maduro.” The greater distance between the left and the right in the usage of the different topics observed in Peru compared to Chile suggests a more polarized immigration discourse in the former.²²

Given our theoretical expectations and the prominence of references to Venezuela and Maduro identified above, we employ a dictionary-based approach to investigate two specific narratives: one emphasizing socialism, and another focusing explicitly on Venezuela. We test whether right-wing parties strategically exploit voters' concerns about immigration by associating the immigration shock with criticisms of socialism and the Venezuelan regime.

The results in Table 3 (columns 1 and 2) confirm that right-wing legislators indeed mention socialism and Venezuela significantly more than their left-wing counterparts—by 4.8 and 11.8 pp, respectively. Importantly, these differences persist after controlling for

²²Appendix I presents similar findings for Venezuela-specific immigration statements, with right-wing legislators describing immigrants as “brothers” fleeing Maduro's regime.

	Chile				Peru			
	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4
	para	politica	venezolanos	migrantes	venezolanos	trump	japonesa	campo
	migracion	niños	chile	derechos	peru	politica	inmigracion	ciudades
	pais	migratoria	venezuela	este	pais	contra	amistad	migracion
	nuestro	trump	maduro	como	para	migratoria	años	ciudad
	gobierno	gobierno	dictadura	junto	peruanos	donald	peruano	solo
	inmigrantes	sobre	como	organizaciones	venezuela	derechos	japon	estar
	haitianos	separados	piñera	trabajo	maduro	mocion	peru	preparadas
	chile	familias	millones	todos	esta	niños	congresoperu	resentidos
	inmigracion	eeuu	guaido	mujeres	xenofobia	migrantes	exteriores	todas
	extranjeros	derechos	frontera	proceso	como	gobierno	relaciones	ante
%	40.8	13.1	15.4	30.7	67.8	18.0	7.7	6.5
Left (%)	36.0	14.9	12.3	36.8	55.5	35.3	5.0	4.2
Center (%)	42.4	12.0	21.7	23.9	60.7	17.9	8.1	13.3
Right (%)	47.1	10.9	17.5	24.5	79.5	9.2	8.7	2.6
Distance L-R	-11.1	4.0	-5.2	12.3	-24.0	26.1	-3.7	1.6

TABLE 2: Topic Analysis - NMF 4 clusters regarding Immigration statements

Note: The columns display the most representative words for each topic and the distribution of topics across party families by country. The analysis includes all immigration-related posts from 2018 and 2019 in Peru and Chile. The row labeled “%” indicates the size of each topic, while the rows labeled Left, Center, and Right represent the proportion of each party family addressing that topic. The row “Distance L-R” shows the difference in the shares between the left and right party families.

regional exposure to immigration (columns 3 and 4). The insignificant coefficients of immigration exposure suggest that the frequent use of these narratives is driven by strategic, national-level messaging rather than by direct, localized reactions to immigration itself.

To interpret the framing effects easily, we re-estimated models using a binary variable for high usage of socialist and Venezuelan frameworks. Figures J.11 and J.12 in the Appendix reveal that right-wing legislators are about 20% more likely to be top users of these narratives, supporting the hypothesis that the right employs immigration strategically to critique opponents and appeal to voters.²³

In Appendix K, we conduct a robustness check focusing on Chile, which received significant numbers of both Venezuelan and Haitian migrants (see Figure K.13). While Haitian migration was slightly lower, Haitians were culturally and demographically more distant from Chileans, speaking Haitian Creole and French and differing racially and religiously. Based on a cultural distance hypothesis, we would expect right-wing politicians to emphasize Haitian immigration more as they may be a greater cultural threat.

Our findings, however, show that right-wing politicians prioritized more Venezuelan immigration, supporting the hypothesis that immigration is strategically framed for domestic politics. Venezuelans’ closer cultural and linguistic ties to Chileans allowed

²³These estimates remain robust across different thresholds.

VARIABLES	(1) Socialism	(2) Venezuela	(3) Socialism	(4) Venezuela
Right	4.809** (2.044)	11.487*** (4.364)	2.986** (1.387)	11.659*** (3.992)
Center	4.668 (4.430)	-9.630 (7.420)	3.628 (4.526)	-3.241 (6.685)
Share Imm			-0.101 (0.262)	-0.266 (1.229)
Observations	182	182	182	182
R-squared	0.337	0.525	0.025	0.305
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Model	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
F-stat			97.42	97.42

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE 3: Party Families and Framing Used when Discussing the Immigration Issue.

Note: Models estimated using data from members of Congress who discussed immigration in 2018-2019 on X. The unit of analysis is individual legislators. Dependent variables represent the proportion of immigration-related statements falling into each specified category, calculated as a share of each legislator's total immigration-related posts. All models control for legislator gender, district magnitude (number of representatives per electoral district), and total post volume. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The F-stat indicates the F statistic of the first stage. Full results are displayed in [Table J.17](#) in the Appendix.

right-wing politicians to frame their migration as a warning about the risks of leftist governance, linking it to the failures of Venezuela's government. In contrast, Haitian migration—occurring under the center-right presidency of Jovenel Moïse and following natural disasters—offered less strategic value and was less politically relevant to Chileans. Right-wing politicians mentioned Venezuelan migration in 21% of immigration-related posts but referenced Haitian migration only 7% of the time. Left-wing politicians, however, referenced both groups at similar rates—12% for Venezuelans and 15% for Haitians. As shown in [Table K.18](#), right-wing politicians were significantly less likely than their leftist counterparts to highlight Haitian immigration, further supporting the argument that immigration shocks were framed to serve domestic political narratives.

To sum up, these analyses show that while immigration has become more salient across party lines, politicians frame the issue through distinct ideological lenses. This supports our theoretical expectations that parties differentiate rather than converge in response to the immigration shock. In a context where threat-based narratives

are less effective due to cultural similarities, and inclusive narratives become more advantageous given both the enfranchisement of immigrants and the adversarial stance toward the sending country's government, immigration emerges as a relatively new issue primarily framed through pro-immigration discourse. Within this setting, right-wing legislators adopt selective pro-immigrant stances, welcoming immigrants fleeing Maduro's dictatorship to strategically critique the domestic left by suggesting that it might emulate similar policies. In contrast, left-wing legislators focus on broader immigrant rights and social inclusion, largely avoiding discussions of the crisis's origins or migrants' backgrounds.

CONCLUSION

This study has demonstrated how a sudden immigration shock reshapes political discourse and ideological framing. Analyzing an original dataset of legislators' social media posts from Chile and Peru during the Venezuelan exodus, we find that while legislators across the ideological spectrum increased attention to immigration, their framing diverged sharply by partisan lines. Right-wing legislators often linked immigration to ideological critiques, exemplified by statements such as "Venezuelans flee socialism to Chile [...], yet @labeasanchez and @SenadorGuillier [left-wing leaders] want to lead us down that same path," or "My solidarity with those fleeing Maduro's socialist genocide." In contrast, left-wing legislators emphasized humanitarian values, stating "We must reject hatred, xenophobia, and intolerance with strength and energy. The Homeland is humanity." These examples illustrate how immigration shocks generate heightened salience but polarized ideological narratives.

Empirically, we contribute by constructing and analyzing an original dataset of over two million social media posts by legislators in Chile and Peru (2013–2020), allowing fine-grained analysis of political discourse around a significant South–South migration shock. While South–South migration has become predominant globally, it remains understudied compared to its South–North counterpart. Unlike typical South–North contexts, Venezuelan migrants share language and cultural traits with their host communities, reducing traditional ethnic and linguistic cleavages. This scenario allows us to

explore how political actors strategically frame immigration in contexts where inclusive rhetoric is advantageous due to liberal immigration policies and opportunities for domestic ideological critique. Our findings challenge standard expectations derived from developed democracies—where immigration discourse is often dominated by right-wing parties (e.g., Gessler and Hunger 2022; Hutter and Kriesi 2022; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020)—by demonstrating that salience and polarization are highly context-dependent. In particular, ideological incentives rather than local migration pressures shape elite rhetoric, as regional exposure did not account for observed rhetorical variations (Rozo and Vargas 2021; Ajzenman, Dominguez, and Undurraga 2023; Lebow et al. 2024). Ultimately, our analysis broadens theoretical understandings of immigration politics by highlighting how strategic ideological reframing emerges in contexts where exclusionary narratives offer fewer benefits and inclusive approaches yield greater political advantage.

Methodologically, we leverage advances in natural language processing by employing LLMs to classify political rhetoric at scale, significantly expanding researchers' tools for text analysis (González-Rostani, Incio, and Lezama 2024; Bellodi et al. 2023). Using OpenAI's state-of-the-art LLM, we evaluated hundreds of thousands of legislators' social media posts, accurately identifying whether statements were pro or anti-immigration. This approach reliably captured nuanced language such as irony and context, required minimal human intervention, and was highly cost-efficient, totaling under \$10—a fraction of traditional human-coding or crowdsourcing costs. Our study thus presents one of the first large-scale quantitative applications of LLMs to political discourse analysis, offering a scalable, accessible, and multilingual template for future research on ideological framing across diverse policy domains. Although we used a closed-source LLM due to its superior non-English performance, future improvements in open-source models, with more diverse non-English training data, will enable reproducible alternatives.

Our findings carry important theoretical implications for immigration politics by demonstrating that inclusive and strategic discourse can prevail over exclusionary narratives, even amid large-scale migration crises. Partisan elites strategically adapted their rhetoric,

using the crisis to reinforce existing ideological positions without fundamentally altering the broader ideological landscape. This dynamic likely explains why both Chile and Peru initially maintained relatively open and cooperative migration policies, even under right-wing governments. However, it remains uncertain whether this cross-party consensus on inclusive immigration framing will persist under sustained immigration pressures. Future research should investigate the long-term stability of this agreement, particularly as migrants progressively gain political representation.

Regarding generalizability, while our analysis specifically focuses on Chile and Peru, the consistency of findings across these two distinct institutional contexts—Chile’s stable party system and Peru’s fragmented political landscape—strengthens confidence in their broader applicability. Anecdotal evidence from other regional cases, such as Colombia’s cross-party anti-xenophobia agreement (Migra-Venezuela 2019) and Brazil’s welcoming policies under Bolsonaro’s presidency (Brumat and Geddes 2023; France 24 2018), further indicates that explicitly anti-immigration rhetoric may not dominate political discourse in similar migration scenarios, at least in the short term. Key questions remain, including whether left-wing parties strategically use immigration crises originating from radical-right-led sending countries, and how migration affects politics along transit routes where integration prospects are limited. Additionally, investigating the translation of strategic elite rhetoric into tangible policy outcomes remains an important avenue for subsequent research.

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ONLINE APPENDIX

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A SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION

A.1 Evolution of People Displaced and region of Destination




Figure A.1: Evolution of the number of people affected displacement in OECD and non-OECD countries
Note: Data from UNHCR population statistics database.

A.2 Similarities between Natives and Immigrants

Tables [Table A.1](#) and [Table A.2](#) draw from national surveys (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática 2022b, 2022a; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2017) and regional data (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2018; Universidad Católica Andrés Bello 2017).

TABLE A.1: Cultural and Demographic Characteristics (2018)

Characteristic	Venezuela	Peru	Chile
Language			
Spanish as mother tongue	99.9%	85.7%	98.9%
Religion			
Catholic	66.7%	69.8%	52.9%
Evangelical	18.0%	15.3%	13.8%
Ethnicity			
Self-identified as mestizo	37.7%	62.8%	—
Indigenous population	7.1%	24.7% ^a	12.8%
Household Composition			
Nuclear households	54.0%	53.9%	57.0%
Average household size	3.4	3.4	3.1
Political Ideology			
Center political identification	48.6%	52.1%	46.5%

Notes: ^aIncludes 22.3% Quechua and 2.4% Aymara.

Source: Latinobarómetro (2018), National Census data, and INEI (2017).

Note: All data corresponds to 2018 unless otherwise specified.

TABLE A.2: Educational Attainment Distribution Across Populations (2022)

Education Level	Peru		Chile	
	Natives	Venezuelan Imm.	Natives	Venezuelan Imm.
No education	6.58	2.99*	4.12	0.24
Complete Primary	10.83	6.88*	29.00	1.28
Some Secondary	15.39	6.90*	-	3.19
Complete Secondary	20.62	20.30	37.84	16.36
Some/Complete Technical	9.66	18.04	8.11	18.04
Some University	4.78	10.85	-	10.85
Complete University	5.95	11.00	15.29	43.34
Post-graduate Studies	1.22	5.03	1.15	5.03

Notes: Data for natives comes from ENAHO 2022 (Peru) and CASEN 2022 (Chile). Data for Venezuelan immigrants comes from ENPOVE 2022 (Peru) and Encuesta Migrantes 2022 (Chile). Some categories have been combined in the Chilean data due to different categorization in the original source. All values are percentages. *Values from ENPOVE 2018 as 2022 exact figures were not available in similar categories.

A.3 Foreigners' right to vote

In South America, immigrant voting rights showcase a commitment to democratic inclusion, yet the extent of these rights varies widely across countries. Notably, Uruguay, Chile, and Ecuador are among the few countries worldwide that grant universal voting rights to noncitizen residents across all political levels—local, intermediate, and national—placing them in a unique global group alongside New Zealand and Malawi (Altman, Huertas-Hernández, and Sánchez 2023). Uruguay's inclusion dates back to 1934, Chile to 1980, and Ecuador to 2008, reflecting the region's progressive stance in recognizing immigrants as integral members of the political community.

However, these advances coexist with practical and institutional challenges. While countries like Colombia and Peru grant voting rights primarily at the local level with moderate residency requirements, others, such as Uruguay, impose longer residency periods, limiting accessibility. These diverse approaches highlight both the region's aspirations for inclusion and the ongoing barriers to fully integrating immigrants into political life what Hammoud-Gallego and Freier (2023) describe as symbolic purposes.

Table A.3 summarizes immigrants rights to vote in South American countries.

To put in context the exercise of this right we know the follow heterogeneous context for Chile and Peru:

- In Chile, immigrants represent a significant portion of the electorate, accounting for 5.1% of the 2024 electoral roll, equivalent to 786,466 voters, with this share reaching up to 32% in areas of high immigrant concentration, such as the comuna of Santiago. Between the Constitutional Plebiscite of 2023 and the national elections of 2024, the number of registered immigrant voters increased by 16.3%. Registration in Chile is facilitated through accessible channels, including online platforms, enabling broad participation. Data comes from SERVEL (2024).
- In Peru, 153 foreign citizens were registered to vote in 2022, an increase from 26 in 2018. Registration in Peru requires in-person visits and substantial documentation, reflecting a more complex administrative process. Data comes from GOB-PE (2023).

Country	Legal Framework	Residency Requirement	Scope of Voting Rights
Chile	Article 14 of the 1980 Constitution	5 years	Immigrants can vote in national elections, including presidential and parliamentary elections.
Peru	Ley N.º26864 de Elecciones Municipales, 1997: art. 7	2 years	Immigrants can vote in municipal elections.
Colombia	Article 100 of the 1991 Constitution. RESOLUCION 542 DE 2015	5 years	Immigrants can vote in municipal and district elections.
Ecuador	Article 63 of the 2008 Constitution	5 years	Immigrants can vote in all local and national elections and plebiscites.
Uruguay	Article 78 of the 1967 Constitution	15 years	Immigrants can vote in national elections.
Argentina	Varies by province; for example, Buenos Aires Constitution, Article 61	Varies (e.g., 2 years in Buenos Aires)	Immigrants can vote in provincial and municipal elections; requirements differ by province.
Brazil	Article 14 number 2º, Constituição Federal	15 years	Immigrants have the right to vote in national or local elections.
Bolivia	Electoral Law (Ley del Régimen Electoral, Law No. 026, Article 45)	2 years	Immigrants can vote in municipal elections.
Paraguay	National Constitution, Article 120	3 years	Immigrants can vote in municipal elections.

TABLE A.3: Laws or Executive Decrees Referring to the Right to Vote of Immigrants in South America

A.4 Public Salience of Venezuelan's Migration

The influx of refugees and migrants from Venezuela has not gone unnoticed by citizens; rather, it has captured considerable attention from the general public. As illustrated in [Figure A.2](#), there is a notable surge in Google searches for the term “Venezuelans,” signaling an increased awareness and concern regarding the influx of Venezuelan refugees and migrants. There is a notable peak in the popularity of the issue between 2018 and 2020, coinciding with the significant influx of migrants to the region. To illustrate, when examining the trend in Peru (represented by the red line), the popularity of searches remained relatively low until around 2016, after which it began to rise steadily.

The heightened popularity of these searches not only demonstrates a broader societal interest and concern regarding Venezuelan migration but also reflects the recognition of the profound impact and significance of this phenomenon within the region.

A.5 Policies

The influx of Venezuelan migrants has prompted significant policy responses in host countries. Table [A.4](#) presents a chronological overview of key immigration policies implemented by Chile and Peru in response to the Venezuelan exodus. These policies reflect the evolving nature of the crisis and the host countries' attempts to manage its impact. Both nations have implemented a range of measures, from creating new visa categories and temporary residence permits to establishing shelters and modifying identification requirements. Notably, Chile's policies seem to focus more on border control and national security, while Peru's approach appears to emphasize regularization and socio-economic integration.

4 A SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION




Figure A.2: Public Saliency: Venezuelans

Note: The graph shows the 4-month moving average of the search interest relative to the highest point on the chart for the given region and time for the word “Venezolanos” (Venezuelans), from 2005 to May, 2023. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. A score of 0 means that there was not enough data for this term. Source: Authors’ own elaboration base on Google Trends’ data.

TABLE A.4: Immigration Policies During the Venezuela Migration Exodus

Country	Date	Institution	Description	Source
Chile	02/2022	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Formation of a working group with the Bolivian government, subsidizing and adopting measures presented by UNHCR such as the Regional Response Plan for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants	https://www.minrel.gob.cl/noticias-antteriores/situacion-migratoria-en-la-macro-zona-norte-de-chile
Chile	05/2023	Chamber of Deputies and Ministry of the Interior	Deployment of the Armed Forces at the border of the northern macro-zone for 3 months	https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1189669&idParte=10410548
Chile	07/2023	Ministry of the Interior and Public Security	National migration and foreign policy applying cross-cutting approaches for control such as biometric identification, new residency requirements, economic development, integration, family reunification, etc.	https://serviciomigraciones.cl/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/PNM-V-ERSION-EJECUTIVA.pdf
Peru	2017	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	National Migration Policy 2017-2025	http://transparencia.rree.gob.pe/index.php/datos-generales-11/13-normas-emitidas-por-la-entidad/133-decretos-supremos-ds/2017-5/10116-ds-n-015/file
Peru	2019	International agencies	Study on the socio-economic profile of the Venezuelan population and their host communities: a look towards inclusion	https://www.observatoriovenezolanodemigracion.org/noticias/politica-migratoria-cambiante-del-estado-peruano-ha-dificultado-la-inclusion-de-inmigrantes-venezolanos
Peru	2018	Presidency of Peru and Ministry of the Interior	Policies for control and identification: requirements for the PTP and Special Resident migratory status	https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2017/11018.pdf
Peru	2017	Municipality of San Juan de Miraflores	Creation of the largest shelter in Lima for Venezuelan migrants	https://perureports.com/meet-first-venezuelan-neighborhood-lima/6000/
Peru	2020	Presidency of Peru and Ministry of the Interior	Change from PTP to Temporary Permanence Permit Card (CPP) for people with irregular residence, in practice the benefited population was low	https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/decreto-supremo-que-a-prueba-medidas-especiales-excepcionale-decreto-supremo-n-010-2020-in-1895950-4/

(Continues in the next page)

Immigration Policies During the Venezuela Migration Exodus (continued)

Country	Date	Institution	Description	Source
Peru	2021	Presidency of Peru and Ministry of the Interior	Ease of immigration regularization for children and adolescents and expansion of the foreign ID card to include foreigners who have a request to access resident migration status	https://cdn.www.gob.pe/uploads/document/file/1813182/DS%20002-2021-IN.pdf?v=1618708384

B CHILEAN AND PERUVIAN'S PARTIES

We employ the CHES:LA project (Martínez-Gallardo et al. 2022), an expert survey on political parties' programmatic and ideological positions, to categorize most parties into ideological families. Tables B.5 and B.6 present the parties' ideological scores, assigned party families, and their positions on immigration as assessed by experts. We classify parties based on their ideological scores: those below 4 are categorized as "left," those above 7 as "right," and those between 4 and 7 as "center."

We observe a correlation between the parties' attitudes and their positions on migration. However, the CHES:LA survey relies on expert opinions of political parties rather than legislators' views and rhetoric, which limits our understanding of their positions and dynamics regarding the impact of Venezuelan immigration. Our work contributes to this field by providing more dynamic coverage of the issue and analyzing direct statements from legislators.

TABLE B.5: Parties Chile

	Party Family	L-R Ideol.	Immigration Position	Saliency
Amplitud	Right	-	-	-
Evolución Política	Right	7.33	6.92	3.69
Federación Regionalista Verde Social	Left	-	-	-
Izquierda Ciudadana	Left	-	-	-
Mov. Indep. de Renovación Absoluta	Left	-	-	-
Partido Comunista de Chile	Left	1.22	1.69	4.31
Partido Demócrata Cristiano	Center	5.00	4.58	3.31
Partido Humanista	Left	1.65	1.22	4.73
Partido Igualdad	Left	-	-	-
Partido Liberal de Chile	Left	-	-	-
Partido Progresista	Left	-	-	-
Partido Radical Chileno	Left	-	-	-
Partido Radical Socialdemócrata	Left	3.88	3.75	3.91
Partido Socialista de Chile	Left	3.11	2.58	3.77
Partido por la Democracia	Left	3.61	2.67	3.62
Renovación Nacional	Right	7.11	7.58	4.21
Revolución Democrática	Left	2.28	1.38	4.00
Unión Demócrata Independiente	Right	8.94	9.00	4.21

TABLE B.6: Parties Peru

	Party Family	L-R Ideol.	Immigration Position	Saliency
Acción Popular	Center	6.13	6.22	3.40
Alianza para el Progreso	Center	6.93	6.44	3.50
Avanza País	Right	7.50	6.40	4.50
Frente Amplio	Left	2.00	4.60	4.27
Frente Popular Agrícola del Perú	Center	4.79	5.75	2.80
Fuerza Popular	Right	7.80	7.70	5.00
Juntos por el Perú	Left	2.50	4.17	4.50
Partido Aprista Peruano	Right	7.27	7.00	5.00
Partido Democrático Somos Perú	Right	7.00	6.14	4.00
Partido Morado	Center	6.07	4.30	4.00
Partido Popular Cristiano	Right	7.93	6.11	4.45
Perú Libre	Left	0.67	8.83	6.50
Podemos Perú	Center	6.47	7.00	5.18
Renovación Popular	Right	9.83	9.33	7.17
Unión por el Perú	Left	2.42	6.90	5.20

Note: The ideological position goes from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Position on immigration is a 10 point scale going from 1 (welcoming) to 10 (restrictive). Immigration saliency is also a 10 point scale going from 1 (low) to 10 (high). Parties with out CHES score were classified manually by authors.

Source: Author's own elaboration based on CHES:LA

C MEASUREMENTS: LEGISLATORS' RHETORIC**C.1 Identifying Immigration Statements**

We identify immigration-related posts following several steps summarized in Figure C.3. We start by using an adapted dictionary approach, combining close reading of politicians' statements, machine learning techniques, and commonly used public words to reference immigration. Initially, we compile a list of relevant keywords related to immigration, such as "immigrant," "migrant," "refugee," and "asylum seeker" (see C.2). These keywords

filter posts by identifying those containing at least one of the specified terms.²⁴ Next, natural language processing techniques expand our dataset. We train a Naive Bayes Classification Model to identify posts similar to those classified by the dictionary. We also search for posts mentioning Venezuelans, carefully evaluating them since discussions about Venezuela extend beyond migration.

We hand-code all posts related to immigration in one country to assess the accuracy of our selection and ensure that only relevant statements are included in our analysis.²⁵ This process identifies word combinations that may refer to immigration and words that should not be included in our dictionary. Consequently, we create an updated dictionary of single words and word pairs to extend the analysis to other countries. Finally, we apply the updated dictionary to the remaining countries and have two independent coders evaluate a sample of 500 posts per country. The accuracy of classification exceeds 0.85 in all cases, indicating a high level of accuracy in identifying posts related to immigration while excluding unrelated content. We refine the dictionary based on misclassified cases, removing irrelevant classifications such as “migrating birds.”




Figure C.3: Summary of the steps for detecting immigration-related posts

Note: Blue refers to steps implemented with only one country (Perú), red refers to steps including both countries.

C.2 Dictionaries

This section presents the construction of dictionaries to identify the immigration issue. We begin with a minimum dictionary (refer to [Figure C.4](#)), followed by the incorporation of combinations of two words, as indicated in [Figure C.5](#). Finally, we include combinations of three words (see [Figure C.6](#)).

²⁴The initial dictionary focuses on terms directly related to immigration and excludes specific terms like “Venezuelan” by itself.

²⁵Three annotators coded the posts, and any discrepancies were thoroughly re-evaluated.

Figure C.4: Minimum initial dictionary

- Immigrants = ['migrantes', 'inmigrantes', 'inmigrante', 'xenofobia', 'refugiados', 'migratoria', 'inmigracion', 'migrante']
- Venezuela = ['venez', 'maduro', 'hugo chavez']
- Socialism = ['socialis', 'comunis', 'cuba', 'nicaragua', 'hugo chavez', 'fidel castro', 'evo morales', 'daniel ortega']
- Haiti = ['haiti', 'haitianos', 'hatianas']

Figure C.5: Dictionary of two words combinations

```
data = [ ("yosoyvenezolano", "años"), ("antecedentes", "extranjeros"), ("antimigratoria", "derechos"), ("antimigratoria", "presidente"),
  ("años", "inmigracion"), ("años", "japonesa"), ("campo", "extranjero"), ("cancilleriaperu", "migratoria"), ("cancilleriaperu",
  "venezolanos"), ("chile", "venezolanos"), ("ciudadanos", "extranjeros"), ("ciudades", "extranjero"), ("conmemoracion", "japonesa"),
  ("crisis", "huyen"), ("crisis", "migratoria"), ("derechos", "migrantes"), ("emigrar", "millones"), ("escapan", "miles"), ("exodo",
  "maduro"), ("extranjero", "migracion"), ("extranjero", "migratorias"), ("extranjero", "venezolanos"), ("extranjeros", "migraciones"),
  ("extranjeros", "socialismo"), ("extranjeros", "venezolanos"), ("extranjeros", "xenofobia"), ("familias", "inmigrantes"), ("familias",
  "migrantes"), ("familias", "migratoria"), ("familias", "venezolanos"), ("frontera", "migracionespe"), ("frontera", "migratoria"), ("frontera",
  "venezolanos"), ("hermanos", "huyen"), ("huyen", "maduro"), ("huyen", "venezolano"), ("huyen", "venezolanos"), ("inmigracion",
  "japonesa"), ("inmigracion", "migracion"), ("inmigrantes", "pais"), ("inmigrantes", "paises"), ("internacional", "migrante"),
  ("internacional", "refugiados"), ("japonesa", "marco"), ("japonesa", "migracion"), ("migracion", "solo"), ("migracion", "todas"),
  ("migracion", "venezolana"), ("migracion", "venezolanos"), ("migraciones", "personas"), ("migraciones", "situacion"), ("migraciones",
  "trabajo"), ("migraciones", "venezolanos"), ("migrantes", "niños"), ("migrantes", "pais"), ("migrantes", "personas"), ("migrantes",
  "situacion"), ("migrantes", "trump"), ("migrantes", "venezolano"), ("migrantes", "venezolanos"), ("migrantes", "venezuela"),
  ("migratoria", "niños"), ("migratoria", "paises"), ("migratoria", "personas"), ("migratoria", "politica"), ("migratoria", "trump"),
  ("migratorias", "puede"), ("migratorias", "solo"), ("migratorias", "todas"), ("miles", "refugiados"), ("niños", "trump"), ("pais",
  "xenofobia"), ("paises", "refugiados"), ("personas", "refugiados"), ("peruanos", "venezolana"), ("peruanos", "venezolanos"),
  ("peruanos", "xenofobia"), ("argentinos", "venezolana"), ("argentinos", "venezolanos"), ("argentinos", "xenofobia"), ("chilenos",
  "venezolana"), ("chilenos", "venezolanos"), ("chilenos", "xenofobia"), ("ecuatorianos", "venezolana"), ("ecuatorianos",
  "venezolanos"), ("ecuatorianos", "xenofobia"), ("colombianos", "venezolana"), ("colombianos", "venezolanos"), ("colombianos",
  "xenofobia"), ("problemas", "venezolana"), ("puede", "venezolanos"), ("trabajo", "venezolanos"), ("venezolana", "venezolanos") ]
```

Figure C.6: Dictionary with a combination of three words

```
data = [ ("frontera", "peru", "venez"), ("peruanos", "salud", "venezolanos"), ("perú", "educaci", "venez"), ("frontera", "cerr", "venez"),
  ("permiso", "renovable", "trabajo"), ("peru", "venezolanos", "ileg"), ("delinc", "frontera", "venez"), ("trabaj", "peruan", "venez"),
  ("venezol", "recibir", "peru"), ("venezol", "ingres", "frontera"), ("venezol", "salud", "frontera"), ("venezol", "golp", "miraflores"),
  ("venezol", "norte", "frontera"), ("venezol", "peruan", "dialogo"), ("venezol", "peruan", "explot"), ("venezol", "peru", "labor"),
  ("venezol", "fronter", "ecuador"), ("peru", "colombianos", "expuls"), ("frontera", "colombianos", "ingres"), ("frontera", "miner", "ilegal"),
  ("extra", "mineros", "ecuador"), ("refugio", "venezol", "frontera"), ("peru", "venezolanos", "proteger"), ("peru", "venezolanos",
  "porcentaje"), ("peru", "venezolanos", "hermandad"), ("peru", "venezolanos", "turista"), ("peru", "venezolanos", "calidad"), ("gracias",
  "venezolanos", "apoyar"), ("miles", "venezolanos", "apoyar"), ("argentina", "venezolanos", "peruanos"), ("afect", "venezol",
  "peruano"), ("crimin", "venezol", "fronte"), ("trabaj", "venezol", "solid"), ("preocupan", "venezol", "peruanos"), ("trabajo", "venezol",
  "visas"), ("nacionalizar", "venezol", "peru"), ("brazos", "venezol", "peru"), ("ilegad", "venezol", "peru"), ("bienvenid", "drama",
  "venezolanos"), ("trabaja", "reconstru", "venezolanos"), ("venezol", "chile", "protest"), ("venezol", "chile", "captur"), ("venezol", "chile",
  "acogi"), ("venezol", "chile", "ilegan"), ("venezol", "chile", "joven"), ("venezol", "peru", "comunidad"), ("venezol", "exilio", "ppkamigo"),
  ("venezol", "apoyemos", "peru") ]
```

C.3 Open AI

Our Python function configures ChatGPT-3.5 with a few instructions (detailed in the next section) and connects to the OpenAI API. The function processes all posts and

executes the given instructions. Based on the prompt in [subsection C.3.1](#). The cost of using the OpenAI API for this project was 8.53 USD.

Summary of the characteristics of the LLM:

- **Model:** GPT-3.5
- **Access:** Closed-source
- **Execution:** Accessed via API
- **Training Period:** Ended in April 2024
- **Publisher:** OpenAI
- **Implementation:** Used through Python in Google Colab with the `openai` package

Scores of 2 and 1 refer to posts advocating for immigration, from strong endorsements to subtle support. "Other" (0) includes posts discussing immigration without a clear stance. Scores of -1 and -2 cover posts opposing immigration, from mild concerns to strong opposition.

C.3.1 Prompt

The prompt we used to configure the language model parameters is detailed below. It is a complete list of instructions to avoid ambiguities during classification.

prompt = ("Prompt for Classifying Tweets on Immigration:" "Objective: Classify tweets from members of the Chilean Congress regarding their stance on immigration, " "based on the content and implications of the tweet. Pay special attention to the context, including irony, " "negation, and the specific use of language that may indicate criticism or support of immigration policies." "Classification Categories:" "Highly Pro-Immigration (2): Tweets that strongly advocate for immigration, emphasizing support through " "explicit messages against discrimination, highlighting economic benefits, or welcoming sentiments. " "Includes tweets using negation or irony to criticize anti-immigration stances, or directly accusing others of promoting hate or discrimination." "Pro-Immigration (1): Likely supportive but less emphatic, subtly advocating for immigrant rights or benefits. " "This includes criticizing restrictive policies proposed by others, questioning the motives behind such policies, " "or using indirect speech to oppose anti-immigration rhetoric (e.g., questioning the ethics or logic of restrictive policies)." "Other (0): Tweets that are descriptive or neutral, discussing immigration-related events, administrative actions, " "or mentioning issues without advocating for or against immigration policies. This includes discussions on geopolitical " "or humanitarian issues in countries like Venezuela without explicitly linking these issues to immigration stances." "Anti-Immigration (-1): Likely opposes immigration, subtly suggesting restrictions or expressing concerns " "over societal impacts without explicit hostility. This includes agreeing with or supporting policies that restrict or control immigration." "Highly Anti-Immigration (-2): Strongly opposes immigration, explicitly associating negative aspects such as " "crime or economic burdens with immigrants, or advocating for strict regulations and deportations. " "Clear expressions of support for restrictive or punitive immigration measures fall into this category." "Unrelated (99): Tweets that do not pertain to immigration or only mention it in passing without any clear stance " "or relevant content." "Key Considerations for Classification:" "1. Look for indicators of irony, sarcasm, or negation that may flip the apparent meaning of a statement. " "A tweet that on the surface might seem to support anti-immigration actions

but is actually criticizing such views should be considered pro-immigration." "2. Assess the context of quotes: determine whether the politician is endorsing the views they quote or using the quote to criticize those views." "3. Distinguish between criticism of foreign political situations and immigration views: Criticism of a political situation in another country should be classified as neutral unless it explicitly links to views on immigration." "Analyze the tweets provided below, and for each, indicate only the number(s) it pertains to (NEVER A TEXT), based on the central theme of the tweet in relation to the topics and keywords listed." "Remember, the classification should be based on the tweet, not on general expressions or sentiments. Do it from a Chilean or Peruvian Perspective. Provide only the number(s) of the relevant topic(s), nothing else.")

C.3.2 Validation

To validate our classification strategy, we employed two approaches. The first involved human coding.

Research Assistants From a pool of posts pre-selected by dictionaries as potentially discussing immigration, we sampled 954 posts for Chile and 646 for Peru. Two research assistants (RAs), undergraduate students majoring in social sciences, independently classified these posts, determining whether they genuinely discussed immigration.

The level of agreement between the annotators was high.²⁶ Subsequently, a coauthor reviewed the classifications and resolved any discrepancies between the RAs to establish the final reference classification.

This reference classification was then used to evaluate the performance of the OpenAI classification. Table C.7 presents the accuracy measures comparing the reference classification with OpenAI's results. The validation analysis reveals a strong agreement between OpenAI's classification and the reference classification, with an overall accuracy of 84.0% and a substantial Cohen's Kappa of 0.678. Particularly noteworthy is the excellent performance in identifying positive statements, demonstrated by high precision (0.866), recall (0.922), and F1-score (0.893) for this category. These results indicate that the OpenAI classification system is highly reliable.

TABLE C.7: Validation Metrics: OpenAI vs. Human Classification

Metric	Overall	Neutral (0)	Positive (1)	Negative (2)
Accuracy	0.840			
Cohen's Kappa	0.678			
Precision	-	0.780	0.866	0.782
Recall	-	0.580	0.922	0.809
F1-Score	-	0.664	0.893	0.796

Fighting Words approach Our second approach is to use **Fighting Words approach** to identify the most distinctive words associated with anti-immigration, pro-immigration, and "other" stances in political discourse. This approach calculates the log-odds ratio with a Dirichlet prior for each word across three categories, providing a measure of how strongly each word is associated with one category compared to the others.

²⁶The percentage of agreement is 86, and the Cohen's Kappa value is 0.67 showing significant agreement between coders

This approach highlights words that best capture the sentiment and themes of each stance, providing insights into the language patterns associated with different immigration views.

For example, among those with an anti-immigration stance, we find words such as “delincuentes” (criminals) and “antecedentes” (criminal records), reflecting a framing that associates immigrants with crime and emphasizes requirements for proof of good conduct (“antecedentes”) for entry (“ingreso”) into the country. Additionally, the term “extranjero” (foreigner) is used instead of “inmigrante” (immigrant), portraying immigrants as outsiders or alien to the nation.

In contrast, pro-immigration language includes words like “refugiados” (refugees), “personas” (people), and “niños” (children), which convey a more humanizing perspective, often evoking empathy. Terms such as “derechos” (rights) indicate a focus on protecting immigrants’ rights, while “xenofobia” (xenophobia) appears frequently in the context of condemning xenophobic attitudes or actions.

“Other” statements typically refer to government actions and policies, with terms like “comisión” (commission), “gobierno” (government), and “política” (policy), as well as words describing specific aspects of the immigration situation, such as “frontera” (border).

TABLE C.8: Fighting Words for Immigration Stance Categories

Anti-immigration		Pro-immigration		Other	
Word	Score	Word	Score	Word	Score
extranjeros	-4.96	migratoria	-5.07	comision	-5.06
peru	-5.13	inmigrantes	-5.09	gobierno	-5.14
gobierno	-5.13	migracion	-5.11	pais	-5.14
inmigracion	-5.31	politica	-5.22	peru	-5.25
peruanos	-5.39	derechos	-5.40	inmigracion	-5.31
migraciones	-5.51	peru	-5.44	ahora	-5.34
migracion	-5.57	niños	-5.57	inmigrantes	-5.38
antecedentes	-5.57	xenofobia	-5.60	maduro	-5.41
ingreso	-5.57	personas	-5.77	politica	-5.45
politica	-5.60	refugiados	-5.81	frontera	-5.56
solo	-5.67	inmigracion	-5.85	personas	-5.56
maduro	-5.67	migrante	-5.86	migracion	-5.60
delincuentes	-5.71	solo	-5.90	situacion	-5.69
haitianos	-5.78	venezuela	-5.93	trabajo	-5.69
venezuela	-5.78	debe	-5.93	venezolana	-5.74

Further details on how fighting word scores were calculated can be found below:

- **Text Vectorization:** First, the code converts cleaned text data into a document-term matrix using CountVectorizer, where each column represents a word, and each row represents a document (tweet).
- **Frequency Counts:** The words are then separated based on stance categories (anti-immigration, pro-immigration, and other), with word counts summed across documents within each category.
- **Log-Odds Calculation with Dirichlet Prior:** For each word, the log-odds ratio is computed with a Dirichlet prior to prevent zero-frequency issues and to smooth

low-frequency counts. This calculation identifies words with the highest log-odds scores in each category, indicating their distinctiveness for that stance.

- Top Words Extraction: Finally, the code extracts the top words for each category based on their log-odds scores, reporting words that are most likely to distinguish one category from the others.

C.3.3 Justification for Using OpenAI API (Closed-Source Model)

As recommended by best practices for closed LLMs by Barrie, Palmer, and Spirling (2024), the trade-offs of using proprietary models are acknowledged and justified by the need for high performance and contextual accuracy, as discussed below. The decision to use OpenAI's proprietary API (ChatGPT-3.5) was driven by its demonstrated superior accuracy in managing Spanish-language data. Many mainstream LLMs, such as LLaMA, are pretrained on English-dominant corpora, which limits their performance in non-English languages, giving OpenAI a clear advantage (Zhao et al. 2024). For instance, Ahuja et al. (2024) show that GPT-4 outperforms PaLM2 and Gemini-Pro across more datasets when using non-English data.

Specifically, OpenAI allows us to excel in capturing context-dependent meaning, irony, and other subtle features critical for analyzing political discourse of Latin American politicians. While proprietary systems raise concerns about replication and transparency, OpenAI mitigates these limitations through comprehensive documentation and we provide the prompt and model characteristics for future researchers. Additionally, its efficiency in processing large datasets ensures scalability and feasibility, making it indispensable for our analysis. Although open-source models offer benefits in version control and reproducibility, they lack the robustness needed to handle complex linguistic constructs in non-English datasets, which is essential for this study.

C.4 Ideological Score

To unpack whether political leaders revise their language and ideological framing we estimate an ideological score per each post following Le Pennec (2024). This measure indicates to what degree a post of a politician is similar to the corpus of other posts of the parties considered as left-wing or right-wing. This method builds on the *Wordscores* method (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003).

We computed the frequencies p_w^R and p_w^L that represent how frequent a word w is in all the posts in the left or right

$$p_w^i = \frac{\sum_{j \in i} c_{wj}}{\sum_{j \in i} m_j}$$

where c_{wj} is the counts of word w in statement j , and m_j is the total number of words of statement j . We estimated these frequencies in a year basis, allowing right-left to vary the way they expressed over time. We also performed this analysis for the posts that were not classified as discussing immigration issues.

Using these frequencies, we can compute the right-wing score of each word w :

$$s_w = \frac{p_w^R}{p_w^R + p_w^L} - \frac{p_w^L}{p_w^R + p_w^L} \quad (2)$$

A post j score S_j , representing the parties' positioning in the left-right axis is calculated by:

$$S_j = \frac{\sum_w p_{wj} \times s_w}{S_R} \quad (3)$$

where S_R is the score of the aggregation of all the posts of the right-wing group.²⁷ Thus, the score of a post is not limited to a specific range, but a score of -1 represents an average post from the left, while a score of 1 represents an average post from the right. In both cases, these scores are estimated by utilizing the vocabularies associated with the left and right wings for posts not related to migration.

D EXAMPLES OF CLASSIFICATION

All translations were made using OpenAI.

D.1 Examples of Politicians Linking Immigration Issues to Venezuela's Left-Wing Regime

Peru

- "El socialismo real acaba en migraciones masivas. Por eso, los regímenes socialistas han llegado a construir muros: no para impedir que los extranjeros entren en manada para disfrutar de los frutos del socialismo, sino para evitar que los locales escapen de su fracaso."
"Real socialism ends in mass migrations. That's why socialist regimes have come to build walls: not to keep foreigners from flocking in to enjoy socialism's fruits, but to prevent locals from escaping its failure."
- "No ha habido en Venezuela un gobierno que le haya hecho tanto daño y causado tanto sufrimientos a la juventud venezolana como el gobierno de Maduro. Hoy somos un país vacío de jóvenes por el éxodo."
"There has not been a government in Venezuela that has done so much harm and caused so much suffering to Venezuelan youth as Maduro's government. Today we are a country emptied of young people due to the exodus."
- "¿Por qué Amnistía Internacional no se atreve a amenazar a Chile o Ecuador sobre los migrantes venezolanos? ¿O mejor, por qué no le grita a Maduro para que no atropelle los DDHH de su gente y no tengan que huir? Que no venga a dar órdenes a nuestros militares que defienden la frontera."
"Why doesn't Amnesty International dare to threaten Chile or Ecuador over Venezuelan migrants? Or better yet, why don't they shout at Maduro so he stops trampling on his people's human rights and forcing them to flee? They shouldn't come here to give orders to our soldiers defending the border."
- "@HDeSotoPeru no solo dice que solucionará el problema de la inmigración, sino que tiene un plan. Necesitamos sancionar a los delincuentes y formalizar a la gran mayoría que vienen a aportar a nuestro país. Mi solidaridad con quienes huyen del genocidio socialista de Maduro."
"@HDeSotoPeru not only says he will solve the immigration problem but also has a plan. We need to sanction criminals and formalize the vast majority who come to contribute to our country. My solidarity with those fleeing Maduro's socialist genocide."
- "@littlepipedream @otravezandres @elcomercioperu @PoliticaECpe JPP sigue defendiendo un modelo criminal: mata de hambre o directamente a quienes gobiernan. No lo dice @otravezandres, lo dicen los hechos, la historia y sobre todo los refugiados que se escaparon de Venezuela, Cuba y otros experimentos socialistas."
"@littlepipedream @otravezandres @elcomercioperu @PoliticaECpe JPP continues to defend a criminal model: it starves or outright kills those it governs. It's not @otravezandres saying this; the facts, history, and above all the refugees who escaped from Venezuela, Cuba, and other socialist experiments say it."

²⁷This is done to preserve the distance between the reference texts (Martin and Vanberg 2008).

Chile

- “Una verdadera fiesta de delincuencia la caravana de migrantes que está generando el caos en Centroamérica. Sólo un sistema es capaz de promover el Caos como forma de acción, y este es el Comunismo. Con el gentil patrocinio del Foro de Sao Paulo, @DiazCanelB y @NicolasMaduro.”
“The migrant caravan creating chaos in Central America is a true crime spree. Only one system can promote chaos as a form of action, and that’s Communism, with the gentle sponsorship of the São Paulo Forum, @DiazCanelB and @NicolasMaduro.”
- “Comunidad de Venezolanos en Chile solicitan solidaridad con los presos políticos del régimen de Maduro.”
“The Venezuelan community in Chile is calling for solidarity with the political prisoners of Maduro’s regime.”
- “Aquí el Alcalde @danieljadue muestra la hilacha. Prefiere defender al Gobierno corrupto, castrista comunista y tiránico de Maduro que defender a los venezolanos que están siendo diezmados por el hambre y la enfermedad. Así son los miembros disciplinados del @PCdeChile!”
“Here Mayor @danieljadue shows his true colors. He prefers defending the corrupt, Castro-style, communist, tyrannical Maduro government over defending the Venezuelans who are being devastated by hunger and disease. That’s how the disciplined members of the @PCdeChile are!”
- “Venezolanos escapan a Chile del socialismo <https://t.co/ygkVgXW6Yj> y @labeasanchez y @SenadorGuillier quieren llevarnos por ese camino.”
“Venezuelans flee socialism to Chile <https://t.co/ygkVgXW6Yj>, yet @labeasanchez and @SenadorGuillier want to lead us down that same path.”
- “Y pensar que el Partido Comunista persigue y agrede a los inmigrantes y perseguidos políticos venezolanos...”
“And to think that the Communist Party harasses and attacks Venezuelan immigrants and political refugees...”

D.2 Examples of Pro, and Anti-immigration posts

TABLE D.9: Examples of Pro, and Anti-immigration posts in Peru

Country	Anti-Immigration	Pro-Immigration
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “124 delincuentes con armas y drogas [...] 118 venezolanos. Todo extranjero en el territorio nacional con antecedentes, ilegales [...] DEPORTARLOS” “124 criminals with weapons and drugs [...] 118 Venezuelans. Any foreigner in the national territory with criminal records, illegal [...] DEPORT THEM” • “Que vergüenza da ver a fiscales liberando a choferes extranjeros sin licencia de conducir [...] ¿Que espera el gobierno para expulsarlo?” “It’s shameful to see prosecutors releasing foreign drivers without a driver’s license [...] What is the government waiting for to expel them?” • “La política migratoria @MigracionesPe donde está? Cómo es que se puede ser tan permisivo? Cuál es la data que maneja el Gob? Se deben dar rptas inmediatas pues la pandemia de la delincuencia también mata.” “Where is the migration policy @MigracionesPe? How can they be so permissive? What data is the government using? Immediate answers are needed because the crime pandemic also kills.” • “Es xenofobia apoyar que expulsen a los delincuentes extranjeros?” “Is it xenophobic to support the expulsion of foreign criminals?” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “En Navidad recordamos el nacimiento de un niño en medio de un viaje forzoso [...] No hagamos a los migrantes en el Perú lo que no queremos que les hagan a nuestros compatriotas” “At Christmas, we remember the birth of a child amid a forced journey [...] Let’s not do to migrants in Peru what we don’t want them to do to our fellow citizens” • “Para un país que tiene millones peruanos fuera inaudito expulsar refugiados extranjeros” “For a country with millions of Peruvians abroad, it’s unheard of to expel foreign refugees” • “No ha habido en Venezuela un gobierno que le haya hecho tanto daño y causado tanto sufrimientos a la juventud venezolana como el gobierno de Maduro. Hoy somos un país vacío de jóvenes por el éxodo” “There has not been a government in Venezuela that has caused so much harm and suffering to Venezuelan youth as Maduro’s government. Today we are a country emptied of youth due to the exodus” • “@HDeSotoPeru no solo dice que solucionará el problema de la inmigración, sino que tiene un plan. Necesitamos sancionar a los delincuentes y formalizar a la gran mayoría que vienen a aportar a nuestro país. Mi solidaridad con quienes huyen del genocidio socialista de Maduro.” “@HDeSotoPeru not only says he will solve the immigration problem, but he has a plan. We need to sanction criminals and formalize the vast majority who come to contribute to our country. My solidarity with those fleeing Maduro’s socialist genocide.”

TABLE D.10: Examples of Pro, and Anti-immigration posts in Chile

Country	Anti-Immigration	Pro-Immigration
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Queremos a estas personas deshumanizadas fuera de nuestras fronteras”: AFEP pide la expulsión de venezolanos “We want these dehumanized people out of our borders”: AFEP calls for the expulsion of Venezuelans • “Este es el estándar del nuevo director nacional del INDH? [...] Chileno primero los migrantes y el resto a la fila” “Is this the standard of the new national director of the INDH? [...] Chileans first, migrants and the rest get in line” • “Es muy duro para las regiones del sur que les digamos que la violencia q sufren todos los días es “legítima”; como es muy duro para la gente del norte que les digamos que sus plazas y calles se pueden llenar de migrantes porq la migración “es un derecho”. ¿Lo vivimos nosotr@s?” “It is very hard for southern regions to be told that the violence they suffer daily is “legitimate”; and for the northern people, it is very hard to be told that their squares and streets can be filled with migrants because “migration is a right.” Do we experience it ourselves?” • “Hoy la Cámara de Diputados aprobó nuestro proyecto de migraciones. Gran paso adelante para seguir poniendo orden en nuestra casa en materia de migraciones y así combatir mejor la inmigración ilegal y el ingreso a Chile de males como delincuencia, narcotráfico y crimen organizado.” “Today the House of Representatives approved our migration project. A big step forward to continue putting order in our home in terms of migration and thus better combat illegal immigration and the entry into Chile of evils such as crime, drug trafficking, and organized crime.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Esta es la realidad a la que nos enfrentamos. Debemos ser generosos y acoger a nuestros hermanos venezolanos que huyen de la tiranía de Maduro Venezuela” “This is the reality we face. We must be generous and welcome our Venezuelan brothers fleeing Maduro’s tyranny Venezuela” • “.@joaperezolea llama al Gobierno a tener humanidad, por caso de embarazada venezolana que perdió a su hijo fuera de consulado chileno en Tacna. Además pide dar estatus de refugiados a cientos de desplazados políticos de dictadura de Maduro” “.@joaperezolea calls on the government to show humanity in the case of a pregnant Venezuelan who lost her child outside the Chilean consulate in Tacna. He also calls for granting refugee status to hundreds of political refugees from Maduro’s dictatorship” • “Ayer se produjeron manifestaciones de odio, intolerancia y de características fascistas en contra de l@s migrantes. Todavía son minoritarias. Debemos rechazar el odio, la xenofobia y la intolerancia con fuerza y energía. La Patria es humanidad.” “Yesterday there were hateful, intolerant, and fascist-like demonstrations against migrants. They are still a minority. We must reject hatred, xenophobia, and intolerance with strength and energy. The Homeland is humanity.” • “Todas las personas tienen derechos y los migrantes son igualmente personas a quienes debemos reconocer como aportes a nuestra economía” “All people have rights, and migrants are equally people whom we must recognize as contributions to our economy”

E MEASUREMENT DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

TABLE E.11: Number of Posts per Country and legislature

Country	Legislature	Tweets during 2013-2020	Tweets during 2018-2019	Number of Legislators
Chile	2018-2022	1,271,545	299,915	141
Peru	2016-2020	754,565	215,518	114

Notes: The “Legislature” column indicates the years of the legislature under study for each country. The third column shows the total number of posts posted by these individuals between 2013 and 2020, which forms our sample for analyzing the evolution of immigration issue salience. The “2018-2019” column presents the number of posts posted right after the immigration shock, representing the sample used to examine how politicians construct rhetoric around immigration. Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data retrieved from X.

TABLE E.12: Descriptive Statistics for Posts after the immigration shock (2018 and 2019)

Country	Posts	Imm. (% of Posts)	Immigration Posts (% of Imm.)			
			Pro-Imm.	Anti-Imm.	Venezuela	Socialism
Chile	299,915	0.63	73.00	11.09	16.03	3.02
Peru	215,518	0.24	61.00	23.58	46.67	4.89
Total	515,433	0.47	68.91	15.69	27.3	3.71

Notes: The first column shows the total number of legislators’ posts in 2018-2019 (post-immigration shock). The second column is the percentage of posts about immigration. The remaining columns are estimated based on the number of posts about immigration. Authors’ elaboration based on data retrieved from X.

TABLE E.13: Summary Statistics by Legislators

Variable	N	Min	Max	Mean	p50	p25	p75	p90
Total Tweets	254	0	17209	2029.264	1264	525	2554	5105
Share of Tweets Imm	241	0	5.2545	0.4430	0.2374	0.0562	0.5994	1.0962
Frames % of Imm. Tw.:								
Share Socialism	182	0	100	3.7143	0	0	0	11.1111
Share Venezuela	182	0	100	27.3167	16.6667	0	50	75.8621
Share Pro-Immigration	182	0	100	68.9158	75.7353	50	100	100
Share Anti-Immigration	182	0	100	15.6922	2.8783	0	20	50

F EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: REGIONAL EXPOSURE TO THE IMMIGRATION SHOCK

To further examine the impact of immigration exposure, we leverage regional variation in immigrant inflows, hypothesizing that areas with higher inflows (e.g., frontier and capital regions) exhibit increased engagement with immigration discourse or specific framings (see [Figure F.7a](#) and [Figure F.7b](#)). The adjusted model is specified as follows:

$$Y_{p,18-19} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Right_p + \beta_2 Center_p + \beta_3 \Delta imm_{p,12-17} + \gamma X_p + \mu_c + \varepsilon_p \quad (4)$$


In this equation, $(\Delta imm_p = \frac{NewImmigrants_p}{Population_p})$ measures the share of immigrants who arrived from another country in the last five years (2012–2017) relative to the district population, as recorded in both countries' censuses. This captures the regional exposure to immigration at the district level. β_3 represents the effect of this exposure on legislators' behavior. Since we incorporate regional exposure at the district level, district fixed effects are omitted, but we include country dummies μ_c and control for the number of legislators per district i to ensure that variations in discourse are not confounded by different levels of political competition across districts. The dependent variable Y_p and the interpretation of β_1 remain consistent with equation 1.

To address the non-random allocation of immigrants—where migrants may settle in districts that are more welcoming or economically prosperous—we employ a shift-share instrument:

$$\widehat{\Delta imm_{p,12-17}} = \sum_n \theta_{p,07}^n \times \Delta \log(imm)_{12-17}^n \quad (5)$$

Here, $\theta_{p,07}^n$ represents the share of immigrants from country n in district p pre-shock, while $\Delta \log(imm)_{12-17}^n$ captures the log change in immigrant stock.²⁸ Our shift-share instrument addresses potential endogeneity by leveraging pre-existing settlement patterns. Causal interpretation of equation 4 relies on the assumption that pre-shock immigrant distributions, rather than new influxes, drive variation. The instrument assumes new migrants settle in areas with established ethnic communities, whose pre-shock size remains unaffected by concurrent political shifts. In the absence of the Venezuelan exodus, political rhetoric trends would likely have been consistent across regions, allowing variation in initial shares to isolate the impact of exposure on political behavior. This approach aligns with studies on immigration inflows, such as Ajzenman, Dominguez, and Undurraga (2023), Roza and Vargas (2021), and Lebow et al. (2024).

²⁸We computed this using UN data, for a few top sources (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Spain, the United States, and Venezuela for both countries, and Haiti for Chile and Japan for Peru) to other LAC countries (excluding Chile and Peru).



(a) New Immigrants in the period 2012-17
 Note: This map shows regions in Chile and Perú. The colors illustrate the share of the population in different regions in Chile and Perú that have arrived from a foreign country in the period 2012-2017. Source: 2017 census for Chile and Perú.

(b) Share of Posts discussing immigration in 2018
 Note: This map shows regions in Chile and Peru. The colors illustrate the share of the posts by legislators representing the different regions in Chile and Perú that refer to immigration. Source: authors calculations.

Figure F.7: Comparison of New Immigrants and Immigration-Related Posts

G RESULTS: SALIENCE

G.1 Saliency by Party Family

Does the increase in saliency vary across party families? As shown in Table G.14 (Column 1), the rise in saliency does not significantly differ among party families, with right- and center-aligned legislators engaging at similar levels to their leftist counterparts.²⁹ One possible explanation for this uniformity is the variation in party families' exposure to immigration shocks (e.g., border areas or capital cities), where high immigrant inflows may heighten saliency through direct demographic and economic impacts. However, our IV analysis (Columns 2–3, Table G.14) reveals no significant relationship between regional exposure and saliency. Even when exposure is interacted with party families (Column 3), we fail to reject the null hypothesis. These null effects suggest that legislators' immigration exposure does not significantly influence their rhetoric. Instead, immigration discourses appear to be shaped more by national-level debates than by localized dynamics.




Figure G.8: 12-Month Moving Average of Immigration Saliency - Chile and Peru (2013-2020)

Note: The figure shows the saliency of immigration operationalized as the ratio of statements about immigration to the total number of public statements made. For this plot, we included legislators' posts from 2013 to 2020. Left (red), Center (yellow), and Right (blue) are defined as discussed in B. The shaded areas around each line represent 95% CI. Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data retrieved from X

²⁹Figure G.8 shows saliency by party families, with overlapping CIs indicating similar increases across all.

VARIABLES	(1) Imm Tweets (%)	(2) Imm Tweets (%)
Right	-0.104 (0.109)	-0.086 (0.095)
Center	0.134 (0.134)	0.149 (0.115)
Share Imm		0.043* (0.026)
Female	0.083 (0.112)	0.067 (0.112)
Peru		-0.357*** (0.101)
Number of Legislators		0.000 (0.003)
Number of Posts/1000	-0.000 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.011)
Observations	241	241
R-squared	0.329	0.140
Controls	Yes	Yes
Model	OLS	IV
F-stat		115.9

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE G.14: Effects of exposure to immigration on legislators' salience of immigration.

Notes: The table displays the results of OLS and IV estimates on posts posted in 2018 and 2019 from all legislators included in the analysis. Individual members as the unit of analysis. The dependent variables are the share of immigration-related posts as explained in subsection C.1. All regressions control for the politician's gender, the number of representatives in their electoral district, and their total number of posts. The F-stat indicates the F statistic of the first stage.

G.2 Benchmark Salience: COVID




Figure G.9: 12-Month Moving Average of Covid Salience - Chile and Peru (2013-2022)

Note: The DV is the salience of covid operationalized as the ratio of statements about Covid-19 to the total number of public statements made. Left, Center and Right are defined as discussed in Figure . The shaded areas around each line represent 95% CI. Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data retrieved from X

H RESULTS: PRO AND ANTI-IMMIGRATION

There is evidence of a difference positioning between right and left parties regarding pro and anti-immigration statements. Columns 1 and 2 shows that right-wing legislators

posted 18.5 percentage points (pp) fewer pro-immigration posts and 12.9 pp more anti-immigration posts than their left-wing [Table H.15](#). Nonetheless, after controlling for regional exposure (columns 3–4), anti-immigration differences are no longer significant.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pro-Imm	Anti-Imm	Pro-Imm	Anti-Imm
Right	-18.473*** (5.660)	12.941*** (4.018)	-35.732** (15.906)	9.876 (10.150)
Center	-1.073 (8.782)	9.091 (7.621)	-12.933 (13.151)	18.239 (11.242)
Share Imm			3.154** (1.330)	-0.069 (1.138)
Female	0.063 (5.876)	-1.305 (5.415)	0.543 (4.537)	-1.192 (4.004)
Number of Legislators			-0.278 (0.313)	-0.209 (0.310)
Number of Posts/1000	0.046 (0.748)	0.548 (0.674)	0.034 (0.583)	0.344 (0.575)
Observations	182	182	182	182
R-squared	0.357	0.395	0.249	0.201
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Model	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
F-stat			56.86	56.86

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

TABLE H.15: Party Families and Position Toward the Immigration Issue.

Notes: Models estimated using data from members of Congress who discussed immigration in 2018-2019 on X. The unit of analysis is individual legislators. Dependent variables represent the proportion of immigration-related, calculated as a share of each legislator's total immigration-related posts. All models control for legislator gender, district magnitude (number of representatives per electoral district), and total post volume. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The F-stat indicates the F statistic of the first stage.

Interestingly, while right-wing legislators are less pro-immigration than their left-wing counterparts, most of their statements (over 60%) remain pro-immigration, with fewer than 20% being anti-immigration.

[Figure H.10](#) illustrates the distribution of pro- and anti-immigration statements across legislators in each party family. Across all party families, anti-immigration statements are skewed toward 0, while pro-immigration statements are skewed toward 100, even among right-wing legislators. This pattern contrasts sharply with developed countries,

where right-wing parties predominantly take anti-immigration stances (e.g., Gessler and Hunger 2022; Hutter and Kriesi 2022; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020).




Figure H.10: Anti-Immigration and Pro-Immigration by Party Families

Note: Lines represent the density distribution of posts posted in 2018 and 2019. Vertical lines represent the median values. Parties are grouped in families (represented by colors) following [section B](#). Pro and anti-immigration statements were classified using OpenAI.

I RESULTS: TOPIC ANALYSIS ON IMMIGRATION STATEMENTS REFERRING TO VENEZUELA

Table I.16 confirms the main results. In Chile, left-wing discourse emphasizes migrants' conditions (e.g., Topic 1), while right-wing discourse highlights political aspects with terms like 'dictadura' and 'Maduro' (e.g., Topic 4). In Peru, right-wing parties frame Venezuelans as victims of an authoritarian regime (e.g., 'hermanos,' 'huyen,' 'Maduro' in Topic 1), whereas left-wing parties focus on work-related issues (e.g., 'trabajo,' 'jovenes' in Topic 3).

	<i>Chile</i>				<i>Peru</i>			
	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4
	chile	nuestro	frontera	maduro	maduro	migracion	trabajo	venezuela
	venezolanos	pais	para	dictadura	venezolanos	venezolana	venezolanos	peruanos
	venezuela	venezolano	chilena	gobierno	para	sobre	jovenes	chile
	para	rector	senadomavarro	chileno	pais	para	peruanos	peru
	sobre	primer	informante	presidente	huyen	peru	para	venezolanos
	migrantes	quien	humanitaria	venezolanos	hermanos	comision	buen	total
	migracion	bello	crisis	consulado	como	rree	inmigrantes	amigos
	situacion	gran	durante	ddhh	nuestros	ahora	ministro	socialismo
	ingreso	migrar	sido	miles	peru	exteriores	porque	pais
	piñera	compromiso	hipocrita	puede	esta	relaciones	ciudadanos	democratas
%	55.8	8.6	9.4	26.2	41.6	15.3	16.8	26.3
Left (%)	61.9	13.4	10.3	14.4	17.9	5.1	41.0	35.9
Center (%)	44.0	4.0	4.0	48.0	34.5	28.6	6.0	31.0
Right (%)	55.8	6.7	10.8	26.7	51.7	10.6	16.6	21.2
Distance L-R	6.0	6.7	-0.5	-12.2	-33.7	-5.5	24.5	14.7

TABLE I.16: Topic Analysis - NMF 4 clusters regarding Venezuelan statements by ideological party family

Note: The columns show the most probable words within each topic, and the topic distributions among the party families by country. All the sample of immigration post from 2018 and 2019 in Peru and Chile was used.

J RESULTS: SOCIALISM AND VENEZUELA

VARIABLES	(1) Socialism	(2) Venezuela	(3) Socialism	(4) Venezuela
Right	4.809** (2.044)	11.487*** (4.364)	2.986** (1.387)	11.659*** (3.992)
Center	4.668 (4.430)	-9.630 (7.420)	3.628 (4.526)	-3.241 (6.685)
Female	0.092 (2.762)	-8.258 (5.394)	-0.038 (2.739)	-6.690 (4.201)
Share Imm			-0.101 (0.262)	-0.266 (1.229)
Peru			0.300 (2.152)	24.854*** (6.837)
Number of Legislators			0.045 (0.184)	0.718** (0.291)
Number of Posts/1000	-0.162 (0.246)	-0.412 (0.742)	0.003 (0.174)	-0.385 (0.521)
Observations	182	182	182	182
R-squared	0.337	0.525	0.025	0.305
Model	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
F-stat			97.42	97.42

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE J.17: Party Families and Framing Used when Discussing the Immigration Issue.

Notes: Models estimated using data from members of Congress who discussed immigration in 2018-2019 on X. The unit of analysis is individual legislators. Dependent variables represent the proportion of immigration-related statements falling into each specified category, calculated as a share of each legislator's total immigration-related posts. All models control for legislator gender, district magnitude (number of representatives per electoral district), and total post volume. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The F-stat indicates the F statistic of the first stage




Figure J.11: Probability of having a high share of statements about Socialism by party family (baseline Left)

Note: This figure presents the estimated coefficients (Beta) from a Linear Probability Model, illustrating the change in the probability of support for Right (blue) and Center (red) ideological positions across different thresholds (i.e., alternative definitions of high-share of statements about socialism). Each coefficient represents the estimated increase in probability associated with each threshold, with confidence intervals displayed to show the level of uncertainty. The results highlight how shifts in threshold levels do not influence the results.




Figure J.12: Probability of having a high share of statements about Venezuela by party family (baseline Left)

Note: This figure presents the estimated coefficients (Beta) from a Linear Probability Model, illustrating the change in the probability of support for Right (blue) and Center (red) ideological positions across different thresholds (i.e., alternative definitions of high-share of statements about Venezuela). Each coefficient represents the estimated increase in probability associated with each threshold, with confidence intervals displayed to show the level of uncertainty. The results highlight how shifts in threshold levels do not influence the results.


K RESULTS: HAITI

Figure K.13: Number of Immigrants in Chile per Origin Country

VARIABLES	(1) Haiti	(2) Venezuela	(3) Haiti	(4) Venezuela	(5) Haiti	(6) Venezuela
Right	-7.479** (3.330)	8.665** (4.124)	-5.777* (3.108)	6.456 (4.078)	-5.268 (5.954)	12.245* (6.591)
Center	8.318 (9.140)	4.594 (5.135)	7.876 (9.712)	1.421 (5.931)	7.999 (9.744)	2.811 (6.013)
Share Imm			-0.700 (0.604)	0.042 (0.993)		
Right*Share Imm					-0.800 (0.899)	-1.098 (1.304)
No Right*Share Imm					-0.619 (0.867)	0.967 (1.499)
Observations	115	115	109	109	109	109
R-squared	0.364	0.327	0.088	0.058	0.088	0.019
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Model	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV
F-stat			103.8	103.8	33.63	33.63

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE K.18: Party Families and Framing Used when Discussing the Immigration Issue.

Notes: Models estimated using data from members of Congress who discussed immigration in 2018-2019 on X. The unit of analysis is individual legislators. Dependent variables represent the proportion of immigration-related statements falling into each specified category, calculated as a share of each legislator's total immigration-related posts. All models control for legislator gender, district magnitude (number of representatives per electoral district), and total post volume. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The F-stat indicates the F statistic of the first stage

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