

Political Agenda Shaping and Differentiation in Response to Unprecedented Shocks: The Venezuelan Migration Crisis*

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Abstract

This study examines how political parties respond to an unprecedented shock that dramatically changes the importance of a particular issue on their agendas. We investigate whether political parties develop distinct policy agendas in an area that previously received minimal attention but, due to the shock, becomes one of the primary concerns among the public. The study analyzes the Venezuelan crisis, which has resulted in a significant influx of over 6.1 million immigrants to Latin American countries unaccustomed to such flows, posing a unique challenge. Using computational text-analysis methods applied to a corpus of over 3 million tweets from Chilean and Peruvian parliament members between 2013 and 2021, our findings demonstrate that all party families increase the salience of the immigration issue without remarkable differences. Additionally, within the context of this issue, different than the European experience where right-wing parties own the issue we found that parties from the left react to the immigration shock similarly to the right. Instead, parties differentiate, employing distinct vocabularies aligned with their ideologies and emphasizing different aspects. These findings have significant implications for understanding the transformative power of unexpected events that emerge as new topics on the political agenda, particularly within the context of the emerging phenomenon of South-South migration.

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1 Introduction

How do unprecedented shocks shape the political agenda? From previous research, we know that crisis-like events serve as catalysts for political mobilization, bringing about political change. Yet, we still have a limited understanding of how these events change the political agenda. Especially when a crisis leads to changes on the extensive margins of the agenda, incorporating a new issue into the politician’s political repertoire. Do political parties vie for ownership of the issue? Do they strive to emphasize specific aspects of the issue? Are there variations in how parties across different ideological families address this issue? This paper addresses these questions by proposing a theoretical framework that examines the relationship between crises, the behavior of legislators, and the emergence of new agenda items. We apply the theoretical framework to understand the Venezuelan immigration crisis and the responses of parliamentary elites in hosting countries, which represents one of the most significant post-World War II exoduses.

Previous studies have examined the intensive margins of the political agenda, in other words, the politicization of existing topics after crises. While this type of change is important as it involves shifts in emphasis, prioritization, and allocation of attention to specific issues, we believe the conditions are different when crises lead to changes in the extensive margins of the political agenda. This refers to modifications made at the agenda’s outer edge, involving adding new topics to the political discourse. In these circumstances, we witness an expansion of the overall scope of the political rhetoric employed by legislators and an opportunity for all actors to build their niche.

Our theoretical framework provides an effective approach for analyzing global crises, such as migration shocks, and their impact on the rhetoric of parliamentary elites. These lawmakers play a crucial role in shaping the dynamics of the political landscape and potentially driving changes in the existing status quo. We argue that in the face of a dramatic crisis that triggers an expansion of the political debate (extensive margin), numerous political actors are likely to address the issue due to the high cost associated with dismissing it. Furthermore, a lack of clear ownership among them is expected. We apply this framework to the specific context of the Venezuelan displacement, where, given its significant scale, all political actors would be compelled to heighten the saliency of the issue. Moreover, considering immigration as a topic was not previously salient in most South American countries, we do not expect any particular group of parties (from the left or the right) to assume sole leadership of the issue in the short term within these countries.

We tested our argument using a unique natural experiment: the significant influx of over 7.2 million people to countries that had not traditionally received immigrants in recent decades.¹ Specifically, we examined how members of the Chilean and Peruvian parliaments, two of the largest recipient nations, addressed this emergent issue using text analysis of their political statements. This sudden population surge impacted public opinion and strained available resources, placing pressure on political leaders. We constructed a novel dataset that captured parties’ frames and emphasis on the immigration issue based on legislators’ public statements

¹Studies such as [Card \(2001\)](#); [Borjas \(2013\)](#); [Dustmann, Glitz, and Frattini \(2008\)](#), among others, have also considered immigration shocks as natural experiments for receiving countries.

on Twitter. The dataset encompassed over 3 million tweets between 2013 and 2021. By analyzing panel data, we traced individual legislators' rhetorical changes and strategies in real-time, enabling us to analyze the different mechanisms at play during the crisis. Complementing our analysis, we incorporated party-level data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey: Latin America (CHES:LA, [Martínez-Gallardo et al., 2022](#)), which surveyed experts about parties' stances on various issues, including immigration.

Our findings demonstrate that all party families² increase the salience of the immigration issue, with no remarkable differences. These results diverge from what we observe in OECD-hosting countries, where right-wing parties tend to dominate the immigration discourse. In contrast, our study reveals that left-wing parties respond to the immigration shock similarly to their right-wing counterparts. Nevertheless, parties differentiate themselves by employing distinct vocabularies aligned with their respective ideologies and emphasizing different aspects. For example, while right-wing legislators connect the immigration topic to regulatory aspects and mention Venezuelan presidents Nicolás Maduro or Hugo Chávez, left-wing legislators focus on human rights, particularly emphasizing women and children. These findings carry significant implications for comprehending the transformative influence of unexpected events that emerge as new agenda topics, especially within the context of the emerging phenomenon of South-South migration.

Our paper makes several contributions to understanding crises, particularly in terms of how new issues that were previously non-salient become incorporated into the political agenda. While there are a few studies on legislative behavior during times of crisis (e.g., [Blumenau and Lauderdale, 2018](#); [Greene and Cross, 2017](#)), we contribute by examining the emergence of a completely new issue for these countries.

Furthermore, our study is the first to shed light on the political reactions to one of the largest post-WWII migratory crises. Previous scholars have focused on relatively minor migration crises involving high-income countries. Surprisingly, Latin America, especially the Venezuelan displacement crisis, remains understudied.³ By examining this particular crisis, our study fills the gap in understanding immigration processes in general and provides insights into the specific dynamics of south-south migrations.

In terms of methodology, most scholars analyzing the politicization of immigration rely on static data from a single point in time, often obtained from electoral manifestos or campaign strategies ([Alonso and Fonseca, 2012](#); [Green-Pedersen and Otjes, 2019](#); [Ruedin and Morales, 2019](#); [Gruber, 2014](#); [van Heerden et al., 2014](#)), with some exceptions such as the recent work by [Gessler and Hunger \(2022\)](#). Surveys that aim to gather information about politicians' positions on immigration do exist for the Latin American region, such as PELA-USAL ([Alcantara, 2022](#)) and CHES:LA. However, one limitation of these surveys is the lack of continuous data collection, which hinders obtaining more frequent and up-to-date information on politicians' stances towards immigration. Our study advances empirical research on immigration politicization by

²We refer to party families as the grouping of parties according to their ideological position. We classify them into left, center, and right (see [subsection 4.2](#) for more details).

³There are only a few working papers or recent papers that focus on forced migration from Venezuela, such as [Selee et al. \(2019\)](#), [Acosta Arcarazo, Blouin, and Freier \(2019\)](#), [Freire-Vidal and Graells-Garrido \(2019\)](#) [Pérez and Freier \(2023\)](#)

examining how immigration becomes integrated into daily political discourse, focusing on a cohort of parliamentary elites in government during the Venezuelan immigration crisis.

Then, to unpack the issue’s complexity, we employ various natural language processing approaches in our empirical analysis. Firstly, we track politicians’ attention to the issue. Then, we develop several measures to understand the frameworks used and employ their own language to gauge their ideologies. Finally, we tackle the challenge of extracting latent thematic patterns in political statements by implementing topic models to investigate the underlying issues related to politicians’ statements on immigration following the immigration shock.

2 Background

Venezuela has been grappling with a severe economic and political crisis in recent years, particularly following the death of President Hugo Chavez in 2013. His successor, Nicolas Maduro, has faced opposition and claims of electoral irregularities during his time in office (Corrales, 2020). The country has also been hit hard by a decline in oil prices, which has led to a significant reduction in government revenue and resulted in shortages and high inflation. The economy is estimated to have contracted by two-thirds between 2013 and 2019 (Knight and Tribin, 2020). This context has sparked widespread protests and demonstrations over economic and political issues in the country, and millions of Venezuelans have flown out. According to the Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), around 7.2 million refugees and migrants have left Venezuela as a result of the crisis.⁴ This crisis is considered the sixth-largest refugee crisis ever registered since World War I, and it is the largest in history in Latin America.⁵




Figure 1: Evolution of the Number of Immigrants in the Top 5 Spanish-Speaking Countries

Note: Millions of Venezuelan population reported by country. Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on R4V’s data.




Figure 2: Latin American Countries with the Highest Number of Venezuelan Immigrants

Note: Millions of Venezuelan population reported by country. Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on R4V’s data.

⁴<https://www.r4v.info/en/refugeeandmigrants>

⁵List of largest refugee crises

Figure 1 represents an exponential increase in the number of Venezuelan immigrants among Spanish-speaking Latin American countries that have encountered substantial immigration flows. This upward trajectory started in 2015 and gained momentum after 2017, coinciding with the reopening of the Venezuelan-Colombian border on August 12 2016,⁶ and subsequently with the imposition of sanctions by the Trump administration on August 2017, which restricted the Venezuelan government’s access to the U.S. financial system.

Following the immigration influx, Figure 2 provides an overview of the overall count of Venezuelan nationals residing in the nine Latin American countries that have experienced the highest influx of immigrants (as of March 2023). Colombia and Peru stand out as the main receiving countries, accommodating approximately 2.5 million and 1.5 million Venezuelans, respectively. In relative terms, these numbers represent around 4.9%, and 4.5% of the population of these countries respectively. These two countries have received more Venezuelans than the United States, where approximately fewer than 600,000 were living in 2021 (R4V based on ACS).

2.1 Public Salience of Venezuelan’s Migration

The influx of refugees and migrants from Venezuela has not gone unnoticed by citizens; rather, it has captured considerable attention from the general public. As illustrated in Figure 3, there is a notable surge in Google searches for the term “Venezuelans,” signaling an increased awareness and concern regarding the influx of Venezuelan refugees and migrants. There is a notable peak in the popularity of the issue between 2018 and 2020, coinciding with the significant influx of migrants to the region. To illustrate, when examining the trend in Peru (represented by the red line), the popularity of searches remains relatively low until around 2016, after which it begins to rise steadily.

The heightened popularity of these searches not only demonstrates a broader societal interest and concern regarding Venezuelan migration but also reflects the recognition of the profound impact and significance of this phenomenon within the region. Delving deeper into the related search topics reveals a range of queries encompassing travel visas, passports, alien law, criminal records, and employment regulations. For instance, in the context of Peru, the 2018 peak relates to the term ”ptp” which corresponds to discussions surrounding transitory employment permits for Venezuelans. Similarly, in Chile, a significant search peak in May 2019 is associated with the topic of criminal records of Venezuelans. This corresponds to a public discussion concerning the regulatory changes introduced in mid-2019, which mandated that individuals seeking definitive permanency in the country must provide proof of a clean criminal record. These example underscores the dynamic nature of the public discourse surrounding Venezuelan migration, as specific policy measures and legal considerations come to the forefront of societal conversations.⁷

To further put in context the relevance of the matter in public opinion, we examine the evolving attitudes towards immigration, as reflected in public opinion surveys. In Peru (Lima), the local newspaper El Comercio conducted two surveys to capture public perspectives on

⁶<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37072433>

⁷Also note that during this period several new policies were implemented; see [subsection A.1](#).




Figure 3: Public Saliency: Venezuelans

Note: The graph shows the 4-month moving average of the search interest relative to the highest point on the chart for the given region and time for the word “Venezolanos” (Venezuelans), from 2005 to May, 2023. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. A score of 0 means that there was not enough data for this term.

Source: Authors’ own elaboration base on Google Trends’ data.

Venezuelan migrants: one in 2018 and another in 2019. In the first survey, 55% of respondents opposed allowing Venezuelans into Peru. The second survey showed a significant increase in opposition, with a 22.7% rise from the previous year. As a response to this increase in the hostility toward immigrants, the Peruvian migration agency launched an anti-xenophobia campaign in 2019, but perceptions that Venezuelan migrants are taking scarce job opportunities and services from locals remain. Reports from the Universidad Católica and the Panamerican Development Foundation suggest that several public institutions are struggling to cope with the influx of immigrants.⁸ These issues underscore the ongoing challenge of managing the impact of Venezuelan migration on Peruvian society.

Similar patterns can be seen in Chile based on the Universidad Católica’s annual migration survey, which reveals a growing perception of conflict between Chileans and immigrants, with 85% of respondents expressing some level of conflict perception.⁹ A comparative analysis of the 2017 and 2018 survey results shows a significant increase of over 15% in respondents perceiving a pronounced conflict with immigrants. Furthermore, the survey findings indicate that approximately three-quarters of the respondents believe that there is an excessive influx of immigrants into the country, and 62% assert that the number of immigrants should be reduced.

⁸<https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/70863>

⁹<https://encuestabicentenario.uc.cl/>

2.2 The Effects of Venezuelan Migration on Hosting Countries

The immigration crisis has profoundly impacted various aspects of hosting countries, with scholars documenting changes in multiple areas, including crime, labor market, housing, education, and health. One of the growing areas of research on the Venezuelan migratory crisis has demonstrated its impact on crime. Studies such as [Knight and Tribin \(2020\)](#) and [Anatol and Kangalee \(2021\)](#) show that the influx of migrants from Venezuela has increased crime in the host countries. In this line, [Knight and Tribin \(2020\)](#) find that immigration and violent crime (i.e., homicides involving Venezuelan victims) are positively correlated in the Colombia-Venezuela border, while [Anatol and Kangalee \(2021\)](#) demonstrate that the increased sentiment of suspicion and paranoia towards Venezuelan immigrants promoted by the media, which led to increased perceived crime level in Trinidad and Tobago.

An emerging group of scholars analyze the migrants' impact on the labor market of the host countries.¹⁰ For instance, [Caruso, Canon, and Mueller \(2021\)](#) find that the spillover effects of the Venezuelan crisis have had a significant impact on the labor market in Colombia, decreasing informal sector wages by ten percentage points in urban areas per every one percentage point increase in immigration from Venezuela. Moreover, [Pérez and Freier \(2023\)](#) have found that Venezuelan women suffer, in addition to discrimination, a hyper-sexualisation that hinders their incorporation into the society of the receiving countries.

Another group of scholars has looked at the impact of the crisis on housing rents, health, and education. [Forero-Vargas and Iturra \(2022\)](#) demonstrate that the migratory shock has increased housing rents, presenting evidence for the Colombian case. Focusing on health, researchers have found that the crisis has had a significant impact on countries receiving immigrants, generating a growing health threat and the resurgence of diseases such as malaria at the borders ([Mendoza and Miranda, 2019](#); [Torres and Castro, 2019](#); [Rebolledo-Ponietsky, Munayco, and Mezones-Holguín, 2019](#); [Jaramillo-Ochoa et al., 2019](#)). Finally, regarding education [Martínez and Martínez Heredia \(2023\)](#) demonstrates that Peruvian parents responded to the migration shock by transferring their children to higher-quality schools with fewer migrants and that children exposed to immigration saw a decline in their performance.

Overall, this emerging research on the Venezuelan migratory crisis accounts for the great magnitude of the struggle in hosting countries. This socioeconomic process should have dramatic political effects. Surprisingly, we still lack an understanding of these effects. Our paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by examining parliamentary elites' political responses to the Venezuelan migratory crisis.

2.3 Immigration and Politics: Latin American Framework

Prior to the immigration shock, Latin American countries underwent significant policy liberalization, characterized by the enactment of expansive refugee laws ([Freier and Arcarazo, 2015](#)). Previous research attributes this liberalization to factors such as low levels of immigration from the region, high emigration rates, and the influence of left-leaning populist politics ([Acosta,](#)

¹⁰See for example: [Zago \(N.d.\)](#), [Caruso, Canon, and Mueller \(2021\)](#), [John \(2019\)](#), [Ryu and Paudel \(2022\)](#), [Santamaria \(N.d.\)](#), [Boruchowicz, Martinelli, and W. Parker \(2021\)](#), [Peñaloza-Pacheco \(2022\)](#), and [Mora, Cuadros-Menaca, and Sayago \(2022\)](#).

2018; Freier and Arcarazo, 2015). Hammoud-Gallego and Freier (2023) demonstrate that Latin American countries adopted strong measures for refugee protection when hosting few or no refugees at all. They argue that the absence of significant political controversy surrounding these policies can be attributed to the minimal presence of refugees. This situation facilitated the enactment of refugee laws alongside immigration law reforms, essentially representing a symbolic endorsement of the issue without substantial associated costs.

Latin America differs from high-income countries due to the active engagement of emigrant diasporas in domestic political debates. These diasporas advocate for the protection of migrants' rights, including the extension of external voting rights. Therefore, even though immigration had not prominently entered the political agenda prior to the shock, politicians were well aware of their compatriots leaving the country and providing support to their families back home. It was within this context that South American politicians began questioning the restrictive immigration policies of European and North American countries in the early 2000s, specifically targeting the EU's 2008 Returns Directive and the criminalization of immigration in the US (Brumat and Feline Freier, 2021).

This past context raises two important points. Firstly, Latin American legislators have not been characterized by restrictive views on immigration in the past. Secondly, the low number of immigrants has made immigration legislation politically inconspicuous. This context has undergone a significant change since 2016. After several decades of primarily being countries sending immigrants, Latin American countries have now become recipients of a large influx of immigrants.

A question arises: How will politicians respond to this change? If politicians follow the previous trend, we would not expect a greater emphasis on restrictive measures in response to the increased number of immigrants. Instead, a focus on human rights may be adopted. Alternatively, political elites could shift their previous "symbolic" liberalizing stance after witnessing the significant inflow of immigrants.

Considering the novelty of this phenomenon in Latin America, the region's previous trajectory of liberalization, and that hosting countries are now developing economies, it is likely that the patterns observed in high-income countries, as documented by previous scholars, will not be mirrored.

3 Theory

In this section, we introduce our theoretical framework, which establishes a relationship between crises, legislators' rhetoric, and the incorporation of new issues into the political agenda. The section is structured as follows: We first propose three hypotheses that elucidate the increased significance of the immigration issue as a response to the exogenous shocks. Then, we discuss the role of ideology and the immigration issue, which is exploratory, as less is known about south-south migration, and our objective is to reveal the intricacies of these new issues by exploring proposed and latent themes.

Crises and Changes in the Extensive Margins of the Political Agenda

Crises often serve as catalysts for political mobilization, creating unique opportunities for implementing drastic reforms (Cortell and Peterson, 1999; Kingdon and Stano, 1984). Previous investigations have referred to these events as “critical junctures,” emphasizing their importance in understanding changes within institutional structures (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Collier and Collier, 2002; Thelen, 2004).

During times of crisis, political actors have the opportunity to develop new perspectives or adjust existing positions, particularly when these topics were already subject to active debate. Crises also serve as a platform for the introduction of novel issues that can be strategically utilized by these actors. In particular, significant exogenous shocks frequently eliminate barriers that impede political action. However, our understanding of how these crises influence the preferences and rhetoric of political elites remains limited due to the absence of a comprehensive theory.

While previous scholars have explored the impact of external shocks on various political phenomena such as government duration and termination (Lupia and Strøm, 1995), ministerial instability (Martínez-Gallardo, 2014), policy change (Williams, 2009), public opinion (Aldrich et al., 2006), the behavior of legislators during crises has received less attention. Legislatures are a vital component of the decision-making process, and we focus on them in this study. We aim to examine how legislators adapt their rhetoric during times of crisis.

Two notable exceptions in the study of legislative changes deserve attention. First, Blumenau and Lauderdale (2018) conducted an analysis of legislative behavior, specifically examining the voting patterns of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) during the European Union crisis period. Second, Greene and Cross (2017) investigated MEPs’ responses to different exogenous shocks, including the Euro crisis and the 2008 financial crisis. While our work builds upon their contributions, it takes a different approach. For instance, Blumenau and Lauderdale (2018) focused on analyzing changes in pro-anti integration positions, which were already part of the political agenda in European countries. Our study instead, examines a unique case: the incorporation of an entirely new issue into the agenda.

Thus, previous studies have examined the *intensive margins of the political agenda*, which means they analyzed the adjustments made by politicians within the existing topics after crises. While this type of change is important as it involves shifts in emphasis, prioritization, and allocation of attention to specific issues, we believe the conditions are different when crises lead to changes in the *extensive margins of the political agenda*. This refers to modifications made at the outer edge of the agenda, involving the addition of new topics to the political discourse. In these circumstances, we witness an expansion of the overall scope of the political rhetoric employed by legislators.

Why do crises triggering extensive margins of politics impact the rhetoric of political elites? During periods of stability, gradual shifts in external circumstances offer limited avenues for the formation of new coalitions aimed at supporting or challenging policy changes, as well as for the establishment of fresh frameworks to engage in discussions surrounding these matters. In such times, it is more likely that certain actors will monopolize specific topics and pursue them, benefiting from the gradual nature of change and the specialization that occurs over time

in building frameworks and leadership around specific issues. However, in the face of dramatic crises, it is likely many actors will look to address these issues, with new frames. For instance, changes such as the magnitude of the Venezuelan displacement crisis that introduces entirely new issues to the political agenda, present an opportunity to take the lead on the issue to all political actors. Previous studies demonstrate that the salience of issues among the electorate plays a crucial role in shaping parties' responses. Klüver and Sagarzazu (2016) refer to this behavior as the "riding the wave theory." Additionally, there is growing evidence that parties adjust their positions based on the stances of other parties and public pressure (e.g., Abou-Chadi, Green-Pedersen, and Mortensen, 2020). Hence, we argue that all political actors are compelled to address the issue, as two factors coincide: 1) the existing status quo may become unpopular, and 2) the cost of ignoring the issue becomes too high as public opinion is keenly aware of the ongoing changes.

Now, shifting our attention to the empirical implications of our theoretical framework, we will apply the theory to understand a specific crisis: the influx of millions of Venezuelans into regions characterized by historical emigration patterns but with minimal or low levels of immigration and refugees (Hammoud-Gallego and Freier, 2023). The occurrence of an immigration shock can have a significant impact on a nation, pushing political leaders to address public opinion discontent. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1 *The migratory shock will lead to an escalation in the salience of political statements pertaining to immigration.*

Based on previous research, it is widely accepted that parties on the extreme right of the political spectrum are more likely to "own" immigration issues in response to migration shocks (e.g., Meguid, 2005; Minkenberg, 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke, 2019). However, most of this literature has focused on European countries, where the arrival of immigrants is not a new issue, and the debate about immigrants and its regulation has been part of the agenda. In these cases, the changes after a migratory shock such as the one they experienced in 2015 are in the intensive margins (i.e., reinforcing existing issues).

Our case is different since this crisis affects the extensive margins of the political agenda, it resulted in the incorporation of a new topic rather than reinforcing an existing one (affecting the extensive margin) that may have previously been monopolized by specialized politicians. Therefore, we expect a lack of ownership by any specific actor in the short term, as all political actors will increasingly engage with the issue. This includes actors who may have previously avoided addressing the political crisis in Venezuela, such as left-wing parties, given that Venezuelan leaders, like Maduro, self-identify as socialists. In the aftermath of the crisis, even those who were previously dismissing the Venezuelan crisis are likely to encounter challenges in dismissing the issue due to its significant magnitude. Put differently, the high cost associated with ignoring the matter forces their involvement. Thus we expect that the salience of the issue to increase across all party families:

Hypothesis 2 *The migratory shock will result in increased salience across all parties regardless of their ideological position, and none of them will possess exclusive ownership of the issue.*

Although we do not anticipate any party family to claim ownership of the immigration issue, we still think it is possible that legislators may respond to the actions of their party counterparts and members from opposing party families.

Ideological Cues in Immigration Discourse

Do politicians from different ideological groups, left or right, employ similar approaches when addressing the issue of immigration? Do they differentiate by using ideological cues? Recent psychology studies have demonstrated that language use varies across the ideological spectrum (Sterling, Jost, and Bonneau, 2020). Likewise, Kteily et al. (2019) show significant and substantially important differences between liberals and conservatives in using language to reduce differences in promoting disadvantaged groups. Parties strategically appeal to different attitudes, values, or references associated with their respective ideological positions in their communications.

Concerning immigration, previous research on high-income countries has suggested that political actors' stances on immigration are influenced by the left-right dimension of the political conflict (e.g, Urso, 2018). Other studies have documented how mainstream parties adjust their positions to align with the extreme positions of radical-right parties (Bale, 2003; Bale et al., 2010; Van Spanje, 2010; Schumacher and Van Kersbergen, 2016).

We expect that ideological cues will play a significant role in shaping how legislators address the immigration issue. Since it is a new topic, we expect all parties to adapt their language to add this issue to their agenda and try to differentiate rather than diffuse it with their counterparts. Our expectations align with the recent work by Gessler and Hunger (2022), which indicates that changes in mainstream parties' positions on immigration after the European migration crisis of 2015 are not solely driven by radical-right parties. Thus, our final hypothesis is as follows,

Hypothesis 3 *Party members from a specific party family will use a differentiation strategy, incorporating their ideological cues in their statements about immigration.*

While we expect ideology to play a role, we are uncertain regarding how politicians constructed their discourses on this topic. Thus, we will conduct an exploratory analysis of the latent topics associated with the issue within each party family.

To sum up, our theoretical framework starts by examining the impact of an exogenous shock on the extensive margins of the political agenda, heightening the salience of the immigration issue. Our hypotheses suggest that all political actors will respond to this increased salience, but none will claim sole ownership of the issue. Subsequently, we delve into the responses of political leaders by exploring the role of ideology in the immigration debate, and we expect ideological differentiation across party families, which we propose to explore by identifying latent topics associated with the issue.

4 Research Design

4.1 Case selection

We focus our analysis on Peru and Chile, two of the greatest destinations for Venezuelan immigrants (see [Figure 2](#)). We examine the migration shock’s impact on parliamentary elites, following them before and after the migratory crisis. In Chile, we analyze legislators from the 2014 and 2018 Congresses, while in Peru, we focus on legislators elected in 2016, 2020, and 2021.¹¹

Besides being great receivers, we excluded Colombia and Ecuador from our cases for several reasons. First, Colombia has the largest border with Venezuela, and there is a long history of immigration between both countries. Since 1970, Colombians have fled to Venezuela to avoid political violence in their country, making Colombians the largest immigration group in Venezuela. This great flux between these countries makes it difficult to identify the impact of the current wave of immigration.

Second, during the peak years of 2017 and 2018, Ecuador was considered only a transit country for Venezuelan immigrants whose final destination was Peru or Chile. According to the Ecuadorian government, 80% of Venezuelan immigrants entering their country have Peru as their final destination.¹² For instance, in 2018, the Ecuadorian government provided free transportation for all Venezuelan immigrants entering Ecuador from their north border to their south border after the Peruvian government enforced in only a few days notice that Venezuelans should hold a passport for entering the country (the measure was implemented to stop the entry as it was difficult for migrants to obtain the document).¹³

4.2 Data

Understanding the complex dynamics surrounding immigration requires access to rich and timely data. Traditional data sources, such as elite surveys and expert-focused datasets, have limitations that hinder our ability to capture nuanced attitudes and responses of political actors. These surveys provide snapshots of data every several years, and only recently, post-2018, have they incorporated questions related to immigration.¹⁴ We overcome these limitations by using politicians’ Twitter statements.

One of the key advantages of Twitter as a data source is its real-time nature, which enables us to gather up-to-date insights into political leaders’ evolving opinions and stances. This timeliness is particularly valuable for capturing immediate responses and adaptations to the influx of immigration in the short term, which may not be adequately reflected in surveys conducted at specific snapshots of time. Additionally, social media statements are easily accessible and not constrained by institutional or resource limitations, facilitating the study of the dynamic

¹¹The congress elected in 2014 in Chile ended its term in 2018 and the 2018 congress ended its term in 2022. In the Peruvian case, the congress elected in 2016 should have lasted until 2021. However, the political crisis in 2017 resulted in the closing of the Congress and the election of a new Congress in 2020 to complete the term until 2021 ([Arce and Incio, 2018](#))

¹²<https://diariocorreo.pe/peru/ecuador-corredor-humanitario-traslado-venezolanos-peru-835940/?ref=dcr>

¹³<https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2018/09/02/exodo-sin-fin-la-odisea-de-conseguir-un-pasaporte-en-venezuela/>

¹⁴Refer to [subsection A.2](#) for a more in-depth discussion of existing survey data.

process of agenda setting.¹⁵ In contrast to works that rely on party manifestos, which can be a complex process and are only published during election campaigns (Dolezal et al., 2012), we gain insights from politicians’ daily communication strategies. This approach aligns with the dynamic approach to party and elite politics advocated by scholars like Gessler and Hunger (2022) and Hopmann et al. (2012), although they rely on party press releases.

Furthermore, by focusing on individual legislators, we can gain a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics within political parties, beyond a simplistic portrayal of parties as monolithic entities (Meyer and Wagner, 2021). By analyzing the individual voices and perspectives expressed on Twitter rather than parties’ statements are able to capture any divergence that may exist within parties, and across time.

	Chile	Peru	Total
Left	724,177	318,775	1,042,952
Center	233,413	619,309	852,722
Right	570,772	543,587	1,114,359
Total	1,528,362	1,481,671	3,010,033

Table 1: Number of Tweets per Country and Party Family
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data retrieved from Twitter

Specifically, we collected tweets from legislators spanning the period of 2013 to 2021, covering legislatures before, during, and after the impact of immigration. This comprehensive collection of Twitter data provides a thorough and current understanding of the perspectives and positions held by political parties in Peru and Chile. The dataset was obtained using the Twitter API,¹⁶ resulting in a total of 1,528,362 tweets from 223 legislators in Chile and 1,481,671 tweets from 295 legislators in Peru (see details of the data in Table 1).¹⁷ Our analysis included various types of tweets, such as retweets, quotes, and replies, and it contains information on the date and time of posting and the user’s Twitter handle.

We examined responses to the immigration crisis among party families by classifying them using CHES:LA data. Legislators were classified as belonging to a leftist party if the party’s ideological score was below 4, and as belonging to a rightist party if it was above 7. The remaining category represents the center. Parties that were not included in CHES:LA were dropped from the analysis.¹⁸

4.3 Measurements

This paper examines the dynamics of immigration discourse among members of Congress in Chile and Peru through multiple dimensions. To capture the dynamic response of politicians, we utilize text-based tools to analyze Twitter statements. Our methodology involves a two-step

¹⁵This source of data has demonstrated potential in measuring politicians’ attitudes (Waisbord and Amado, 2017).

¹⁶We collected the data between November and December of 2023, before Twitter’s new policy restricting academic API came into effect

¹⁷In our sample, we have data representing 94% of the legislators elected during the analyzed period in Peru and 88% in Chile.

¹⁸See appendix A.2.1 for the list of parties included in the analysis

quantitative text analysis approach to construct relevant measures. We analyze the salience of immigration, measured by the frequency of tweets about immigration relative to total statements. We then utilize the set of immigration-related tweets to examine how parties framed their positions. We employ two distinct approaches to determine if politicians addressed various issues within the realm of immigration and whether they employed specific ideological frameworks when discussing these issues. First, we estimate legislators’ ideological scores and then identify latent topics.

The analysis is conducted using yearly averages within each party family. Our study focuses on comparing party families (left, center, and right) rather than individual parties or legislators.

4.3.1 Measuring Immigration Salience

We identify immigration-related tweets using an adapted dictionary approach, which combines close reading of politicians’ statements, machine learning techniques, and frequently used words by the public to reference immigration. Initially, we compiled a list of relevant keywords related to immigration, such as “immigrant,” “migrant,” “refugee,” “asylum seeker,” and so on (refer to Appendix A.3). These keywords were used to filter tweets by identifying those that contained at least one of the specified terms.¹⁹

Next, we employed natural language processing techniques to expand our dataset. We trained a Naive Bayes Classification Model to identify similar tweets to those already classified by the dictionary. Additionally, we searched for tweets mentioning individuals from Venezuela. It is worth noting that discussions about Venezuela in the region extend beyond the issue of migration, so careful evaluation was necessary.

We then proceeded to hand-code all tweets pertaining to immigration in one country to assess the accuracy of our selection and ensure that only relevant statements were included in our analysis.²⁰ Through this process, we identified word combinations that may refer to immigration and words that should not be included in our dictionary. Consequently, we created an updated dictionary of single words and word pairs to extend the analysis to other countries.

Finally, we applied the updated dictionary to the remaining countries and had two independent coders evaluate a sample of 500 tweets per country. The accuracy of classification exceeded 0.85 in all cases, indicating a high level of accuracy in identifying tweets related to immigration while excluding unrelated content. As a final step, we refined the dictionary based on misclassified cases, which involved removing irrelevant classifications such as “migrating birds,” among others.

The process for detecting immigration-related tweets can be summarized as follows:

1. Design a general dictionary with a limited number of words.
2. Apply the dictionary to one specific case (Peru).
3. Utilize the data obtained to train supervised machine learning models in order to minimize false negatives, thereby improving the identification of immigration-related tweets.
4. Redefine the dictionary by including additional relevant words.

¹⁹To ensure clarity and specificity, our initial dictionary focuses on terms directly related to immigration and excludes specific terms like “Venezuelan” by itself.

²⁰Three annotators were involved in coding the tweets, and any discrepancies were thoroughly re-evaluated.

5. Handcode all tweets related to immigration in one entire country involving three annotators.
6. Refine the dictionary further based on cases of false positives, ensuring that only relevant statements are included.
7. Apply the dictionary to all countries under investigation.
8. Hand code a sample of 500 tweets related to immigration to identify any false positives, with two annotators participating in this process.
9. Revise and update the dictionary based on the findings from the previous step.
10. Apply the final version of the dictionary to all countries.

After applying these steps we were able to identify and extract a subset of tweets that are likely to be discussing immigration. This generated a subset of 2,086 tweets related to immigration in Peru and 6,123 tweets related to immigration in Chile.

4.3.2 Measuring Legislators' Ideological Score

To unpack whether political leaders revise their language and ideological framing we estimate an ideological score per each tweet following [Le Pennec \(2021\)](#). This measure indicates to what degree a tweet of a politician is similar to the corpus of other tweets of the parties considered as left-wing or right-wing. This method builds on the *Wordscores* method ([Laver, Benoit, and Garry, 2003](#)).

We computed the frequencies p_w^R and p_w^L that represent how frequent a word w is in all the tweets in the left or right

$$p_w^i = \frac{\sum_{j \in i} c_{wj}}{\sum_{j \in i} m_j}$$

where c_{wj} is the counts of word w in statement j , and m_j is the total number of words of statement j . We estimated these frequencies in a year basis, allowing right-left to vary the way they expressed over time. We also performed this analysis for the tweets that were not classified as discussing immigration issues.

Using these frequencies, we can compute the right-wing score of each word w :

$$s_w = \frac{p_w^R}{p_w^R + p_w^L} - \frac{p_w^L}{p_w^R + p_w^L} \quad (1)$$

A tweet j score S_j , representing the parties' positioning in the left-right axis is calculated by:

$$S_j = \frac{\sum_w p_{wj} \times s_w}{S_R} \quad (2)$$

where S_R is the score of the aggregation of all the tweets of the right-wing group.²¹ Thus, the score of a tweet is not limited to a specific range, but a score of -1 represents an average tweet from the left, while a score of 1 represents an average tweet from the right. In both cases, these scores are estimated by utilizing the vocabularies associated with the left and right wings for tweets not related to migration.

As an alternative to this ideological measure, and based on discussions related to public

²¹This is done to preserve the distance between the reference texts ([Martin and Vanberg, 2008](#)).

opinion and the implementation of public policies, such as transitory permits for Venezuelans to work and the requirement of criminal records for entry, we examine three associated frames when discussing immigration: Venezuela, crime, and employment. To identify tweets related to these topics, we employed dictionaries of key words.²²

4.3.3 Measuring Legislators’ Framing and Content of Immigration Statements: Unsupervised Topic Analysis

To explore specific narratives in tweets concerning immigration, we employ unsupervised machine learning methods, enabling an unbiased approach without imposing any predefined structure. This analysis seeks to identify the underlying semantic structure and latent themes within the discourse on immigration by analyzing the co-occurrence of words in political statements. To achieve this, we employ two distinct methods.

First, we employ a clustering technique that leverages HuggingFace transformers and TF-IDF, as demonstrated (BERTopic, Grootendorst, 2022), to identify the underlying semantic structure and latent themes within the discourse of immigration. BERTopic, built upon the Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) architecture, offers an advanced approach to extracting and categorizing latent topics from textual data. Unlike conventional methods, BERTopic captures contextual relationships between words, resulting in more coherent and interpretable topics. We perform clustering using Hierarchical Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (HDBSCAN). Once clusters are established, we employ the OpenAI API to retrieve topic representations from the documents within each cluster and identify keywords for each cluster. The language is set to ‘multilingual,’ and the number of topics is automatically determined by the algorithm.

Specifically, we implemented an automatic topic reduction process by utilizing HDBSCAN to cluster our topics based on their c-TF-IDF (centrality Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency) representations. By applying HDBSCAN, we group topics exhibiting significant thematic similarities while preserving distinct, unrelated topics. To generate topic labels for candidate documents and keywords, we utilize Chat GPT. Finally, to minimize the number of outliers for each cluster, the algorithm calculates the c-TF-IDF representation and employs cosine similarity to identify the best matching c-TF-IDF topic representation.

In light of the novelty of the previous method, we also examine the same question using non-negative matrix factorization (NMF), a matrix decomposition technique that captures the significance of individual words within a corpus, thus reducing the complexity inherent in high-dimensional text data. To enhance the accuracy of our approach, we incorporate log-based term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) as a weighting factor.²³ We set the number of clusters to 4 and analyze the clusters of tweets identified within ideological families concerning the topic of immigration, as well as for each of the structured topics (crime, employment, and Venezuela).

²²Refer to the appendix A.2.4 for details on the dictionaries. Table A.6 presents the percentage of tweets for each framework.


²³For additional insights on NMF, refer to works such as Wang et al. (2012), O’Callaghan et al. (2015), or studies that have previously utilized NMF in the analysis of political speeches, such as Greene and Cross (2017).

5 The Increasing Salience of the Immigration Issue

To analyze the increased prominence of the immigration issue among legislators in Peru and Chile, we examined the average frequency of tweets related to immigration per year (in relation to all tweets). The initial series of graphs presents the predicted probability of generating tweets about immigration from 2013 to 2021. As stated in hypothesis 1, we expect an increase in the salience of this topic following the massive arrival of Venezuelans. Additionally, as indicated by hypothesis 2, we anticipate that this increase will occur across all party families, which means we should not be able to discern whether a particular party family discusses the topic more or less than others.

Figure 4 demonstrates a noticeable increase in the salience of politicians' statements related to immigration over the specified period, indicating that all parties reacted to the crisis; none of them chose to dismiss the topic. Prior to the arrival of the first wave of immigration, political leaders largely overlooked the issue, as evidenced by probabilities close to 0 in 2013. However, after the first wave of immigration in 2016, the topic began gaining traction, reaching its peak in 2018. For instance, in that year, Chilean center parties dedicated approximately 1.5% of their tweets to discussing the topic. Putting these results into context, Chilean legislators averaged 5.1 tweets per day on the topic of immigration, while their Peruvian counterparts posted an average of 1.5 tweets per day.

Figure 4: Immigration salience per year in Chile and Peru



Note: the DV is the salience of immigration operationalized as the ratio of statements about immigration to the total number of public statements made. To compute these means, a control using the length of the tweet was used. Robust standard errors were computed, Left, Center and Right are defined as discussed in subsection 4.2.

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data retrieved from Twitter

In Chile, as depicted in the first set of plots, the salience increase is steeper than the

Peruvian parliamentary elites. We can observe that all party families react to the crisis in the short term and subsequently reduce the coverage of the issue, although there are still some differences among them. Notably, the center (Christian Democrats) stands out for leading the coverage of the issue starting in 2016, surpassing their counterparts from other party families in a statistically significant manner. This distinction became even clearer in 2018 when they almost doubled the coverage of both the left and the right. It is also interesting to note that both the left and the right reach similar levels at their peak. Additionally, an intriguing element is that in 2021, which coincides with the electoral campaign period, after all party families lowered the salience of the issue, the topic resurfaces predominantly within the right party family. This second peak does not appear to be in response to a new influx of immigrants, as immigration levels in Chile have remained stable since 2019 (see [Figure 1](#)).

The second plot pertains to Peru, where all parties increased the salience of immigration. However, unlike in Chile, none of the party families stands out. At the peak of the topic, all of them exhibited similar levels of salience, and after 2018, the topic lost its predominance. It is worth noting that the coverage of the issue at its peak is more than three times lower than in Chile, which is noteworthy considering that Peru has received more than three times the number of Venezuelan immigrants.

One plausible explanation for these observed changes could be that regions exposed to a substantial influx of immigrants, including both frontier and capital cities, inherently would exhibit a greater inclination to engage in discourse regarding immigration. These areas tend to experience more direct and immediate consequences, such as shifts in demographics, economic dynamics, and increased cultural diversity. Consequently, it appears reasonable to expect that individuals within these communities, who are more directly affected by this immigration influx, are more likely to view immigration as a salient and pressing concern. As a result, politicians representing these areas should be more inclined to address immigration-related matters. To investigate this, we stratified our analysis by region (see [subsection A.4](#)). However, we did not observe any significant differences across regions until 2021. The lack of regional focus on the immigration debate may imply that legislators are not solely reacting to the influx as they perceive its consequences. Other factors, such as interplay among political parties, may also influence their priorities. We explore these correlations over time between party families, with the estimations presented in [subsection A.5](#). These analyses provide some initial insights into the influence of counterparts from party families on issue coverage.

6 How do Political Elites address Immigration issues?

We will now redirect our focus from merely engaging with the immigration topic to analyzing how legislators frame their statements on immigration within different party families to test hypothesis 3 about the role of ideology. To accomplish this, we employ three tools. We utilize Wordscores techniques to understand better how these different frameworks are employed, allowing us to uncover the ideological cues embedded in the language of immigration, as compared to the language used when discussing non-immigration-related topics. Then, we explored common frames (employment, crime and Venezuela) and its usages across party family. Lastly,

we explore the underlying themes by party families using unsupervised machine learning tools.

6.1 Ideological Cues of Immigration

Since we have shown that all party families increased the salience of the issue, we now proceed to explicitly test whether its coverage has ideological signals and how legislators have adjusted their rhetoric in response to the immigration shock. Our primary dependent variable of interest is the ideological score of statements, which we calculated based on their similarity with the language used by left-wing or right-wing legislators (as reviewed in Section 4.3.2). To this end, we present means of the score for each year and party family for tweets about immigration and the rest of the topics in Figure 5. If tweets about immigration do not incorporate ideological cues from other topics, we would observe that their scores tend to be closer to 0. However, if there are such cues, the scores would deviate from 0, leaning towards their respective ideological positions (-1 for the left wing and 1 for the right-wing).




Figure 5: Ideological Score for Immigration and non-immigration issues by party by year
 Note: The DV of this analysis is the ideological score (-1 left, 1 right) per year and per ideological party family.

The Green estimate represents the ideological score of immigration statements, while the Red estimates represent the ideological score of non-immigration statements. The data points represent the estimations by year, starting in 2015 and finishing in 2021. Estimations are performed controlling by the length of the tweet.

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data retrieved from Twitter.

The plot illustrates the ideological score on the y-axis, ranging from left (negative scores) to

right (positive scores). The x-axis represents the party families from left to right. Each party year is compared by the model's estimates for statements unrelated to immigration, denoted by red diamonds, and statements addressing immigration, represented by green circles. The x-axis within each party family displays the estimations for each year, spanning from 2015 to 2021.

Several insights can be gleaned from this figure. Firstly, when examining the overall levels of ideological scores by party family, it becomes clear that each party family is associated with different levels. For example, in the first plot representing Chile, the overall score of immigration statements made by legislators from the right parties is higher compared to those from the center parties, and there is even a greater disparity with the left parties. Intuitively, this indicates that politicians rely on ideological cues to convey their ideas, shedding light supporting hypothesis 3.

Secondly, if we shift our focus to the dynamics and changes over time, we can examine the gap between the ideological scores of non-immigration issues and those related to immigration. This dynamic appears to unfold differently in Chile compared to Peru. In Chile, we observe an increasing gap for both left-wing and right-wing legislators, particularly among the former. For instance, on the left side, while the statements of politicians concerning non-immigration issues demonstrate a growing presence of leftist ideological cues over time, we observe the opposite trend regarding immigration. In other words, it seems that left-wing legislators are employing language less characteristic of the left-wing when addressing the immigration issue. Starting in 2018, after a significant influx of immigrants, the leftist ideological cues appear to have merged with non-left-wing language, indicating a shift towards more moderate language in Chile. However, the levels still differ from those of the right wing. On the right side, the increase in this gap (i.e., use of language less characteristic of the right) began in 2016 but remains stable after the initial shock.

Regarding the dynamics in Peru, the second plot reveals minimal changes in the gap between the ideological scores of non-immigration issues and immigration issues on the left side. If anything, we observed the opposite trend in 2020-2021. In contrast to the left, the right and center exhibit a significant rightward shift in immigration and non-immigration issues following the migratory shock. To illustrate this change, let's focus on the ideological score estimates for statements made by the right in 2015. Here, we can observe a substantial gap between the ideological scores of non-immigration issues and immigration statements. However, this gap diminishes, and the estimates in 2021 are nearly identical. This reflects a radicalization of speeches rather than moderation, as seen in Chile.

Overall, this analysis highlights that ideological cues are employed when referring to immigration. However, in Chile, these cues have become less distinct over time, with a greater use of right-wing language among left-wing legislators, and a somewhat similar trend among right-wing legislators. In Peru, there is a notable radicalization of language in the center and right, instead of moderation. Therefore, the right-wing parties in Peru appear to communicate using clear right-wing language rather than adopting ideological cues from other party families.

Finally, we gain further insights about the role of ideology by combining with common frames (Venezuela, crime, and employment). Firstly, when comparing both countries, as we have demonstrated with the evolution of ideological scores, Peru shows a greater differentiation



Figure 6: Ideological Score for Immigration and its different frameworks and Immigration without that frameworks issues by party and years

Note: The DV of this analysis is the ideological score (-1 left, 1 right) per year and per ideological party family.

The party families are represented by different colors in the visualizations. Light colors indicate statements outside the scope of these topics, while bold colors signify statements related to the specific issue being examined. The data points in the figures represent estimations for each year, spanning from 2016 to 2021.

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data retrieved from Twitter.

(as depicted in the rows of the second plot in Figure 6) compared to Chile. This is evident from the larger distance between the left and right in Peru, whereas in Chile, the use of this frames is sorted by ideology but the proportions of usages are more concentrated around 0 (language of the center).

6.2 Topics Within Immigration


So far, we have demonstrated that legislators have heightened the saliency of the immigration issue following the immigration shock. Moreover, they have seamlessly integrated this issue into their agenda through the use of ideological cues that enable them to establish differentiation. We employ two unsupervised machine learning techniques to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the observed ideological differentiation highlighted in the previous section. These methodologies allow us to derive insights from the text data without imposing predetermined structures.

In what follows, We examine the distribution of party families across various topics. If parties assign equal importance to each topic, we would anticipate a similar distribution across clusters. Conversely, a disparate distribution would signify divergence among party families in the aspects of the immigration issue they address. We begin our analysis by implementing clusterization with BERTtopic modeling and subsequently replicate the investigation using NMF to underscore the robustness of our conclusions.

6.2.1 BERTopic

BERTtopic automatically generates several topics. For both countries, the algorithm described in [subsection 4.3.3](#) has determined 11 topics. Figures [Figure 6.2.1](#) and [Figure 8](#) visually illustrate the distinct clusters and their distribution across party families.

Figure 7: Salience of each topic in Chile across party families




References. Red: Left, Orange: Center, Blue: Right. Note: the DV is the salience of each operationalized as the ratio of statements about each of the topics to the total number of public statements made about Immigration. To compute these means, a control using the length of the tweet was used. Robust standard errors were computed. Left, Center and Right are defined as discussed in [subsection 4.2](#). Topics: 0: “Venezuelan immigrants in Chile and their impact on the country’s migration policies”, 1: “La crisis migratoria y la política del gobierno sobre los derechos de los niños y los inmigrantes en el país, junto con el proyecto de ley de migración extranjera en proceso en el gobierno”, 2: “Haitian Migration Crisis in Chile”, 3: “Palestinian refugees and their situation in Israel and other countries”, 4: “Xenofobia and its implications”, 5: “Social Issues and Women’s Rights”, 6: “Vacunación de migrantes en situación irregular y su impacto en la salud pública”, 7: “Hate Crimes and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Germany”, 8: “Migration and its Impact on European Countries”, 9: “Migrant Camp Fire and Education Blame”, 10: “Immigration history and experiences of Italians and Germans from Trieste to Yugoslavia, and the impact on their lives” Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data retrieved from Twitter.

Across most of the issues, we discern divergence, at least for some years, in the emphasis placed on each topic by different party families. This observation aligns with our theoretical

expectations, suggesting a propensity for differentiation rather than the diffusion of ideological cues. Only a handful of exceptions exist where party families show a lack of differentiation over any given period in the discussion of each topic. For instance, one such case is the discussion around the Pope’s appeal to provide refuge and sanctuary to refugees and immigrants within churches, a topic discussed among Peruvian legislators.

In Chile, right-wing legislators prominently engage in discussions regarding the impact of Venezuelan immigrants (topic 0), initially spearheading the discourse on regulations (topic 0). However, from 2019 onwards, all parties partake in this discourse, potentially linked to debates over immigration restrictions. Intriguingly, despite their heightened attention to the Venezuelan crisis, they allocate the least attention to immigrants from Haiti, which could reflect a strategy against the socialist Venezuelan government. Conversely, the left and center are at the forefront of discussions concerning social issues and immigrant women’s rights (topic 5). They also voice opposition against immigrant hostility and hate crimes (topics 4 and, more recently, topic 7).

Figure 8: Salience of each topic in Peru across party families



References. Red: Left, Orange: Center, Blue: Right. Note: the DV is the salience of each operationalized as the ratio of statements about each of the topics to the total number of public statements made about Immigration.

To compute these means, a control using the length of the tweet was used. Robust standard errors were computed. Left, Center and Right are defined as discussed in [subsection 4.2](#). Topics: 0: “Venezuelan migration to Peru and its impact”, 1: “Política migratoria y derechos de los migrantes”, 2: “Xenophobia and discrimination against foreigners and citizens, including racism, homophobia, and misogyny”, 3: “Crisis de refugiados en Europa y el mundo”, 4: “Donald Trump’s Immigration Policy”, 5: “Crisis de refugiados en Alemania y Europa”, 6: “Japanese-Peruvian Friendship and Immigration Anniversary”, 7: “Women’s Rights and Violence Against Migrant Women”, 8: “Syrian and Afghan refugees fleeing to Europe, living conditions, and humanitarian efforts”, 9: “papa francisco pide acojan refugiados, familia, inmigrantes y migrantes en iglesias de europa”, 10: “cities prepared for migration and urban planning” Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data retrieved from Twitter.

Moving to Peru, a similar pattern emerges. Right-wing Peruvian legislators take the lead in

debating the impact of the Venezuelan migratory impact on the country (topic 0). Meanwhile, the left and center drive discussions on defending immigrant rights (topic 1) and condemning foreigner discrimination (topic 2). The left also uniquely addresses the issue of violence and human rights violations against female immigrants.

In summary, the right largely concentrates on crisis impact and its regulation, while the left focuses on immigration rights and societal concerns, especially those affecting vulnerable immigrant groups, such as women’s rights.

6.2.2 NMF

To further demonstrate the utilization of a diverse set of perspectives within each party family, we proceed to present the results of the NMF analysis.²⁴ Table 2 shows the latent topics pertaining to immigration and the specific roles played by individual party factions.

Beginning with the examination of Chile, the most frequently discussed topic, labeled as number 1, centers around immigrants’ rights. Looking at the most representative words of this cluster, migrants’ rights are a relevant part of it. This topic is predominantly associated with the left, but we still observe a relatively slightly minor presence of other party families, followed by the center, and then the right. The second-largest topic, labeled as number 4, encompasses terms like crisis, politics, government, and specific cities such as Antofagasta (where a significant number of immigrants reside). The right-wing party family leads this topic, and we note a greater disparity compared to the left, and an even more pronounced difference with the center. The third topic, labeled as number 2, primarily led by the center, revolves around the issue of Venezuela, with words such as refugees, millions, against, Venezuela, and Maduro appearing frequently. The smallest topic, also led by the center but largely discussed by the right, touches upon illegal immigration and the possibility of expulsion, as well as broader international immigration concerns like those associated with Trump.

	<i>Chile</i>				<i>Peru</i>			
	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4
	personas	pais	chile	antofagasta	maduro	migratoria	machismo	paises
	nuestro	contra	piñera	niños	como	sobre	campana	derecho
	este	chilenos	expulsion	senador	esta	millones	todos	alemania
	immigracion	millones	trump	esta	venezuela	miles	discriminacion	como
	derechos	refugiados	diputado	gobierno	migrantes	unidos	como	acnur
	como	dictadura	para	crisis	pais	estados	para	campo
	pais	maduro	sobre	nueva	para	politica	belmont	niños
	migracion	venezuela	pais	sobre	peruanos	donald	racismo	migrantes
	para	chile	ilegales	politica	peru	trump	contra	para
	migrantes	venezolanos	immigrantes	migratoria	venezolanos	immigrantes	xenofobia	refugiados
%	48.5	17.7	14.6	19.2	60.9	12.8	12.9	13.3
Left (%)	50.0	18.8	12.7	18.5	53.6	13.0	15.4	18.0
Center (%)	48.5	20.1	17.9	13.5	53.4	16.1	16.7	13.9
Right (%)	46.0	14.9	15.8	23.2	78.1	8.3	5.8	7.8
Distance L-R	4.0	3.9	-3.1	-4.8	-24.4	4.6	9.6	10.2

Table 2: Topic Analysis - NMF 4 clusters regarding Immigration statements
The columns show the most probable words within each topic, and the topic distributions among the party families by country.

The analysis of clusters for Peru reveals that the largest topic, encompassing over 60% of the statements –topic 1– predominantly revolves around Venezuela, evident from the two explicit

²⁴We first look at all the immigration statements, then subset by ideological party family and finally subset by the topics of Venezuela, employment, and crime. For detailed results on the latter one, please refer to the appendix from Table A.12 to Table A.20.

mentions and the inclusion of Maduro. The Peruvian right-wing party family overwhelmingly leads this topic. The remaining three topics are relatively similar in size. Topic 4, led by the left, receives the least coverage from the right. Similar to the topic led by the left in Chile, this topic emphasizes rights, referring to refugees, children, and mentioning the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ACNUR in Spanish), among other aspects. Topic 3, led by the center but closely followed by the left, exhibits a substantial gap with minimal attention from the right. This topic incorporates references to xenophobia, racism, or discrimination, as well as a mention of Belmont, the former mayor of Lima, where left and center legislators confronted his xenophobic rhetoric. Lastly, topic 2 encompasses general references to the migration crisis, such as millions, while also touching upon international processes indicated by words like Donald Trump and the United States.

Overall, these clusters of topics support the hypothesis of differentiation, as different party families focus on distinct topics and approaches when discussing immigration. While all party families address immigration, the left highlights rights, whereas right-wing legislators emphasize the crisis and politics, particularly in Peru with a strong emphasis on the Venezuelan crisis. An important difference between these countries, which reinforces previous findings, is that the polarization regarding these topics appears to be more pronounced in Peru, evident from the greater disparity in topic coverage by topics between the left and right. This observation aligns with the radicalization trend depicted in Figure 5.

To gain further insight into the frameworks employed by different party families, we now present the clusters generated when examining party families separately. If the narratives parties are discussing are similar, we should see some overlap on the most representative words of the different clusters that compose each party family corpus of tweets.

Table 3 shows the clusters for Chile. As previously demonstrated, the left’s primary focus lies on rights, emphasizing migrants’ humanity (topic 1, 41%). They also address politics and acknowledge the existence of a crisis (topic 3). Their third-largest topic pertains to other instances of immigration issues, evident from references to Trump’s policies, children in cages, and conflicts such as Palestine or Israel (topic 4). The smallest topic (number 2) centers around the Venezuelan crisis, including mentions of Maduro and references to dictatorship, while also incorporating terms like humanitarianism. Conversely, right-wing legislators in Chile primarily focus on safety, regulatory policies, and maintaining order (topic 1). The second-largest topic revolves around immigrants, with the prominent use of terms like illegal and illegals. Topics 2 and 3 address the Venezuelan crisis, employing terms such as dictatorship, Maduro, and emphasizing the scale of the crisis by mentioning “millions.”

Turning our attention to Table 4, we observe a similar pattern for Peru, indicating that the left’s main topic encompasses women, Peruvians, and Venezuelans, capturing the overall immigration shock (topic 1). The second-largest topic opposes xenophobia, evident from words like discrimination, xenophobia, and mentions of Belmont, among others (topic 2). Topic 3 addresses immigrants as refugees, displaced individuals, and emphasizes human rights, specifically mentioning national organizations focused on refugee rights. Similarly to left-wing politicians in Chile, but to a lesser extent (10%), a proportion of immigration statements in Peru appear to relate to international issues and opposition to Donald Trump’s migration policies. In contrast,

right-wing legislators in Peru primarily focus on the Venezuelan crisis, positioning Venezuelans as fellow victims of Maduro’s regime failure (topic 1). The second-largest topic includes references to xenophobia, with immigrants being referred to as people (topic 3), which is also reflected in topic 4 with mentions of solidarity, rights, children, and women.

When examining the subset of immigration discussions specifically related to Venezuela in both countries, we observe clear differentiation between the left and the right (refer to Tables [A.12](#), [A.15](#), and [A.16](#)). In Chile, the left’s topic includes terms such as crisis or humanitarianism (topic 1), while the right’s topic incorporates opposition leaders like Guaido and requests for asylum (topic 2) as shown in [Table A.12](#). In Peru, this differentiation is even more pronounced, with the right clearly distinguishing itself in topic 1, which focuses on Venezuelans as “brothers” escaping from Maduro’s regime. On the other hand, the Peruvian left speaks out against xenophobia (topic 4). When looking at these cluster stratified by party family we see Chilean’s right covering immigration while also making stance about Venezuela denoted by words such as communism, and political prisoners (topic 4, in [Table A.15](#)).

Similarly, when examining the employment subset, we observe references to rights, people, and women, as well as mentions of order, safety, regulation, and the inclusion of citizens from the host country (refer to Tables [A.14](#), [A.19](#), [A.20](#)).

Finally, when examining the clusters within the intersection of crime and immigration, clear and differentiated topics emerge. In both countries, the left is associated with terms such as xenophobia, racism, hate, human rights, opposing the criminalization of immigrants, and recognizing migrants as individuals, indicating a controversial stance regarding the portrayal of immigrants as criminals (refer to Topic 1 and 4 in Chile, and Topic 2 in Peru in [Table A.13](#)). Conversely, right-wing legislators in both countries emphasize illegal actions or individuals, organized crime, drug trafficking, crimes, and delinquents (topics 2 and 3 in Chile, and topic 1 in Peru). Notably, one of the greatest gaps between left and right party families is evident in the context of crime and immigration, particularly in topic 2 in Chile and topic 1 in Peru, both led by right-wing legislators. For a more detailed examination of the differences by party family within the crime framework, please refer to Tables [A.17](#) and [A.18](#).

To sum up, beyond the increase in the issue’s salience, we have demonstrated that after incorporating this new issue, politicians use ideological signals and relate the problem to different topics. We have presented evidence of this differentiation which is robust to different modeling strategies (wordchore, Bert, NMF), which demonstrates strong support for hypothesis 4 regarding parties’ strategies differentiating rather than accommodating and diffusing with each other areas. These results are novel to the study of immigration, as previous work generally focuses on the effect of radical-right parties pushing other party families to accommodate their moderate to anti-immigration positions.

<i>Chile</i>											
Left		Center		Right							
Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4				
migrante	dictadura	pacto	como	nuestro	somos	refugiados	miles	proceso	mayoria	presidente	miles
todos	colombia	migracion	millones	gobierno	nuestro	sjmchile	democratica	regular	chilenos	derechos	bachelet
este	chilenos	proyecto	israel	esta	delincuencia	chilenos	pueblo	ordenada	millones	gobierno	tema
migracion	humanitaria	crisis	años	migracion	chile	claudioarriagad	dictadura	segura	contra	esta	chile
pais	crisis	nueva	palestinos	inmigracion	niños	carolinagoic	refugiados	nuestro	esta	niños	para
como	pais	politica	trump	politica	como	están	maduro	extranjeros	venezuela	crisis	illegales
personas	maduro	gobierno	niños	pais	sobre	derechos	sobre	pais	dictadura	sobre	sobre
derechos	venezuela	sobre	para	haitianos	hijos	contra	venezuela	migracion	maduro	nueva	illegal
para	chile	migratoria	refugiados	migratoria	piñera	como	venezolanos	para	chile	politica	inmigrantes
migrantes	venezolanos	inmigracion	inmigrantes	para	inmigrantes	migrantes	chile	migrantes	venezolanos	migratoria	inmigrantes
41.00	16.62	22.44	19.94	36.53	17.33	24.00	22.13	37.32	15.19	19.24	28.25

Table 3: Topic Analysis - NMF 4 clusters regarding Immigration statements by ideological party family
Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data retrieved from Twitter.

<i>Peru</i>											
Left		Center		Right							
Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4				
peruanos	tambien	internacional	rechazo	sobre	unidos	este	tienen	hermanos	ahora	países	pero
pais	discriminacion	crisis	movion	venezolana	latinos	para	extranjero	todo	congresoperu	extranjeros	derecho
mujeres	belmont	como	niños	esta	politica	porque	casi	venezuela	aniversario	gran	miles
esta	delinquentes	pueblo	humanos	venezuela	para	machismo	desde	como	japon	xenofobia	niños
como	pais	contra	donald	pais	pais	contra	para	esta	peru	sobre	fueron
venezolanos	dice	desplazados	derechos	migrantes	miles	como	solo	maduro	peruano	migrantes	solidaridad
sobre	todos	historia	contra	para	millones	belmont	ciudades	pais	amistad	personas	mujeres
peru	venezolanos	acur	trump	peruanos	donald	esta	como	peruanos	años	migraciones	como
para	contra	para	migratoria	peru	trump	racismo	campo	peru	inmigracion	inmigrantes	mundo
migrantes	xenofobia	refugiados	politica	venezolanos	inmigrantes	xenofobia	refugiados	venezolanos	japonesa	para	refugiados
56.36	16.36	16.16	10.71	58.04	14.69	16.36	10.77	60.69	6.52	25.72	7.07

Table 4: Topic Analysis - NMF 4 clusters regarding Immigration statements by ideological party family
Source: Authors' elaboration based on Twitter data.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we have sought to understand how unexpected events like migratory shocks, which introduce completely new issues to the agenda, affect the political behavior of party leaders. Our analysis of the immigration discourse in Chile and Peru reveals several key findings.

Firstly, following such disruptive phenomena, there has been a notable increase in the salience of immigration across all political parties, indicating a growing recognition of its significance as a societal issue. Importantly, none of the parties can claim exclusive ownership of the immigration debate, as it transcends ideological lines.

Furthermore, our examination of the textual data using ideological scores and unsupervised machine learning techniques allows us to delve deeper into the common frameworks employed by the parties. Our work has demonstrated the parties maintain differentiation through their use of ideologically-infused language and different topics. In particular, left-leaning legislators place a strong emphasis on rights, humanitarianism, and opposition to xenophobia. They consistently portray immigrants as deserving of recognition and protection, rejecting the narrative of criminalization. On the other hand, right-wing parties tend to prioritize issues of safety, regulatory policies, and order. They are more likely to discuss illegal actions, organized crime, and present immigrants through a security lens. They are also more likely to emphasize Venezuelan immigrants as victims escaping a failing socialist regimen.

Notably, our analysis also highlights distinct variations between the two countries. Peru, which experienced a significant immigration shock, exhibits a higher degree of polarization on the issue compared to Chile. This is evident in the divergence of topics and the ideological signals expressed by the respective party families.

Our work contributes to a better understanding of the interplay between political ideologies and discourse framing in the context of unexpected events. Additionally, it sheds light on the phenomenon of South-South migration, as observed in several Latin American countries following the influx of over 6 million Venezuelans into the region.

There are still important avenues for further research in order to fully comprehend South-South migration crises. Firstly, our analysis is limited to parliamentary elites, but it is crucial to consider the local dimension of politics, particularly given the heterogeneous geographical distribution of the impacts of immigration. Future studies should examine political changes at the local level, particularly in the most affected areas. Secondly, it will be important to go deeper into electoral periods, including the analysis of party statements in order to understand how the salience of immigration is starting to play a role in electoral campaigns as was demonstrated by the recent election in Chile with a xenophobic candidate in the competition.

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A Online Appendix

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A.1 Policies

País	Fecha	Institución	Descripción	Fuente
Chile	02/2022	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	Conformación de una mesa de trabajo junto al gobierno de Bolivia, subvención y adopción de las medidas presentadas por ACNUR como el Plan Regional de Respuesta para Refugiados y Migrantes Venezolanos	https://www.minrel.gob.cl/noticias-antiores/situacion-migratoria-en-la-macro-zona-norte-de-chile
Chile	05/2023	Cámara de diputados y Ministerio del Interior	Disposición de las FF.AA en la frontera de la macro zona norte por 3 meses	https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1189669&idParte=10410548
Chile	07/2023	Ministerio del Interior y seguridad pública	Política nacional de migración y extranjería donde se aplican enfoques transversales para el control como la identificación biométrica, nuevos requisitos para residencia, desarrollo económico, integración, reunificación familiar, etc.	https://serviciomigraciones.cl/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/PNM-VERSION-EJECUTIVA.pdf
Ecuador	10/2022	Agencias internacionales	Documento de agencia humanitaria que explica la evolución de las políticas para migrantes basicamente en control y registro, mientras que las políticas de asistencia son mayoritariamente abarcadas por el Grupo de Trabajo para Refugiadas y Migrantes (GTRM) de la UN	https://www.undp.org/es/latin-america/publicaciones/migracion-y-politica-migratoria-en-el-ecuador-en-el-periodo-2000-20211
Ecuador	06/2022	Presidencia de Ecuador	el Estado otorgó una amnistía migratoria a todas las personas que hubieran quedado en situación irregular e inició un proceso de regularización extraordinario dirigido únicamente a la población venezolana	https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2022-09/decreto-ejecutivo_no._436_2022050316373_3_20220503163738%20%281%29.pdf

Ecuador	2018	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana	Plan Nacional de Movilidad Humana	https://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/plan_nacional_de_movilidad_humana.pdf
Perú	2017	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores	Política Nacional Migratoria 2017-2025	http://transparencia.rree.gob.pe/index.php/datos-generales-11/13-normas-emitidas-por-la-entidad/133-decretos-supremos-ds/2017-5/10116-ds-n-015/file
Perú	2019	Agencias internacionales	Estudio sobre el perfil socio económico de la población venezolana y sus comunidades de acogida: una mirada hacia la inclusión	https://www.observatoriovenezolanodemigracion.org/noticias/politica-migratoria-cambiante-del-estado-peruano-ha-dificultado-la-inclusion-de-inmigrantes-venezolanos
Perú	2018	Presidencia del Perú y Ministerio del Interior	Políticas para el control e identificación: requisitos para el PTP y calidad migratoria Especial Residente.	https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2017/11018.pdf
Perú	2017	Alcaldía de San Juan de Miraflores	Creación del albergue más grande de Lima para personas venezolanas migrantes	https://perureports.com/meet-first-venezuelan-neighborhood-lima/6000/
Perú	2020	Presidencia del Perú y Ministerio del Interior	cambio del PTP al Carné de Permiso Temporal de Permanencia (CPP) para personas con residencia irregular, en la práctica la población beneficiada fue baja.	https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/normaslegales/decreto-supremo-que-aprueba-medidas-especiales-excepcionales-decreto-supremo-n-010-2020-in-1895950-4/
Perú	2021	Presidencia del Perú y Ministerio del Interior	Facilidad para la regulación migratoria a niños, niñas y adolescentes y ampliación del carné de extranjería para incluir a personas extranjeras que cuenten con una solicitud para acceder a la calidad migratoria de residente.	https://cdn.www.gob.pe/uploads/document/file/1813182/DS%2002-2021-IN.pdf.pdf?v=1618708384

A.2 Politicians' attitudes towards Immigration in Latin America

In Latin America, there are two important sources of information on the perceptions and attitudes of political elites. PELA-USAL (Alcantara, 2022) is a survey of legislators applied since 1994.²⁵ On the other hand, there is the CHES:LA project (Martínez-Gallardo et al., 2022), which is a survey of experts on the programmatic and ideological positions of the parties. Although both projects are important, they present important limitations for the purposes of this project. The main limitation is the static nature of the surveys and important limitations in their coverage. PELA-USAL has recently included questions on legislators' position on migration issues only in Peru but not Chile²⁶.

From CHES: LA we observe that there is some correlation between the attitudes of the parties and their migration positions (see tables in appendix A.2.1). Moreover, CHES:LA survey

²⁵Including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela

²⁶We did a descriptive analysis with the data from PELA-USAL. See appendix A.2.2

relies on expert opinions of political parties rather than legislators’ views and rhetoric, which limits what we can learn from their position and dynamics regarding the impact of Venezuelan immigration. Our work contributes by providing a more dynamic coverage of the issue and analyzing direct statements from legislators.

A.2.1 CHES: LA

	L-R	Immigration	
	Ideol.	Position	Saliency
Evolución Política	7.33	6.92	3.69
Partido Comunista de Chile	1.22	1.69	4.31
Partido Demócrata Cristiano	5.00	4.58	3.31
Partido Humanista	1.65	1.22	4.73
Partido Radical Socialdemócrata	3.88	3.75	3.91
Partido Socialista de Chile	3.11	2.58	3.77
Partido por la Democracia	3.61	2.67	3.62
Renovación Nacional	7.11	7.58	4.21
Revolución Democrática	2.28	1.38	4.00
Unión Demócrata Independiente	8.94	9.00	4.21

Table A.2: Parties Chile

	L-R	Immigration	
	Ideol.	Position	Saliency
Acción Popular	6.13	6.22	3.40
Alianza para el Progreso	6.93	6.44	3.50
Avanza País	7.50	6.40	4.50
Frente Amplio	2.00	4.60	4.27
Frente Popular Agrícola del Perú	4.79	5.75	2.80
Fuerza Popular	7.80	7.70	5.00
Juntos por el Perú	2.50	4.17	4.50
Partido Aprista Peruano	7.27	7.00	5.00
Partido Democrático Somos Perú	7.00	6.14	4.00
Partido Morado	6.07	4.30	4.00
Partido Popular Cristiano	7.93	6.11	4.45
Perú Libre	0.67	8.83	6.50
Podemos Perú	6.47	7.00	5.18
Renovación Popular	9.83	9.33	7.17
Unión por el Perú	2.42	6.90	5.20

Table A.3: Parties Peru

Note: The ideological position goes from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Position on immigration is a 10 point scale going from 1 (welcoming) to 10 (restrictive). Immigration saliency is also a 10 point scale going from 1 (low) to 10 (high). Source: Author’s own elaboration based on CHES:LA

Table A.4 provides a summary of the attitudes of seven Peruvian political parties towards immigration-related issues.²⁷ While most parties agree on accepting immigrants from war-torn countries and granting them equal rights, there is divergence when considering social costs. Parties such as FA and FP demonstrate reluctance towards pro-immigration attitudes, as indicated by their higher means in prioritizing employment for natives over immigrants and concerns about immigrants taking advantage of social services. In contrast, NP stands out as the most supportive party, even when social costs are considered. It is important to note that FA represents the extreme left while FP represents the extreme right of the political spectrum in Peru (Table A.5)

A.2.2 PELA-USAL

PELA-USAL survey provides detailed information on legislators’ attitudes toward a range of issues. This survey asked questions about immigration to members of Congress in only one of the two cases examined: Peru, and only for the most recent wave. We analyzed this wave to gain insight into legislators’ attitudes more directly. The questions cover four areas: acceptance of immigrants from war-torn countries, granting the same rights to immigrants, prioritizing employment for native-born individuals over immigrants, and the perceived impact of immigrants

²⁷For additional details, refer to Table A.2.3 in the Appendix, which contains other measures of tendencies and ranges per question.

on social services. The responses were given on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the most favorable view on each item. We utilized the responses to these questions to develop an index to measure the parliamentary elites' stance on immigration

Table A.4: Summary statistics.

	Accept immigrants countries at war		Immigrants and natives same rights		Natives have preferences over employment		Immigrants take advantage social security		Immigration Favorability Index	N
	Mean	Sd	Mean	Sd	Mean	Sd	Mean	Sd		
APRA	5.0	0.00	5.0	0.00	2.3	2.31	2.3	2.31	3.67	3
AP	4.0	0.00	4.3	0.58	2.7	2.08	2.0	1.00	3.67	3
FA	4.3	1.21	4.2	1.17	4.2	0.98	3.0	1.79	2.42	6
PPK	4.0	1.34	3.9	1.30	2.7	1.27	2.3	1.68	3.50	11
APP	4.8	0.41	5.0	0.00	2.8	1.83	2.5	1.76	3.33	6
NP	3.5	1.52	4.2	1.60	2.3	1.03	1.8	0.98	3.92	6
FP	4.1	0.93	4.2	0.95	3.3	1.60	3.0	1.48	2.91	36

1-5, 5 - strongly agree

1-5, 5 pro-immigration

APRA = Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana; AP = Acción Popular; FA = Frente Amplio; PPK = Peruanos Por el Kambio; APP = Alianza Para el Progreso; NP = Nuevo Perú; FP= Fuerza Popular
Source: Author's own elaboration based on PELA-USAL survey (2017).

Table A.4 provides a summary of the attitudes of seven Peruvian political parties towards immigration-related issues.²⁸ While most parties agree on accepting immigrants from war-torn countries and granting them equal rights, there is divergence when considering social costs. Parties such as FA and FP demonstrate reluctance towards pro-immigration attitudes, as indicated by their higher means in prioritizing employment for natives over immigrants and concerns about immigrants taking advantage of social services. In contrast, NP stands out as the most supportive party, even when social costs are considered. It is important to note that FA represents the extreme left while FP represents the extreme right of the political spectrum in Peru (Table A.5).

Following a principal exploratory components analysis, we categorized the questions into two factors based on the perceived cost of immigration. The first factor encompasses questions related to the basic rights of immigrants, while the second factor covers questions related to the social costs of immigration, such as employment and social services.²⁹

The figure below shows the correlation matrix for the four questions.

The table below A.2.2 shows the average of the indexes by party. The first index, Index 1, consists of four questions that pertain to immigration. Index 2 consists of two questions specifically related to the basic rights of immigrants (IMM1, IMM2). Index 3 (IMM3, IMM4), in turn, encompasses two questions that address the potential social costs associated with immigration. An analysis of the standard deviations of the three indexes was performed, with the results revealing that Index 3 had the largest standard deviation (0.51) among the four

²⁸For additional details, refer to Table A.2.3 in the Appendix, which contains other measures of tendencies and ranges per question.

²⁹After comparing different ways to combine these variables, we evaluated the effectiveness of our index by analyzing the standard deviations, and we selected the one with the largest standard deviation (Index 3, 0.51). The selection was based on which index had the higher discriminatory power in determining differences in party attitudes. A detailed description of the index construction can be found in the Appendix A.2.2




Figure A.1: Correlation matrix

indexes. This indicates that Index 3 has a higher discriminatory power in determining differences in party attitudes, as it is able to differentiate better among them.

Party	Index1	Index2	Index3
APRA	4.33	5.00	3.67
ACCION POPULAR	3.92	4.17	3.67
EL FRENTE AMPLIO POR JUSTICIA, VIDA Y LIBERTAD	3.33	4.25	2.42
PERUANOS POR EL KAMBIO	3.73	3.95	3.50
ALIANZA PARA EL PROGRESO DEL PERU	4.12	4.92	3.33
NUEVO PERU	3.88	3.83	3.92
FUERZA POPULAR	3.53	4.18	2.91

A.2.3 Descriptive Data

	PELA-USAL (2021)			CHES (2020)				
	Ideology	Immigration	Regulated Economy	Ideology	Immigration	Immigration Saliency	Galtan	Economic liberalism
APRA	4.33	3.67	5.33	7.47	7.00	5.00	7.47	7.27
AP	5.33	3.67	6.67	5.60	6.22	3.40	6.73	6.13
FA	1.67	2.42	4.50	1.93	4.60	4.27	3.40	2.00
PPK	5.82	3.50	7.91	5.62	5.50	5.00	4.25	5.54
APP	5.00	3.33	6.50	7.14	6.44	3.50	7.47	6.93
NP	2.33	3.92	3.83					
FP	6.14	2.01	7.24	8.53	7.70	5.00	9.00	7.80
	1-10, 10 extreme right	1-5, 5 favorability	1-10, 10 pro-market	1-10, 10 extreme right	1-10, 10 favors restrictive policy	1-10, 10 great importance	0-10, 10 traditional	1-10, 10 extreme right

Table A.5: Party family data

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on PELA, and CHES databases.

A.2.4 Related topics

	Chile				Peru			
	Immigration	Venezuela	Crime	Employment	Immigration	Venezuela	Crime	Employment
Left	0.35	1.20	3.26	6.80	0.17	0.56	5.18	8.85
Center	0.36	1.04	2.39	7.88	0.15	0.76	3.31	6.23
Right	0.30	1.17	3.31	9.18	0.12	1.34	3.63	6.49
Total	0.33	1.17	3.15	7.85	0.14	0.93	3.83	6.89
	Within Immigration Tweets				Within Immigration Tweets			
Left		14.3	5.6	10.0		25.6	10.2	12.2
Center		14.1	4.2	10.7		30.2	7.0	9.1
Right		17.1	5.4	10.4		53.7	7.0	10.4
Total		15.2	5.3	10.2		36.0	7.8	10.3

Table A.6: Summary Descriptives

Note: The numbers refer to percentages. Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data retrieved from Twitter

A.3 Dictionaries

This section presents the construction of dictionaries to identify the immigration issue. We begin with a minimum dictionary (refer to Table [Table A.7](#)), followed by the incorporation of combinations of two words, as indicated in Table [Table A.8](#). Finally, we include combinations of three words (see Table [Table A.9](#)).

Word 1

migrantes
 inmigrantes
 inmigrante
 xenofobia
 refugiados
 migratoria
 inmigracion
 migrante

Table A.7: Minimum initial dictionary

Table A.8: Dictionary with combination of two words

Word 1	Word 2
#yosoyvenezolano	años
antecedentes	extranjeros
antimigratoria	derechos
antimigratoria	presidente
años	inmigracion
años	japonesa
campo	extranjero
cancilleriaperu	migratoria
cancilleriaperu	venezolanos
chile	venezolanos
ciudadanos	extranjeros
ciudades	extranjero
conmemoracion	japonesa
crisis	huyen
crisis	migratoria
derechos	migrantes
emigrar	millones
escapan	miles
exodo	maduro
extranjero	migracion
extranjero	migratorias
extranjero	venezolanos
extranjeros	migraciones
extranjeros	socialismo
extranjeros	venezolanos
extranjeros	xenofobia
familias	inmigrantes
familias	migrantes

familias	migratoria
familias	venezolanos
frontera	migracionespe
frontera	migratoria
frontera	venezolanos
hermanos	huyen
huyen	maduro
huyen	venezolano
huyen	venezolanos
inmigracion	japonesa
inmigracion	migracion
inmigrantes	pais
inmigrantes	paises
internacional	migrante
internacional	refugiados
japonesa	marco
japonesa	migracion
migracion	solo
migracion	todas
migracion	venezolana
migracion	venezolanos
migraciones	personas
migraciones	situacion
migraciones	trabajo
migraciones	venezolanos
migrantes	niños
migrantes	pais
migrantes	personas
migrantes	situacion
migrantes	trump
migrantes	venezolano
migrantes	venezolanos
migrantes	venezuela
migratoria	niños
migratoria	paises
migratoria	personas
migratoria	politica
migratoria	trump
migratorias	puede
migratorias	solo
migratorias	todas
miles	refugiados

niños	trump
pais	xenofobia
paises	refugiados
personas	refugiados
peruanos	venezolana
peruanos	venezolanos
peruanos	xenofobia
argentinos	venezolana
argentinos	venezolanos
argentinos	xenofobia
chilenos	venezolana
chilenos	venezolanos
chilenos	xenofobia
ecuatorianos	venezolana
ecuatorianos	venezolanos
ecuatorianos	xenofobia
colombianos	venezolana
colombianos	venezolanos
colombianos	xenofobia
problemas	venezolana
puede	venezolanos
trabajo	venezolanos
venezolana	venezolanos

Table A.9: Dictionary with combination of three words

Word 1	Word 2	Word 3
frontera	peru	venez
peruanos	salud	venezolanos
perú	educaci	venez
frontera	cerr	venez
permiso	renovable	trabajo
peru	venezolanos	lleg
delinc	frontera	venez
trabaj	peruan	venez
venezol	recibir	peru
venezol	ingres	frontera
venezol	salud	frontera
venezol	golp	miraflores
venezol	norte	frontera
venezol	peruan	dialogo

venezol	peruan	explot
venezol	peru	labor
venezol	fronter	ecuado
peru	colombianos	expuls
frontera	colombianos	ingres
frontera	miner	ilegal
extra	mineros	ecuador
refugio	venezo	frontera
peru	venezolanos	proteger
peru	venezolanos	porcentaje
peru	venezolanos	hermandad
peru	venezolanos	turista
peru	venezolanos	calidad
gracias	venezolanos	apoyar
miles	venezolanos	apoyar
argentina	venezolanos	peruanos
afect	venezol	peruano
crimin	venezol	fronte
trabaj	venezol	solid
preocupan	venezol	peruanos
trabajo	venezol	visas
nacionalizar	venezol	peru
brazos	venezol	peru
llegad	venezol	peru
bienvenid	drama	venezolanos
trabaja	reconstru	venezolanos
venezol	chile	protest
venezol	chile	captur
venezol	chile	acogi
venezol	chile	llegan
venezol	chile	joven
venezol	peru	comunidad
venezol	exilio	ppkamigo
venezol	apoyemos	peru

A.4 Geographical Variation


As someone could argue that the differences may only be given by certain regions, we implemented a stratified analysis to understand whether we can identify any variations by region. Immigration may concern people more when they directly interact with immigrants. The majority of immigrants choose to live in capital cities, but they also spend some time in border cities. Due to these concerns, politicians representing these regions may address the issue more

frequently than their counterparts.

However, in [Figure A.2](#), we do not see significant differences between legislators representing the capital city and those representing other parts of the country, regardless of whether they represent border cities or not.

The most notable difference appears to relate to the last year in our sample when we observe an increase in the salience of this issue among politicians representing border cities in both Chile and Peru.

Figure A.2: Immigration Saliency per year in Chile and Peru for Different Regions



References: Orange (Capital city), Blue (cities in the border) and Red (Other regions). Note: the DV is the saliency of immigration operationalized as the ratio of statements about immigration to the total number of public statements made. To compute these means, a control using the length of the tweet was used. Robust standard errors were computed, Left, Center and Right are defined as discussed in [subsection 4.2](#). Source:

Authors' own elaboration based on data retrieved from Twitter

A.5 Dynamics of Immigration Saliency Across Parties

Thus far, our analysis has revealed that all party families have exhibited similar trends in their response to the topic. However, it remains unclear whether this response is solely attributable to the phenomenon itself or if there is an interplay between party families. [Gessler and Hunger \(2022\)](#), in their analysis of European countries, find that parties on the left and center tend to release more statements when extreme right-wing parties focus on the immigration issue. We adopt their approach to examine whether the number of tweets from parties on the left and center positively correlates with increased saliency within right-wing parties.³⁰

Our analysis involves constructing a monthly panel dataset, with each party as the unit of observation. The dependent variable in this analysis is the number of tweets by the center

³⁰Similar to [Gessler and Hunger \(2022\)](#), we employ the Arellano-Bond model, which assumes a serial autocorrelation structure and includes lagged dependent variables.

	Peru All	Peru 2017-21	Peru 2013-16	Chile All	Chile 2017-21	Chile 2013-16
Tweets on Immigration (lag 1)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.09* (0.06)	0.38*** (0.04)	0.27 (0.19)	0.36*** (0.05)
Tweets on Immigration (lag 2)	0.08* (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.09** (0.03)	0.09* (0.05)	0.05 (0.03)
Saliency Immigration Left × Right	6.33* (3.26)	6.21 (4.94)	5.38* (3.21)	4.30*** (1.41)	3.85** (1.83)	4.43*** (1.40)
Saliency Immigration Left (lag) × Right	-1.00 (0.95)	-1.64 (1.34)	-1.31 (0.87)	-1.67*** (0.46)	1.69 (2.13)	-1.59*** (0.46)
Saliency Immigration Left × Center	9.40** (4.12)	12.50* (6.63)	9.47** (4.04)	11.46*** (4.46)	33.23*** (1.51)	10.08*** (0.43)
Saliency Immigration Left (lag) × Center	-2.45*** (0.93)	2.07* (1.20)	-1.78*** (0.61)	-4.16*** (0.50)	-8.57* (5.10)	-3.42*** (0.47)
Tweets	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Trend	0.02* (0.01)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.01)
Constant	-0.97*** (0.24)	-0.54** (0.21)	-1.91*** (0.64)	-1.14 (0.85)	-1.21** (0.57)	0.74 (2.15)
Observations	1,036	410	626	985	405	580
Number of Party	11	10	11	10	9	10

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.10: Regression results for left and center parties' tweets about immigration

and the left (or, alternatively, the right and the center), while the independent variables consist of the saliency of the immigration topic (measured as the percentage of immigration-related tweets among all tweets) within the right-wing parties (or alternatively, the left-wing parties). We interact this measure of saliency with a dummy variable indicating whether the legislator is a member of a party on the left or the center (or alternatively, the center and the right). Additionally, we control for the total number of tweets and public opinion, which we proxy using the Google Trends Index for each country with the keyword 'Venezuelans.'

Table A.10 reveals that in both countries, center parties exhibit a positive correlation in the number of tweets they post related to immigration within right-wing parties. This holds across all years, including pre-shock (2013-16) and post-shock (2017-2021) periods. However, this correlation weakens or becomes non-significant when considering tweets by left-wing legislators.

Similarly, Table A.11 demonstrates that in both countries, center parties display a positive contemporaneous correlation in the number of tweets they post concerning the saliency of immigration within left-wing legislators. This correlation remains consistent across all years, pre-shock years (2013-16), and post-shock years (2017-2021). As with the previous table, this positive correlation is weaker or even non-significant in the case of Peru when examining the number of tweets by right-wing legislators.

In summary, this section shows that party families in both countries do not independently address the immigration issue, and there is a correlation between them.

	Peru All	Peru 2017-21	Peru 2013-16	Chile All	Chile 2017-21	Chile 2013-16
Tweets on Immigration (lag 1)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.27*** (0.08)	0.11** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.05)	0.29 (0.22)	0.31*** (0.05)
Tweets on Immigration (lag 2)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.11)	0.01 (0.06)
Saliency Immigration Left \times Right	7.56 (4.70)	8.56 (5.81)	6.74 (4.45)	11.60*** (3.57)	12.41*** (3.52)	11.90*** (3.44)
Saliency Immigration Left (lag) \times Right	-1.00* (0.58)	-0.76 (0.85)	-1.26*** (0.46)	-3.64** (1.54)	-3.98 (3.18)	-2.48* (1.43)
Saliency Immigration Left \times Center	7.23** (3.45)	7.70* (4.32)	7.31** (3.40)	18.11*** (0.60)	37.41*** (3.67)	17.91*** (0.31)
Saliency Immigration Left (lag) \times Center	-2.45** (1.06)	1.05 (0.68)	-2.20** (0.99)	-7.01*** (0.94)	-14.45** (6.68)	-4.75*** (0.83)
Tweets	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Trend	0.02* (0.01)	0.23** (0.10)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04* (0.03)	0.23** (0.12)	0.03 (0.02)
Constant	-1.24*** (0.37)	-0.84*** (0.31)	-2.02*** (0.69)	-2.41 (1.50)	-1.56** (0.71)	-0.80 (5.28)
Observations	929	389	540	525	225	300
Number of Party	9	9	9	5	5	5

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.11: Regression results for right and center parties' tweets about immigration

A.6 NMF

	<i>Chile</i>				<i>Peru</i>			
	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4
	frontera	guaido	exodo	rector	hermanos	articulo	venezuela	ministro
	visa	tienen	regimen	primer	huyen	solidaridad	argentina	venezolano
	migratoria	ingreso	chilenos	muchos	esta	este	peru	extranjeros
	esta	migrantes	chileno	chilenos	migrantes	oportunidades	muchos	olivios
	migrantes	venezuela	nicolas	bello	maduro	para	libertad	trabajo
	venezolanos	diputado	gobierno	inmigrantes	para	inmigracion	millones	delincuentes
	humanitaria	asilo	venezolanos	venezolano	venezuela	peru	somos	como
	crisis	pide	dictadura	como	venezolanos	sobre	chile	venezolanos
	venezuela	venezolanos	contra	nuestro	peru	migracion	venezolanos	xenofobia
	para	chile	maduro	pais	pais	venezolana	peruanos	contra
%	38.4	20.9	24.0	16.7	43.0	13.2	19.7	23.9
Left (%)	42.6	20.3	21.2	15.9	35.1	14.9	21.6	28.4
Center (%)	35.1	18.0	27.9	18.9	34.7	16.7	20.7	27.9
Right (%)	33.3	23.2	25.7	17.7	53.1	9.9	18.5	18.5
Distance L-R	9.3	-2.9	-4.6	-1.8	-18.0	5.0	3.1	9.8

Table A.12: Topic Analysis - NMF 4 clusters regarding Immigration & Venezuela statements

	<i>Chile</i>				<i>Peru</i>			
	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4
	contra	aprobo	exponen	para	urresti	personas	dice	seguridad
	estado	casa	inmigracion	extranjeros	bien	frente	decir	horas
	odio	ingreso	delitos	comision	danielurrestil	sobre	todos	peruanos
	este	orden	tiene	tienen	trabajo	entre	hace	delincuentes
	como	crimen	solo	criminalizar	maduro	ddhh	este	ciudadanos
	racismo	organizado	delincuentes	chilenos	peru	internacional	delincuencia	acciones
	xenofobia	ilegal	pero	gobierno	olivos	contra	contra	extranjeros
	chile	inmigracion	quienes	contra	como	mujeres	discriminacion	nuestro
	para	narcotrafico	delincuencia	migracion	delincuentes	migrantes	delincuente	para
	violencia	migraciones	inmigrantes	migrantes	venezolanos	violencia	xenofobia	pais
%	42.3	9.3	22.9	25.4	38.7	23.8	16.1	21.4
Left (%)	51.6	3.8	18.5	26.1	17.5	42.9	15.9	23.8
Center (%)	37.1	2.9	34.3	25.7	45.2	8.1	27.4	19.4
Right (%)	27.6	21.8	26.4	24.1	60.5	18.6	0.0	20.9
Distance L-R	24.0	-18.0	-8.0	2.0	-43.0	24.3	15.9	2.9

Table A.13: Topic Analysis - NMF 4 clusters regarding Immigration & Crimen statements

<i>Chile</i>				<i>Peru</i>			
Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4
derechos	control	chilenos	hace	hace	laborales	casualidad	tienen
personas	proceso	segura	pero	urresti	xenofobia	buen	están
gran	extranjeros	ordenada	todos	danielurresti1	peru	vida	ciudadanos
como	haitiano	proyecto	esta	gobierno	sino	tiene	migraciones
mujeres	diputado	migraciones	venezuela	pais	migrante	millones	ministra
trabajadores	haitianos	trabajo	pais	olivos	peruano	gran	ahora
sobre	laborales	turismo	inmigracion	delincuentes	solo	porque	jovenes
este	trabajar	migracion	ejemplo	como	nuestros	todo	venezolanos
trabajo	inmigrantes	migratoria	venezolanos	trabajadores	migrantes	venezuela	peruanos
migrantes	para	laboral	chile	venezolanos	para	peru	trabajo
%	29.5	24.4	23.8	22.4	40.7	13.4	25.4
Left (%)	31.8	24.2	19.9	24.2	60.0	4.6	20.0
Center (%)	30.6	28.2	22.4	18.8	39.2	11.4	21.5
Right (%)	25.7	22.2	30.4	21.6	21.5	24.6	35.4
Distance L-R	6.0	1.9	-10.5	2.5	38.5	-20.0	-15.4

Table A.14: Topic Analysis - NMF 4 clusters regarding Immigration & Employment statements

<i>Chile</i>				
Center		Right		
Left	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4
como	salud	estamos	aprobacion	Topic 1
pais	cultura	sobre	arley	Topic 2
venezuela	ambiente	gente	ipilowsky	Topic 3
inmigracion	noscausamosnosumimos	turismo	feliz	Topic 4
ejemplo	pensionados	laboral	hace	Topic 1
inmigrantes	pueblos	proyecto	bien	Topic 2
trabajar	originarios	senador	chilena	Topic 3
venezolanos	educacion	insulza	ejemplo	Topic 4
chile	vivienda	trabajo	nacionalidad	Topic 1
para	mujeres	migrantes	inmigracion	Topic 2
42.37	6.36	28.81	22.46	73.10
				8.19
				15.79

Table A.19: Topic Analysis - NMF 4 clusters regarding Immigration & Employment statements by ideological party family

<i>Peru</i>				
Center		Right		
Left	Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4
hermanos	esto	condiciones	huyeron	Topic 1
restringir	para	mercado	familiares	Topic 2
tienen	trabajar	laborales	quita	Topic 3
pais	personas	laboral	ellos	Topic 4
gobierno	mujeres	donde	peruanos	Topic 1
estan	contra	esta	miles	Topic 2
jovenes	sobre	explotacion	venezolano	Topic 3
trabajo	migrantes	sino	tienen	Topic 4
trabajadores	peru	peruano	cuantos	Topic 1
venezolanos	derechos	problema	dicen	Topic 2
35.38	27.69	10.77	26.15	64.62
				9.23
				20.00

Table A.20: Topic Analysis - NMF 4 clusters regarding Immigration & Employment statements by ideological party family